that formal diftinction which is between things and that certain Habitude of Agreement under which they are confider'd, there is no poffibility of conceiving one if the other fhould be removed, fo much as in Thought. For fo tho' I can conceive Figure in general, according to the abftract Reafon of it, without thinking upon this or that in Particular, yet if there fhould be fuppofed to be no Circles, no Triangles, no Squares, &c. 'tis impoffible I should have any idea of Figure remaining after all these are taken away. And indeed this is no more than what follows from the general Nature of Abstraction, and therefore must be true in all the forts of it. For an abstract Idea is fuppofed to be really the fame with that from which it is abstracted, and to owe its diftintion only to the operation of the Mind, that confiders it without confidering the other. And that indeed it may do. But if that other fhould be fuppofed not to be, the very Foundation of all Abstraction would be taken away, and fo I fhould have nothing to abstract from, and fo could have no abstract Idea.'

23. From thefe Principles then I gather this Rule, That whenfoever I find it in my power not only Negatively but Pofitively to Abstract, when I can fo far divide and feparate one thing from another in my Thoughts, as to be able not only to conceive one of them without conceiving the other, but to have a clear and diftinct Conception of one as exifting, tho? the

other

other were removed out of being, or were fuppofed never to have been, I may then conclude this to be a fure fign that there is no Modal nor any other fort of Abstraction in the Cafe, but that the Ideas are abfolute and complete, fuch as have no dependance upon, or communication with one another; and confequently that the things whofe Ideas they are, are of a kind and order wholly diftinct. There being no further condition wanting to confirm the confequence from the diftinction of Ideas to the diftinction of Things, than the compleatnefs and Intireness of those Ideas; which whoever denies to be a fufficient Mark or Argument of real diftinction, makes it utterly impoffible for us to know any thing, and very impertinent to argue or difcourfe about any thing.

24. To apply this Rule then to the Cafe which is now under Confideration; It seems in the first place very clear that I cannot only abftract a Thinking Being from an Extended Being, or Matter, but that I can conceive a Thinking Being to be, even tho' I fhould fuppofe Matter not to be, and that becaufe I can fo conceive it while I doubt whether Matter be or no. I can upon Metaphyfical Principles doubt, till by a further purfuance of thofe Principles there appears Reason to be otherwife fatisfy'd, whether there be any fuch thing as Matter or Body in the World. Not only for the Reasons affigned by Des Cartes taken from the Errors of the Senfes, and the Imagination which we have of many non-exifting things in our sleep, but

alfo

alfo partly because Bodies are not the Causes. of those Senfations which we have upon their occafion, and partly becaufe we do not fee them (as will be fhewn in the fequel) either by themselves or by Ideas that proceed from them. And therefore our feeing them or having Ideas of them, is no Argument that they really are. Therefore I can doubt, and that very juftly and reasonably, whether they are or no. But I cannot doubt of my Thinking, nor yet of my Being while I think, as Des Cartes rightly remarks. But then if I can neither doubt of my Thinking nor of my Being while I think, 'tis plain I can conceive a Thinking Being to be, and that while I doubt whether there be any fuch thing as Matter or no. And if I can conceive, nay, am fure that I do conceive a Thinking Being to be while I doubt whether Matter be or no; then 'tis plain that I might conceive the fame Thinking Being tho' I fhould fuppose Matter not to be, fince that which I am certain of can no ways depend upon that which I am in doubt of, fince if it did, it would be as doubtful as the other. But now this is more than can be faid of figured Substance and movable Substance, for tho' I can conceive one of these without conceiving the other (or elfe they would not be fo much as formally diftinct) yet I cannot conceive figured Substance at the fame time fuppofing moveable Substance not to be, no, nor even if I fhould doubt whether it be or no. And therefore from my being able to conceive a Thinking Being to be, tho' I should fup

Part II. fuppofe Extended Being not to be, I conclude that the Ideas of thefe things are diftinct not by modal Abstraction, as figured Subftance and moveable Substance, but really and intirely diftinct from one another, and independant one upon another, and that because things whenever they are must be according to their Ideas.

25. But to carry this Matter a little further; I think, and when I think I think of certain Truths, and when I think of thefe Truths I find I understand them; whence I gather notwithstanding my Ignorance of fome Truths, that all Truth is intelligible. And fome Truths I find I always understand in the fame way and manner, as not being able to conceive them any otherwife. And thefe I perceive to be neceffary, eternal and immutable Truths, whence I gather that fuch Truths indeed there are, and that they are always intelligible, as being always Truths, and intelligible only after one determinate manner, which fuppofes their being fimply fo. As Intelligibility then is a Property or Affection of Truth, fo conftant and perpetual Intelligibility, is a Property of neceffary and external Truths. They are always and for ever intelligible. And this is as neceffary a Truth as any of the reft. But now this cannot be without fuppofing a Thinking Being to which the Intelligibility of an Object carries a neceffary Relation. Therefore a Thinking Being is full as neceffary as any neceffary

Truth

Truth is. But now all Matter is contingent, and it being utterly impoffible that what is neceffary fhould depend upon what is contingent, it feems fufficiently plain that we may conceive a Thinking Being, tho' all Matter fhould be fuppofed not to be, which again proves the fame Conclufion.

26. Besides, the Ideas are independant upon one another as well as the Things, and I can have the Idea of a Thinking Being without the Idea of Matter. The Idea of Matter, tho' of a great Comprehenfion, fo as to be the Object and Foundation of a whole Science (that which is called, tho' I think not very properly, by the Name of Geometry) is yet however not neceffary to Thought. For when I think I find (what every one may that will at all reflect) that there are abundance of things which I conceive after a manner fo pure and fo wholly Intellectual as not to have any corporeal Phantafms, Images, or Reprefentations of them; and as I then have them not, fo I want them not, being able to think of those things as clearly, to understand them as perfectly, and to demonstrate the Affections that belong to them with as much evidence and certainty as I can in the other Objects that are reprefented to me under thofe corporeal appearances. I find then that the Idea of Matter, tho' a very large and filling, is not the only Object of my Thought, but that I conceive Things by way of pure Intellect as well as by Imagination, and

A

that