jury shall be regarded as approved unless excepted to as provided for in the foregoing articles." This article is mandatory and precludes the consideration of any assignment of error as to the action of the court in giving, refusing, or qualifying requested charges, unless such action be excepted to and presented by bill of exceptions. Insurance Co. v. Rhoderick, 164 S. W. 1069. It is true that article 2062, R. S., is not expressly repealed by the act above referred to, but said act repeals all laws in conflict therewith, and if any conflict exists between article 2062 and article 2061, as amended, the former is repealed. The Legislature that passed the original articles evidently did not intend article 2062 to apply to the giving or refusing special charges; if so, there would have been no necessity for article 2061. Appeal from Smith County Court; J. F. Odem, Judge. Action by J. W. Beaird against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded. The appellee had purchased from the appellant's agent a ticket entitling him to passage from Grand Saline to Mineola, paying The ticket therefor the sum of 40 cents. became misplaced in some way about the person of appellee, and he paid the conductor of the passenger train the cash fare and took a receipt therefor. Upon the arrival of the train at Mineola, appellee found the ticket and at once presented it, together with the cash fare receipt of the conductor, to the appellant's ticket agent at Mineola for redemption. In respect thereto appellee testifies: "He told me he could not do it, he had no authority to redeem the ticket, but said that any agent at any station could redeem it. He would not redeem the ticket, and I purchased a ticket to Tyler and got on the train and came to Tyler." [5] 7. We overrule appellant's assignments of error as to the action of the court in refusing to allow appellant to introduce testimony in reference to the suits against the accident insurance companies. The eviClaiming that the railway company failed dence offered was irrelevant and immaterial and refused to redeem the ticket when preto any issue in this case, and would have sented, appellee brought the suit to recover been prejudicial to appellee. In so far as such $500 as a statutory penalty, the penalty beevidence was offered for the purpose of im-ing based upon articles 1527-1529 as containpeaching appellee by declarations in his peti-ed in the Penal Code of 1911. The agent of tion in his suit against the insurance company appellant testified as follows: it was clearly shown that such declarations were not made by him nor with his knowledge, authority, acquiescence or ratification. Finding no error of record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed. TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. BEAIRD. (No. 1317) Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 1527, requiring railroad companies to provide for the redemption of tickets which the holder has not used, article 1528, requiring presentation of the ticket for redemption within 10 days after the right to use it has expired, and article 1529, providing that any railroad company, refusing to redeem any ticket when presented, shall be subject to penalty, the railway company may provide its own processes of disbursement; and where a company required tickets for redemption to be forwarded to the auditor of the company, who would send a cash slip to the ticket agent whereupon the money would be paid to the holder of the ticket, the refusal of an agent to immediately pay the redeemable value of a ticket upon presentation did not subject the company to the prescribed penalty, the words "when presented," being equivalent to "in case it is presented," or "on condition that it be presented." [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. 1034; Dec. Dig. § 261.*] 2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 501*) TION OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW. RESERVA Assignments of error complaining of the charge cannot be considered, where no bill of exception was preserved. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2300-2305; Dec. Dig. § 501.*] fice on the arrival of the passenger train and * The court gave the following special charge at the request of the plaintiff, which is here assigned as error: "You are charged that if the agent of the defendant railway at Mineola, at the time plaintiff presented the ticket in question, failed to then and there redeem said ticket, plaintiff would be entitled to recover, notwithstanding said agent offered plaintiff to forward said ticket to the auditor's office at Dallas, Tex., for redemption." Young & Stinchcomb, of Longview, and R. S. Shapard, of Dallas, for appellant. E. P. Price, of Tyler, for appellee. LEVY, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] The legal effect of the instruction complained of is to declare that it is a violation of the statute requiring railway companies to redeem unused tickets where a ticket agent of the selling company does not return For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes the amount of the fare to the holder of such | sented." In this construction the right of unused ticket immediately on his presenta- the holder of an unused ticket presenting it tion of the ticket for redemption. As to to a local agent for the purpose of having whether there was error in giving the charge a refund of the fare made to him by the must be considered from the viewpoint of company would be to have return of the fare there being testimony going to show that the made with reasonable dispatch through the appellant had provided the channel or pro- usual processes of disbursement employed by cess of redemption of unused tickets to be by the particular company. The holder of the the local ticket agent forwarding the unused ticket would not be entitled to have return of ticket to the auditor of the company, who the fare made by the local agent "then and would send a cash slip to the ticket agent, there" on presentation of the ticket, regardand the money would then be paid by the less of the processes for disbursement employlocal agent to the holder. Article 1527 of the ed by the particular company for the especial Penal Code of 1911 imposes the duty upon all purposes of redemption. And the railway railroad companies in this state "to provide company having, by the terms of the act, the for the redemption" from the holder of the right to redeem an unused ticket through the whole or any part of an unused ticket that processes of disbursement employed by the may have been sold by the company or its particular company to accomplish the purposauthorized agent. Article 1528 makes it the es of the law, such company would not be actduty of the holder of such unused ticket, as ing in violation of the statute, subjecting it a condition precedent to any right to redeem, to the damages specified, in offering or unto present such ticket or parts unused for dertaking to redeem an unused ticket actuthe purpose of redemption to the company ally presented to it for redemption by the selling, or to any of its authorized agents, holder within the ten days required, through within a time not exceeding ten days after the usual processes of disbursement employed the right to use said ticket has expired. And by the particular company Hence we conarticle 1529 provides: Iclude that giving the special charge constitutes, in view of the agent's testimony, reversible error. "Any railroad company or receiver or trustee of such railroad company over or on which said ticket may be used, which shall refuse or fail to redeem the whole or any part or coupon of any ticket or tickets, when presented, shall forfeit to the holder thereof a sum not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, recoverable in any court of competent jurisdiction." It is not doubted that by the terms of articles 1527 and 1528 there is created the obligation on the part of the railway company to make a refund of the purchase money of such of its unused tickets as are actually presented to it by the holders for redemption before a period of ten days after the right to use such tickets has expired. But neither of the two articles mentioned provides the particular channel or processes of disbursement that the company shall employ. By article 1527 the railway company is only required "to provide for the redemption" to the holder of such unused ticket that may be presented. The language would seem to express the intention to leave to the railway company the right to provide a channel or employ processes of disbursement most orderly to it. And the language of article 1529 is consistent with the intention expressed in article 1527, and not a limitation upon the authority conferred upon the company to adopt a particular channel or employ a particular reasonable process for the purposes of redemption to the holders of such unused tickets most orderly to it. The clause "when presented," as used in article 1529, reasonably introduces into the meaning of the sentence the idea of the fact of presentation rather than the time of presentation of the unused ticket. Hence the clause "when presented," being a conditional adverbial clause modifying the verbal phrase "refuses or fails to redeem," is equivalent to "in case it is presented," or "on condition that it be pre [2] Under the third assignment several propositions are made and argued. As there was no bill of exception preserved to the charge, as required by the latest law, we are without authority to consider the assignment and the propositions thereunder. Railway Co. v. Wadsack, 166 S. W. 42; Railway Co. V. Galloway, 165 S. W. 546. We are not unmindful of the decision in Railway Co. v. Mahaffey, 98 Tex. 392, 84 S. W. 646; but we assume, without any express ruling, that the Legislature properly re-enacted the statute in 1911. We suggest that the ruling here necessitates the ruling that the first and second assignments present error and in view of another trial can be remedied. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. WILLSON, C. J. (dissenting). I think the trial court correctly construed the meaning of the statute, and therefore dissent from the conclusion reached by the other members of this court. The statute plainly makes it the duty of a railroad company in this state to provide for the redemption of a ticket sold by it and unused by the purchaser, if such ticket is presented for redemption to one of its ticket agents "within a time not exceeding ten days after the right to use" same "has expired by limitation of time as stipulated therein." Article 1528, Revised Criminal Statutes (Pen. Code). It as plainly denounces a penalty against such company if it "shall refuse or fail" to redeem such ticket "when presented" to it for the purpose. Article 1529, Revised Criminal Statutes. To my mind the words "when presented," used in article 1529, mean that the ticket must be redeemed at the time it is presented to the company for the purpose, and the requirement of article 1528 that the company shall provide for the redemption of the ticket, means that the company shall provide for its redemption at that time, and not at some other time chosen by it. Rohrig v. Railway Co., 130 Iowa, 380, 106 N. W. 935. FT. WORTH & R. G. RY. CO. v. MATHEWS et al. (No. 5381.) (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin. June 10, 1914. Rehearing Denied Oct. 21, 1914.) 1. COURTS (§ 169*)-COUNTY COURT-JURISDICTION-AMOUNT INVOLVED INTEREST. Where a shipment of cattle was, through defendants' negligence, damaged to the amount of $970, the shipper immediately upon the injury became entitled to 6 per cent. interest on that amount, as compensation for withholding the money to which he was entitled. Hence, after the lapse of more than a year, the shipper's cause of action was for a sum in excess of $1,000, and the county court was without jurisdiction. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. 88 413-425, 428-436, 443, 456, 458, 465; Dec. Dig. § 169.*] 2. COURTS (§ 169*)-TEXAS-COUNTY COURTJURISDICTION. Where plaintiffs' cause of action was in excess of $1,000, the county court is without jurisdiction, even though plaintiffs prayed judgment for a sum slightly less than $1,000. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 413-425, 428-436, 443, 456, 458, 465; Dec. Dig. § 169.*] 3. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1166*)-DISMISSAL -GROUNDS-WANT OF JURISDICTION. Upon appeal from a judgment of the county court which was without jurisdiction, the appeal will not be dismissed, but the cause will be reversed and remanded to enable that tribunal to dismiss the action. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4527-4530, Dec. Dig. § 1166.*1 Appeal from Coleman County Court; M. Bowen, Judge negligence as were set out in their original petition. They further allege that the various acts of negligence charged against appellant occurred on March 18, 1909, and that they suffered damages by reason thereof in the aggregate sum of $977. They conclude said pleading with the prayer that they have judgment for 'the said sum of $977 as damages, without interest, judgment for costs and for general and special relief.' A trial of said cause resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of defendant Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company and against appellant for $950, with interest from September 16, 1913, at 6 per cent. per annum and costs of suit. A motion for new trial was duly presented by appellant Ft. Worth & Rio Grande Railway Company, in the court below, and same was by the court overruled. Thereupon appellant perfected its appeal to this court." [1, 2] The first three assignments of error deal with the question of the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the contention being that as the jurisdiction of the county court is limited to $1,000, exclusive of interest, the plaintiffs' petition showed on its face that the court was without jurisdiction. In other words, counsel for appellant contend, and we sustain the contention, that the petition shows on its face that the subject-matter was of the value of more than $1,000. The plaintiffs sued for damages to a certain shipment of live stock and for $7 worth of hay. According to the petition the live stock was damaged in their market value in the sum of $970, which damage, it was alleged, occurred on the 18th day of March, 1909. The plaintiffs' original F.petition was filed February 9, 1910. It is well settled by the decisions of our Supreme Court that if the plaintiffs had any cause of action they were not only entitled to recover for the injury done to their property, but were also entitled to recover 6 per cent. on the amount of such damages from the time that the injury was inflicted, not as interest eo nomini, but as compensation for withholding the sum of money they were entitled to recover as soon as the injury was inflicted; and at the time the suit was brought the 6 per cent. referred to brought the total amount of the plaintiffs' cause of action up to a sum considerably in excess of $1,000; and, this being true, the county court was without jurisdiction to try the case. That identical point was decided by our Supreme Court in Schulz v. Tessman & Bro., 92 Tex. 488, 49 S. W. 1031, and we feel compelled to follow that decision. The plaintiffs' cause of action being in excess of $1,000, it is immaterial that they prayed for judgment for only $997. Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. Action by Will Mathews and others against the Ft. Worth & Rio Grande Railroad Company and another. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant named appeals. Reversed and remanded. Andrews, Streetman, Burns & Logue, of Houston, and Snodgrass & Dibrell, of Coleman, and Lockett & Rowe, of Ft. Worth, for appellant. Woodward & Baker, of Coleman, for appellees. KEY, C. J. We copy from appellant's brief the following substantially correct statement of the nature and result of this suit: "This is an action instituted by appellees against appellant, Ft. Worth & Rio Grande Railway Company, and Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company, for alleged damages by bad handling en route, to a shipment of cattle moving from Coleman, Tex., on the line of the Gulf Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company, to Brady, Tex., on the line of appellant railway company Appellees filed their original petition in this cause on February 9, 1910, and v. Canyon Coal Co., 102 Tex. 478, 119 S. W. alleged therein various acts of negligence 294. against this appellant and its codefendant, al[3] With perhaps a few exceptions, it has leged by them to have occurred on March 18, 1909, and they further aver that, by reason of been the general practice of this court, when the acts of negligence set out by them, they it ascertained that the trial court had no were damaged in the aggregate sum of $980, jurisdiction of the subject-matter, to dismiss for which amount they pray for judgment, as the appeal, for the reason that the jurisdiewell as for costs of suit. On April 2, 1913, tion of this court is limited to cases of which appellees filed their first amended original petition, alleging substantially the same acts of trial courts have jurisdiction. However, in For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes Cent. Dig. § 69; Dec. Dig. § 32.*] Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Canyon Coal Co., I could not expect justice before a justice of the supra, the Supreme Court seems to disap- peace. prove that practice, and, in deference to the views of that court, the judgment of the trial court in this case will be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to that court to dismiss the case. Reversed and remanded. June 10, 1914. Rehearing Denied 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 954*)-MATTERS_OF VIEW. Whether an injunction will be granted in a given case rests, to a certain extent, in the discretion of the trial judge, the exercise of which, while reviewable on appeal, will be up held unless some abuse of discretion is shown. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3818-3821; Dec. Dig. § 954.*] 2. INJUNCTION (§ 118*)-COMPLAINT. Defendant, having 43 claims against an express company for damages by reason of an alleged fact that turkeys shipped by complainant company for him were dead when delivered, filed 43 separate suits before a justice of the peace to recover damages, ranging from 95 cents to $18.48. Complainant, in a suit to restrain the prosecution of such suits, alleged as a defense thereto that it was not liable to defendant in any damages or sum whatsoever, in that it held a receipt from him for each and every shipment sued on, without exception, "and none dead within complainant's knowledge." Held, that such allegation did not charge that none of the turkeys were, in fact, dead when delivered, but was only an allegation of complainant's evidence of that fact, and hence the petition was demurrable. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 223-242; Dec. Dig. § 118.*] 3. INJUNCTION (§ 119*)-VERIFIED ANSWERCONSIDERATION. Appeal from District Court, Travis County; Chas. A. Wilcox, Judge. Suit by Wells Fargo & Co. against Chas. S. Guilheim and others. From an order dissolving a temporary injunction, complainants appeal. Affirmed. Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood, of Houston, and W. B. Garrett, of Austin, for appellants. J. H. Hart, of Austin, for appellee. Statement of the Case. JENKINS, J. This is an appeal from an order dissolving a temporary injunction. Appellants' petition alleged that appellee Guilheim had 43 pretended claims against it for damages, by reason of the alleged fact that turkeys shipped by appellant for appellee were dead when delivered, and that he had filed 43 separate suits in the court of appellee Johnson, a justice of the peace, for the recovery of such damages, and had caused citation to be issued thereon in each suit; that said claims were from 95 cents to $18.48, and aggregated $208.37; that each of said claims involved issues of fact and questions of law identical with each other; that said suits were separately filed for the purpose of vexing and harrassing appellant, and that the costs therein would amount to the sum of $300; that the county court had jurisdiction of the aggregate amount of said claims, and that a suit for same could be tried in the county court at comparatively small trouble and expense; that appellant has a legal defense to said claims, in that it holds receipts from appellee showing that none of the turkeys were dead when the same were delivered to appellee; that appellant has no adequate remedy at law, in that neither of said suits is appealable from justice's court, by reason of the fact that neither of them involves an amount exceed[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Injunction, ing $20, and that he cannot have said suits Cent. Dig. §§ 243-250; Dec. Dig. § 119.*] consolidated in the justice's court for the 4. INJUNCTION (§ 32*)-GROUNDS OF RELIEF reason that the aggregate amount in con-SUITS BEFORE JUSTICE-MULTIPLICITY. Defendant, having 43 claims for damages troversy exceeds the sum of $200; that “apagainst complainant express company arising pellant has no reason to expect, anticipate, out of shipments of turkeys brought 43 suits or hope for the proper determination of its before a justice of the peace against complain- just and legal rights in the trial of said suits ant for amounts ranging from 95 cents to $18.48, aggregating $208.37 in all. Complain- in the said justice court, for the reason that ant sought an injunction, alleging that each of the said defendant M. M. Johnson, justice the claims involved issues of fact and ques- of the peace aforesaid, is not a lawyer learntions of law identical with each other, and that ed in the law, and that a jury in the justice the suits were separately filed for vexation and to prevent an appeal. Held, that since if court, although with no knowledge whatever the suits did involve the same issues, though of the law or the application of legal printhey could not be consolidated into one suit be- ciples to facts, are the exclusive judges of cause the amount would exceed the jurisdiction of the justice, yet they could be consolidated the facts and the law, with no appeal whatinto two suits, which would afford complain- ever from their decision, and, such jury beant an adequate protection and a right to ap- ing wholly ignorant of the law, and wholly peal, complainant was not entitled to an injunction restraining the prosecution of the incapable of applying any legal principle to suits on the ground that they were so institut- any state of facts, your petitioner could ed to prevent an appeal, and that complainant not hope for any consideration or determina*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes In determining whether a party is entitled to injunction, the answer, when verified, as well as the petition, must be considered under Rev. St. 1911, art. 4645. tion of its legal rights in the trial of said suits in said justice court than such as the prejudice and whims of said jury might dictate." Appellee demurred generally to appellant's petition, and specially in that it appeared that appellant's alleged legal defense involves a question of fact, and that the justice court had obtained exclusive jurisdiction to try the same. He alleges that his claims for damages involved are valid, and have arisen from the fact that appellant shipped for appellee a large number of turkeys from various points at different times, and that one or more of the turkeys in each of said shipments were dead when delivered to appellee; that appellee had furnished appellant a full statement as to his several claims for such damages, and that appellant failed and refused to pay the same or any part thereof; that appellee notified appellant long before said suits were filed, to wit, on March 26, 1913, that if said claims were not paid he would file separate suits thereon, and that said suits were not filed until May 1, 1913; that by refusing to pay said claims and by failing to take any action to prevent or restrain appellee from so filing said suits, appellant invited appeflee to file the same, by reason of which it is estopped from receiving the relief claimed herein. Appellee denies that said suits were brought for the purpose of vexing or harrassing the appellant, or that the defense to same involves the same issues, but alleges, on the contrary, that each shipment was at a different time, of turkeys purchased from different parties, and that the facts that may be shown upon trial in one case will not be in any wise material in determining the facts at issue in any other of said cases; that the costs in said cases will be only what the law allows, and that if appellant establishes a legal defense it will not have to pay the same. On March 25, 1914, the court heard the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, "the same having been submitted on the plaintiff's petition and the defendant's demurrers and motion," and entered a decree that "said injunction heretofore granted in this cause is hereby in all respects dissolved." The appellant, having duly excepted to the order dissolving said injunction, prosecutes this appeal under article 4644, R. S. Opinion. not been denied, and would not be denied, by the plaintiff, Wells Fargo & Co." Such [1] As to whether or not the equitable relief of injunction will be granted in a given case rests, to a certain extent, in the discretion of the judge, which discretion is reviewable on appeal, and should be upheld, unless some abuse of such discretion is shown. If appellant was entitled to enjoin the separate prosecution of appellee's claims, and knew that it was appellee's purpose to so prosecute said suits, it might not be inequitable to hold that it should have done so before appellee had incurred the expense of filing such suits, which presumably included an attorney's fee in each of them. course would have prevented incurring the costs, which is one of the grounds of appellant's complaint here, and for which, even should injunction be granted, it has already rendered itself liable by reason of its delay herein, unless it should clearly appear that such suits were brought for the purpose of vexing and harrassing the appellant. However, we do not rest our opinion on this reason of the court for dissolving the injunction. If the judgment is correct for any other reason apparent of record, it ought to be upheld. [2] We are of the opinion that appellant's petition for injunction was bad upon general demurrer. It appears from said petition that each of the suits in the justice's court grew out of shipments of turkeys by appellant for appellee, and that appellee's claim for damages is that some of the turkeys so shipped were dead when delivered to appellee. The only alleged defense to such claim is as follows: "Your petitioner alleges and charges the fact to be that it has a full and complete legal defense in each and all of said 43 suits, and is in no way liable to the said defendant Chas. S. Guilheim in any damages or sum whatsoever, in that it holds a receipt from the defendant Chas. S. Guilheim for each and every shipment sued on without exception, and none dead within knowledge of plaintiff.' If this means that appellant holds appellee's receipt showing that none of the turkeys were dead when delivered to appellee, it is not an allegation that none of them were dead when so delivered, but only an allegation of appellant's evidence of that fact, which evidence is not conclusive of the fact. If it be an allegation that appellant does not know that any of the turkeys were not an allegation of the fact that none were dead at that time. In order to obtain an injunction, the petitioner must allege the facts that entitle him to the same, and not his evidence as to such facts, or his want of knowledge as to the same. The court found that appellant was estop-dead when delivered to appellee, it is clearly ped from prosecuting its suit herein for injunction, for the reason that it was "made known to the court that the facts set forth in the answer of the defendant Chas. S. Guilheim, to the effect that the said defendant presented all of said claims to the plaintiff, Wells Fargo & Co. long before suits were filed in justice's court, and that payment of said claims was declined, and that said defendant Guilheim notified the plaintiff that he would bring separate suits on same, had [3] In determining whether or not a party is entitled to an injunction the answer, when verified, as well as the petition, must be Article 4645, R. taken into consideration. S.; Dawson v. Baldridge, 55 Tex. Civ. App. |