Before the Commission can make an order under that section two conditions must be complied with: First, a formal complaint must have been filed under the thirteenth section; second, there must have been a full hearing of the parties. In the amendments of June 29 the thirteenth section was in no respect changed. If this complainant were to file to-day its complaint against these rates, that complaint might well be in the precise form of the original complaint in this proceeding, excepting only its prayer for specific relief, which is not essential. We have, therefore, a compliance with the first prerequisite to the exercise of this jurisdiction, in that, in this case, there has been filed a complaint under the thirteenth section. The second condition precedent is that a full hearing shall be granted. Certainly the hearing upon this record has been sufficiently full. More than six weeks were expended in the taking of testimony, which, as extended, covers several thousand typewritten pages. It would seem that every fact which could have the slightest bearing upon the subject has been elaborated and every consideration dwelt upon. But it is said that the question now presented is different from the question presented then; that the question then was, Is the rate charged unreasonable? that the question now is, What will be a reasonable rate for the future? It was the duty of the Commission in disposing of this complaint under the former statute to determine whether the rates charged by the defendants were just and reasonable, and if it found them unjust and unreasonable to determine by how much, in order that reparation might be awarded. It is now necessary to determine by how much these rates are unjust and unreasonable, looking to the future. While this question is, strictly speaking, a new one, and while it is conceivable that the Commission might find that a rate would be reasonable for the future which had been unreasonable in the past, it is.probable that the character of the testimony introduced upon the hearing of complaints like that before us in the future will not differ much from what it has been in the past. But if the fact be otherwise, if the carriers have failed to produce any evidence either because the decision of the Commission was not, in their estimation, of the same importance before as now, or because the issue of fact is different now than formerly, or if conditions have changed since this testimony was taken, their rights in the premises can be and should be amply protected. All the parties, both complainant and defendants, should be allowed to introduce whatever additional testimony they may desire. It is difficult to see why, when such opportunity for further hearing has been given, the second pre requisite to the making of an order under the fifteenth section will not have been fully met. If so, it is not enly the right of this body but it becomes its imperative duty under that section to proceed to the making of such an order. This view is confirmed by a consideration of what would be the consequence of a contrary holding. The fifteenth section was amended by rewriting the section itself. There is to-day no fifteenth section as it existed when this complaint was filed, and there is no provision under which the terms of that section have been continued in force. If, therefore, it should be held that this Commission has no authority to make an order in the case before us under the fifteenth section as it now stands, it must follow that no order of any sort can be made; in other words, that this proceeding has been ended by legislative enactment. When it is remembered that there were pending before this Commission a great number of complaints at the time of this amendment in all stages of advancement, that in many of them large sums of money and much time had been expended in the taking of testimony, it is incredible that Congress can have intended to arbitrarily and unnecessarily terminate these suits which had been brought and prosecuted in good faith under the law as it previously stood. Certainly, no interpretation should be given this statute which will produce such a result in the absence of explicit language to that effect. We think that this case should be set down for further hearing; that both the complainant and the defendants should be allowed to introduce such additional testimony as they may be advised; that thereupon the Commission should reexamine the whole record and reach such conclusion as justice requires, and that upon this conclusion it should proceed under the fifteenth section, as it now stands, to the making of an order. 12 I. C. C. Rep. No. 466. CATTLE RAISERS' ASSOCIATION OF TEXAS, COMPLAINANT, AND CHICAGO LIVE STOCK EXCHANGE, INTERVENER, v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY; CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY; CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY; CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY; CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY; CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY. COMPANY; ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY; WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY; AND ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY. Submitted November 9, 1906. Decided November 14, 1906. In this case final order was entered by the Commission November 16, 1905, but has not been obeyed by defendant carriers. Complainants' petition to set aside such order and reopen the case for further proceedings with a view to decision and order under the act of June 29, 1906, denied. S. H. Cowan for complainant. Ed. Baxter for Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. Robert Dunlap for A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. Burton Hanson for Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. C. A. Severance for Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. PROUTY, Commissioner: The original complaint in this case was filed September 1, 1896, and the matter has been pending in various forms before the courts and the Commission since then, the subject of controversy being the charge of $2 per car made by the defendants for the delivery of carloads of live stock at the Union Stock Yards, Chicago. On August 16, 1905, the Commission filed a report and opinion holding that the imposition of a greater charge than $1 was unjust and unreasonable, and on November 16, 1905, an order was issued by the Commission directing the carriers to cease and desist from imposing the charge of $2. The question of reparation was reserved for future disposition. No proceedings have been begun to enforce this order in the courts, and the complainant now files a petition asking that the Commission strike off its former order, set down the case for further hearing, and make an order under the present fifteenth section. No claim is made that the Commission committed any error in its findings of fact or in the making of its order as the law formerly stood, the only object of the complainant being to secure an order under the amended fifteenth section. Without inquiring what authority as a matter of law this Commission may have over a case in which an order was issued before the amendment of June 29, 1906, took effect, we are all agreed that this petition ought to be denied. This case has been ended by the making of an order. For nearly a year it was optional with the complainant to proceed in court with the enforcement of that order, and such may be its right even now. We feel that when an order has been made the case before this Commission should be treated as closed, and that it ought not to be opened except upon a showing that some wrong or injustice has been or will be effected. The petition is denied. COMPLAINT OF ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, AS SET FORTH IN STATEMENT OF J. C. STUBBS, CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE OF WESTERN LINES. Submitted November 9, 1906. Decided November 16, 1906. Land and immigration agents, unless they are bona fide and actual employees of carriers subject to the act to regulate commerce, are not within the excepted classes specified in that statute, and providing transportation for such agents free or at reduced rates over lines of such carriers is, and since the act was originally past has been, unlawful. Ruling in Tariff Circular No. 5-A reaffirmed. C. A. Cairns for Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. J. M. Dickinson for Illinois Central Railroad Co. P. S. Eustis for Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. E. L. Lomax for Union Pacific Railroad Co. Howard Payne for Missouri Pacific Railway Co. John Sebastian for Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. W. S. St. George for Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. KNAPP, Chairman: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. The matter heard under the above title on the 9th instant relates to the free transportation of certain persons known as land agents or immigration agents. It appears that the important railroads operating in the territory west of Chicago have been accustomed to give free transportation to numerous persons who are engaged in selling lands belonging to private owners, and who accompany prospective purchasers to view such lands along the respective railway lines. These persons are not employed by the railroads, but secure their compensation for the most part, if not altogether, by commissions on the land sales effected. The interest of the railroads is promoted by securing settlers upon lands otherwise unoccupied whose productive industry increases the business of the carriers. This interest has been advanced as a justification for giving free transportation to these agents. Some of them appear to have annual passes, or passes good for a stated period, while others receive round-trip passes for each journey which they take in the prosecution of their business. There are many thousands of these persons, and their operations are claimed to be of great benefit to the roads which provide them with free carriage. Soon after the amended law took effect on the 28th of August, the carriers in question, or most of them, were advised by counsel, as the Commission is informed, that the free transportation of the class of persons mentioned had become unlawful. Thereupon some of the roads, including the Illinois Central, at once discontinued the free carriage of these land agents, but other roads are still issuing passes to them as heretofore. Under date of October 12 the Commission announced certain rulings by Tariff Circular 5-A, among which was the following: Issuance and use of free passes.-The provisions of the act relative to the issuance of free tickets, free passes, free transportation, or free carriage to employees of carriers apply only to persons who are actually in the service of the carriers and who devote substantially all of their time to the work or business of such carriers. Land and immigration agents, unless they are bona fide and actual employees, representatives of correspondence schools, agents of accident or life insurance companies, agents of oil or lubricating companies, etc., are not within the classes to which free or reduced-rate transportation can be lawfully furnished. This ruling specifically names the classes of persons in question and holds that they can not lawfully receive free transportation. The facts disclosed at the hearing of this matter confirm our conviction of the correctness of the ruling, and nothing has been shown which war |