may be ftill faid of them, that, according to this Senfe, we ordinarily have them from our Senfes. 2dly. That there is nothing Inftructive in it. It gives no Light into the main Queftion that concerns the Theory of Humane Understanding, fince, tho' our Senfes fhould be allow'd to be the occafions of our Ideas, it ftill remains to be inquired what those Ideas are. And as I fhould think my felf little the wifer as to the manner how I understand till this Queftion be refolved; fo I fee not how the being told that my Ideas come from my Senfes, will help me to refolve it, nor confequently to what great purpose it should ferve. I would not be thought to flight or undervalue the performance of this ingenious Author, which I allow to be very valuable and confiderable in many respects, and that he has deferved well of the Publick for those many ufeful Truths which he has clear'd, and thofe many great Discoveries which he has made in the Intellectual way. But as to the Account which he has given us of Ideas (which ought to have been the great Subject of his undertaking, in an Effay of Humane Understanding) that, I think, is as Lame and Defective as any thing can well be, fince; in that Senfe, where in it would have been to the purpose, it ap pears not to be true, and in that fenfe wherein it is true, it is not much to the purpose. If this Cenfure be thought too fevere, I should be glad to be fhewn how to mollifie it. In the

mean

mean time, as to the prefent Account, that which is the great omiffion in Mr. Lock's is fufficiently supplied here, by that fpecial Enquiry which we have made into the Nature of those Ideas whereby we understand. So that if our Account be true, it cannot be denied but that it is very much to the purpose. And to convince that it is true, I have offered as much as I think convenient at this time in the way of Reafon, only there are some few things which I have to offer in the way of Authority; for the confideration of which this last enfuing Chapter is purposely. defigned.

CHA P.

Wherein is confider'd bow far the Grounds of this Hypothefis are laid by the Schools, and the Hypothefis itfelf confirm'd by the Authority of St. Au ftin: With fome concluding Reflections upon the whole, relating to Morality and Religion.

I.

L

They

Abour at once recommends and juftifies the indulging ones self someEase andRefreshment, and therefore after all this toil and travel of Thought, let us now a little repofe our felves upon the Bed of Authority.I cannot fay,that we have that of the Schools on our fide as to this latter Part of our Theory, which concerns the manner of Humane Understanding. give a very different Account of it as we have already fhewn, and fuch, as like the reft of their Philofophy, feems to proceed upon fenfible Prejudices. great Prejudice feems to be this, We have our Ideas upon the presence of fenfible Objects, therefore our Ideas are from thofe Objects. In like manner, as is generally argued in the other Cafe, we have our Senfations upon the impreffions of Bodies; therefore Bodies are the effiL14 cient

*See the 7 Chap. of this 2d Part. at the 13 Paragraph.

And the

cient Causes of thofe Senfations. And indeed one Confequence is as good as the other, tho', if my Logick be right, neither of them are extraordinary. If they are, reddat mihi minam Diogenes.

2. It is true indeed, that the Schools make one very promising advance towards us when they talk of the Souls understanding things in the eternal Reasons, which eternal Reafons are with them the fame as Ideas, according to the promifcuous use of thofe Terms in St. Auftin. But then they fall off again from us by diftinguishing of a twofold manner whereby one thing may be faid to be known or understood in another. Either as in the Object that is known, as when one fees in a Glafs the Images that refult from it; and in this Senfe, according to them, the Soul does not at prefent fee things in their eternal Reafons, tho' at the fame time they allow that the Blessed do fo, whom they fuppofe to fee God, and in him all things. Or elfe, as in the Principle of Knowledge, as when we fay thofe things are feen in the Sun, which are feen by the Sun. And in this Senfe they allow that the Soul knows things in the eternal Reason, by the participation of which we know all things; and that for this Reason, because that intellectualLight which is in us is nothing elfe but a certain participated Similitudę of the increated Light, wherein the eternal Reasons are contain'd. So that in fhort, according to the Doctrine of the Schools, we do

not

not at present fee things in their eternal Reafons Objectively, as if thofe eternal Reasons were the immediate Objects of our Underftanding, but only Cafually, as Aquinas is pleased to diftinguish.

Part 1. Quæf.84. Art. 5

3. Well, but however in the firft place they exprefly own that there are fuch eternal Reasons or Ideas of things, tho' they will not allow them to be the immediate Objects of our Understanding. The Schools are for an intelligible World as well as we, and their intelligible World happens to be the very fame with ours. As they are for a World of Ideas, fo they place these Ideas in God: And they own not only the Truth, but the Neceffity of this Suppofition. This Aquinas repeats no less than four times in the very fame Article. Cum omnia fint à Deo, non à Cafu Facta, Ne'ceffarium eft in ejus mente omnium Ideas "præexiftere Objective, ad quarum Similitudi'nem omnia Condita funt. Again, Again, Neceffe 'eft ponere in Mente Divina Ideas. Again, Neceffe eft ponere Ideas. And again, Quia 'Mundus non eft Cafu factus, fed à Deo per "Intellectum agente; Neceffe eft quod in Men

Part 1. Quæf.15. Art 1.

te Divina fit forma ad Similitudinem cujus 'Mundus eft factus, & in hoc confiftit ratio 'Idex.' And as they affirm the Ideas of all things to be in God, fo they confequently fuppofe God to make all things, and to know all