the all-rail gateways on the north, northeast, and south of Texas, by the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and by the Atlantic seaboard, through the ports of New Orleans and Galveston and thence by a short rail haul to destination. Various routes into Texas are open by water and rail to many other manufacturing centers in the North and East. The Red River on the north and the Sabine on the east boundary of the state, while furnishing little actual competition, also undoubtedly afford an appreciable tendency in the equalizing of rates to all points in the common-point area. Carriers no doubt found it necessary to adjust themselves to such influences. And out of these aggressively active competitive conditions the Texas system of commonpoint rates was developed and now has the authority and force of many years of actual use. It has grown up with the growth of the state itself. Commercial enterprises and industries in the state have fully adjusted themselves to it. Investments have been made in reliance upon the continuance of the system, and new jobbing centers have been created and have reached a position of local importance that probably could not have come into existence except upon equal rates with other centers.

It follows from such a condition of affairs that any controversy before this Commission that draws in question the reasonableness of rates from an interstate point to a particular common point and results in an order requiring a change of rates to that point must have a far-reaching effect. Such a readjustment of rates to one of the common points would either tend to disrupt the present system of equal rates or would put the carriers under the compulsion of making the same readjustment to all other points in the common-point territory. Moreover, as the rail rates from producing points in the North and East seem to be based on St. Louis, taking a differential under or over the St. Louis rates according to their location, a change in the rates from St. Louis to any common point such as is here demanded would necessarily affect the rates to that point from many other interstate points. Aside from the question, which seems to be suggested by the record, whether the Texas common-point system of rates is obnoxious in any respect to the present law, it is obvious that a complaint from which so extensive a disturbance in rates must necessarily follow ought to be presented to us in all its aspects and receive the fullest consideration before any action is taken by this Commission.

The complaint made on this petition is of certain rates from St. Louis to Dallas, an enterprising commercial center in the northern part of the common-point territory. The allegation is that the rates on agricultural implements, axes, sadirons, galvanized-steel plate, pig iron, pumps and blowers, whisky, corn mills, wrapping paper, hand implements, hinges and tinware, coke, sweat pads, straw for collars,

alcohol, stoves, sheet-iron stovepipe (nested), loaded shells, engines and boilers, glucose, cologne spirits, and wines are excessive and unreasonable. Complaint is also made of the rates on sugar, molasses, and glucose from New Orleans to Dallas. It is further alleged that the minimum carload weights required on shipments from St. Louis of engines, boilers, straw for collars, vehicles, and threshers are in excess of the weights that can actually be loaded into cars of the capacities designated in the published tariffs. The prayer of the petition is that reasonable rates and proper minimum carload weights be fixed by the Commission in conformity with the maximum rates and minimum carload weights suggested in the petition.

No reference is made in the complaint to the effect of the proposed reductions in the rates to Dallas on the commodities enumerated upon the rates on related commodities to Dallas or to their effect upon the rates on the same and related commodities to other points in the common-point territory. As to this phase of the matter the principal and only witness for the petitioner during the course of his testimony said: "I am here simply to look after the interests of the people of Dallas." The other common points, he said, "have freight bureaus of their own to look after their affairs. I am simply representing the people who pay me." While such singleness of purpose is not fairly open to criticism but on the contrary is entirely proper, it is clear that this Commission has a wider duty to perform and must not lose sight of the effect and natural consequences of its own acts. If the reductions demanded on this petition are made effective by the order of the Commission the result will be either to segregate Dallas from the other common points and establish a precedent for a similar complaint by the next point south of Dallas and thus gradually to break up the Texas rate system, or, as heretofore pointed out, it will compel the carriers to extend the reductions to all the common points. It may be that such changes ought to be effected. It may be that the complaint is well founded and that the rates complained of are excessive, both with respect to Dallas and to the other common points, and that all ought to be reduced. It may also be, as is suggested in argument on behalf of complainant, that Dallas is entitled to be taken out of the common-point system and to be put with immediately adjacent points in a special group with rates of its own based upon the shorter haul from St. Louis. As to such matters we express no opinion at this time. But in either event this petition raises an issue that may affect the rates now in force to practically the entire commercial area of the State of Texas. The question then arises whether the testimony before us presents a sufficient basis for our action. A brief reference to the rather voluminous record will suffice to indicate why we are of the opinion that it does not.

No proof was offered of the right of the Dallas Freight Bureau to enter upon this contest on behalf of the municipality of Dallas, as the petition asserts, or on behalf of its merchants who manufacture or deal in the commodities in question. But that omission is perhaps not to be regarded as of serious importance. It is to be noted, however, that a manufacturer of one of the commodities named in the petition who conducts his business at a common point near Dallas, the rates to which would be immediately affected by any reduction in the rates to Dallas, not only vehemently protests, in a communication to the Commission, against any reduction in the rate on that commodity, but he asserts that the reduction demanded in the petition if put in effect would destroy every manufacturer of that class of merchandise in the northern part of the state. Moreover, testimony was offered on behalf of the defendants and not controverted by the complainant, tending to show that the rates on other commodities mentioned in the petition were adjusted only after conferences between the traffic officials of the defendants and wholesale jobbers in those commodities. And the defendants assert that the rates agreed upon have not since been the subject of any complaint to them. It may be well here to call attention to the fact that not a single merchant, or manufacturer, or jobber of Dallas appeared to testify in this case. No person directly interested in the rates complained of came forward to demonstrate to the Commission why they ought to be reduced. The only witness in support of the issues made by the complainant was its secretary. Obviously he could have no personal knowledge of the details of the business of the manufacturers and dealers in these various commodities or any personal knowledge of the effect of the rates complained of upon their prosperity. It does not appear that he had any personal knowledge that the minimum carload weights complained of were excessive and could not in actual experience be loaded into cars of the capacities designated in the tariffs. His testimony was confined largely to a comparison of the rates attacked with other rates in other parts of the country upon the same commodities and for substantially similar distances. The case as presented rests upon such comparisons. There was no discussion by the witness of the actual effect upon the merchants of Dallas of the present rates on the various commodities named. In other words, there is no showing on this record that any complaint of these rates has been made by the merchants of Dallas either to the carriers or to the Commission, except as this petition may be said to speak for them.

We can not regard a record so made up as satisfactory. The Commission affords the largest facilities to shippers to put their grievances before us in person and not by proxy. Upon an intimation of the desire on the part of the merchants of Dallas, on whose behalf

this petition purports to have been brought, to explain their troubles before us in connection with this complaint a Commissioner would have gone to Dallas to take their testimony or a special examiner could have been sent. The Commission would thus have been advised through personal contact with the parties in interest of their actual troubles and the actual results to them of the rates of which they complain. As the record now stands there is no proof of that nature before us. The case seems to have been thrown together as if the Commission needed only to have the opportunity presented to it in order to take favorable action. But we are administering this law upon no such basis. We are authorized under the act to order a reduction in rates only when it is made to appear that they are unjust, or unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential. Complainants must therefore prove the issues that they raise by competent testimony or make out a prima facie case sufficiently clear and strong to require the Commission in the public interest to enter upon an investigation of its own to ascertain the merits of the complaint. In our judgment the complainant has not satisfied either of these requirements.

While a comparison with rates in nearby territory or elsewhere where the same general transportation conditions exist may often suffice without other showing to indicate that the rates complained of are discriminatory or excessive, in several cases we have pointed out that a comparison with rates in other and distant parts of the country where different physical, competitive, and traffic conditions exist is insufficient. In Lincoln Creamery v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 5 I. C. C. Rep., 156, 160, it was said:

Comparison with rates in other localities where different conditions and modifying circumstances are found is not enough to establish the unreasonableness of the rate assailed.

In Morrell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 6 I. C. C. Rep., 121, the Commission held, as set forth in a headnote to the opinion, that:

Rates maintained and which may be reasonable under the conditions existing in one section or part of the country afford no safe criterion by which to measure reasonable charges in other localities where the expense of operating a road and other conditions affecting transportation are widely different.

See also Evans v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 6 I. C. C. Rep., 520; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S., 466, 539.

The comparison made by the complainant of the rates from St. Louis to Dallas with rates from Chicago and St. Louis to St. Paul, and with rates from Pittsburg to St. Louis, and from Boston to St. Louis, and from Chicago to Wichita, while instructive, does not by itself afford proper grounds for our action in a case of such importance as this. An examination of the records of the Commission

shows a much denser traffic, a much larger net revenue per mile, and other transportation conditions that may well justify lower rates between those points than would be fairly remunerative on the same commodities to Dallas.

In our judgment the record does not disclose a sufficient basis for such action as is asked by complainant. The complaint will therefore be dismissed, but without prejudice to any proceeding in the future involving these rates.

An order will be entered in accordance with these views.

CLEMENTS, Commissioner, dissenting:

Believing, upon the facts disclosed in the hearing of this case, that the complainant is entitled to relief by a readjustment of the rates complained of, I do not concur in the conclusions of the Commission.

No. 801.

W. R. GRACE & W. R. STATON, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF ALBANY PRODUCE COMPANY,

v.

CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILWAY COMPANY.

Submitted November 7, 1905. Decided October 8, 1907.

Complaint drew in question the reasonableness of rate on coal of $1.25 per ton from Centerville district, Iowa, to Albany, Mo., in itself and as compared with coal rate to St. Joseph, Mo. After case was submitted the rate to Albany was reduced to $1 per ton. As the record failed to show that the $1.25 rate was unreasonable in itself, or that the present rate of $1 is excessive, or that the facts and circumstances disclose unjust discrimination, the complaint is dismissed.

Ed. E. Aleshire for complainants.
O. M. Spencer for defendant.

KNAPP, Chairman:

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION.

In their petition complainants alleged that the rate exacted by defendant for transporting coal in carloads from shipping points in the Centerville district, in Iowa, to Albany, Mo., is in violation of sections 1, 3, and 4 of the act to regulate commerce-first, because it is unreasonable; second, because it is greater than the rate contempora