INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. MARTIN A. KNAPP, OF NEW YORK, Chairman. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia. CHARLES A. PROUTY, OF VERMONT. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, OF MISSOURI. FRANKLIN K. LANE, OF CALIFORNIA. EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa. JAMES S. HARLAN, OF ILLINOIS. EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary. XXVII INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS. No. 732. CATTLE RAISERS' ASSOCIATION OF TEXAS v. MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY ET AL. Submitted November 9, 1906. Decided November 14, 1906. This case was decided in favor of complainant August 16, 1905. Subsequently complainant's motion for additional and more specific findings was granted, and the case again taken under advisement. The act to regulate commerce was amended June 29, 1906, and thereafter complainant filed its petition praying in substance that the Commission proceed in the case with a view to making an order therein under the new fifteenth section in said act. The new section 15 confers upon the Commission power to enforce what has always been required in the statute, namely, just and reasonable rates, by the application of a new remedy, and, as applied to cases like this, in that way alone has the jurisdiction of the Commission been enlarged. The new section provides as conditions that there shall be formal complaint and full hearing. Both of those prerequisites have been practically complied with in this proceeding, but both complainant and defendants should have leave to submit whatever additional testimony they desire, and thereupon it is not only the right, but the imperative duty of this Commission, to make an order for or against the defendants under the new fifteenth section. To hold otherwise, this case and many others in which large sums of money and much time have been expended must fail, since the old section is superseded by the new, and the amending act contains no provision continuing the old section in force as to cases previously brought before the Commission; the law should not be so interpreted in the absence of explicit provi sion to that effect. Case set down for further hearing, reexamination of the whole record by the Commission, and procedure under the new fifteenth section. S. H. Cowan for complainant. Ed. Baxter for Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. Robert Dunlap for A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. Burton Hanson for Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. Sam H. West for St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. S. A. Lynde for Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. T. J. Freeman for Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. C. A. Severance for Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. PROUTY, Commissioner: February 10, 1904, the complainant filed its petition alleging that certain advances in rates on live stock from various points in the Southwest to Kansas City and other live-stock markets were unjust and unreasonable, and praying that the Commission would order the defendants to cease and desist from continuing such rates in effect and for reparation. To this the defendants made answer that the advanced rates were just and reasonable. Upon the issue thus formed a great mass of testimony was taken and elaborate arguments presented; and on August 16, 1905, the Commission filed its report and opinion sustaining, in the main, the contention of the complainant. On November 18 following the complainant filed with the Commission a motion for additional and more specific findings. This motion was granted and the matter again taken under advisement for that purpose. No additional findings have yet been made, and the case is still pending. No order has ever been made. On June 29, 1906, the act to regulate commerce was amended. The fifteenth section of that act as thus amended provides that the Commission, in a proper case, shall have authority, and that it shall be its duty, if in its opinion a given rate is unjust and unreasonable, to prescribe a just and reasonable rate which shall not be exceeded by the defendant in the future. Subsequent to the taking effect of this amendment the complainant filed this petition, praying, in substance, that the Commission proceed in the case to the making of an order under the new fifteenth section. This petition has been served upon. the defendants, who have made various answers and objections, all of which come, however, to the proposition that this Commission has no authority to make an order under the new fifteenth section in this proceeding for the reason that such an order can not be entered in a case which was pending when the amendment took effect. This petition was referred to in the argument by counsel for both the complainant and the defendants as a supplemental petition under section 16a, but it is evident that this provision of the statute has no application. That section is intended to give the Commission the right to rehear a matter for the purpose of correcting any injustice in its previous order. The petition before us alleges no such wrong and asks for no such change. Its only purpose is to secure from the Commission an order under the amended section 15, which could not have been made upon the same state of facts when the original complaint was filed or when the report and opinion of the Commission was first rendered. The sole question for consideration is, Can the Commission make its order under the fifteenth section upon a complaint filed previous to the date when the amended section went into effect? The defendants insist that this amended section confers upon the Commission a new jurisdiction, in that the Commission is given authority to prescribe a rate for the future, and that this new jurisdiction can only be exercised upon a complaint filed subsequent to the time when the jurisdiction was conferred. The act to regulate commerce has always provided that the rates charged by carriers subject to its provisions should be just and reasonable. In this respect the law stands to-day precisely as it has stood from the beginning. Under the act previous to this amendment it was the right of a party to complain that rates were unjust and unreasonable, and it was the duty of the Commission to consider that complaint in precisely the same way that it is now. If it found that the rate was unjust and unreasonable it was its further duty, in passing upon a demand for reparation, to determine by how much that rate had been unjust in the past. Looking to the future, however, it could only direct the carrier to cease and desist from charging the unreasonable rate. To-day in this latter respect it can go further and can fix the rate, which the carrier may not exceed. In other words, the amended act confers upon the Commission power to enforce what has always been a requirement of the statute by the application of a new remedy. In this sense alone can it be said that the amended fifteenth section, as applied to a case like that before us, enlarges the jurisdiction of the Commission. But if it be true that Congress has thereby conferred upon this body additional jurisdiction, it is clear that in so doing Congress might also prescribe the conditions upon which that jurisdiction should be exercised, and this is explicitly done in the fifteenth section itself. 12 I. C. C. Rep. |