5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another.

The prohibition is upon Congress, and is, by the fair import of the words and the connection in which they stand, subsidiary to a very important purpose, to wit, to restrain Congress from fostering or oppressing one port or the commerce of one State, to the end of destroying equality and uniformity as to levies of contributions from foreign commerce. It does not affect the States in the regulation of their domestic affairs. State v. Charleston, 10 Rich. 240; Munn v. Illinois, 94 Ill. 113.

This clause does not apply to a State tax upon an article brought into the State from another State. State v. Charleston, 10 Rich. 240.

This provision does not apply to the imposition of taxes on foreign vessels. It is within the discretion of Congress to totally prohibit the import or export trade in foreign vessels to or from our ports, or to grant them the privilege of bringing in or carrying out cargoes on such conditions and under such restrictions as may be most beneficial to the United States. Aguirre v. Marwell, 3 Blatch. 140.

A charge for a stamp on a package of tobacco intended for export, which is devised as a means to prevent fraud, and bears no proportion whatever to the value or size of the package on which it is affixed, is not a tax on exports. Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S. 372.

The history of the provision as well as its language looks to a prohibition against granting privileges or immunities to vessels entering or clearing from the ports of one State over those of another. These privileges and immunities, whatever they may be in the judgment of Congress, must be common and equal in all the ports of the several States. This much is undoubtedly embraced in the prohibition, and it may certainly also embrace any other description of legislation looking to a direct privilege or preference of the ports of any particular State over those of another. State v. Wheeling Bridge Co. 18 How. 421.

It is a mistake to assume that Congress is forbidden to give a preference to a port in one State over a port in another State. Such preference is given in every instance where it makes a port in one State a port of entry and refuses to make another port in another State a port of entry. No greater preference in one sense can be more directly given than in this way, and yet the power of Congress to give such preference has never been

questioned, nor can it be without asserting that the moment Congress makes a port in one State it is bound at the same time to make all other ports in all other States ports of entry. State v. Wheeling Bridge Co. 18 How. 421.

There are many acts of Congress passed in the exercise of the power to regulate commerce providing for a special advantage to the port or ports of one State, and which very advantage may incidentally operate to the prejudice of the ports in a neighboring State. The improvement of rivers and harbors, the erection of light houses and other facilities of commerce may be referred to as examples. The exercise of an admitted power of Congress conferred by the Constitution is not to be prohibited, because it appears or can be shown that the law may incidentally extend beyond the limitation of the power. State v. Wheeling Bridge Co. 18 How. 421.

The clause in terms seems to import a prohibition against some positive legislation by Congress to this effect, and not against any incidental advantages that may possibly result from the legislation of Congress upon other subjects connected with commerce, and confessedly within its power. State v. Wheeling Bridge Co. 18 How. 421.

What is forbidden is not discrimination between individual ports within the same or different States, but discrimination between States. State v. Wheeling Bridge Co, 18 How. 421.

A State tax upon capital invested in ships is not a preference of the ports of one State over the ports of another State. State v. Charleston, 4 Rich. 286.

A State may levy a tax upon money, although it is continuously invested in cotton purchased for exportation. People v. Tax Commissioner, 17 N. Y. Supr. 255.

This provision is a limitation upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce for the purpose of producing entire commercial equality within the United States, and also a prohibition upon the State to destroy such equality by any legislation prescribing a condition upon which vessels bound from one State shall enter the ports of another State. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; S. C. 45 Mass. 282; Alexander v. Railroad Co. 3 Strobh. 594.

This provision was intended to prevent vessels bound to or from a port in any State being obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in any State other than that to or from which they should be proceeding. U. S. v. The William, 2 Am. L. J. 255.

A statute regulating commercial intercourse with insurrectionary States, and imposing duties thereon, is valid. Folsom v. U. S. 4 Ct. Cl. 366.

This clause contemplates a restriction upon the powers of Congress, and not a restriction upon the legislation of the States in the regulation of their internal police. Baker v. Wise, 16 Gratt. 139.

A State may require the inspection of vessels bound for certain ports, although no inspection is required from vessels bound for other ports, if such requirement is a part of a police law. Baker v. Wise, 16 Gratt. 139. A State law imposing half pilotage fees on vessels refusing to receive a pilot is not a duty. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 299.

6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.

7. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince or foreign State.

SECTION X.

1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money (a); emit bills of credit (b); make anything but gold and silver coin a tender (c) in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder (d), ex post facto (e) law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; (f) or grant any title of nobility.

Coining Money.

(a) A State can not incorporate any number of individuals and authorize them to coin money. Such an act would be as much a violation of the Constitution as if the money were coined by an officer of the State under its authority. Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257; S. c. 7 J. J. Marsh. 349.

Bills of Credit.

(b) A bill of credit is a paper issued by the sovereign power containing a pledge of its faith, and designed to circulate as money. Briscoe v. Bank,

II Pet. 257; S. c. 7 J. J. Marsh. 349; City Nat'l Bank v. Mahan, 21 La. Ann. 751; Craig v. State, 4 Pet. 410.

To constitute a bill of credit within the Constitution, it must be issued by a State on the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate as money. It must be paper which circulates on the credit of the State, and is so received and used in the ordinary business of life. The individual or committee who issue the bill must have power to bind the State. They must act as agents, and, of course, do not incur any personal responsibility, nor impart as individuals any credit to the paper. These are the leading characteristics of a bill of credit which a State can not emit. Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257; S. C. 7 J. J. Marsh. 349; Billis v. State, 2 McCord, 12; Curran v. State, 15 How. 304; S. C. 12 Ark. 321.

A bill of credit is unconstitutional, although it is not made a legal tender. The prohibition is general. It extends to all bills of credit, not to bills of a particular description. The Constitution considers the emission of bills of credit, and the enactment of tender laws, as distinct operations independent of each other, which may be separately performed. Both are forbidden. To sustain the one because it is not, also the other; to say that bills of credit may be emitted if they be not made a tender in payment of debts, is in effect to expunge that distinct independent prohibition, and to read the clause as if it had been entirely omitted. This can not be done. Craig v. State, 4 Pet. 410; Byrne v. State, 8 Pet. 40; Billis v. State, 2 McCord, 12; McFarland v. State Bank, 4 Ark. 44.

The prohibition can not be evaded by the mere omission of the State to pledge its faith for the redemption of the paper; nor, on the other hand, does the guaranty of the State for an emission of paper as the representative of money, conclusively stamp such paper as the bills of credit forbidden by the Constitution. Owen v. Branch Bank, 3 Ala. 258; Billis v. State, 2 McCord, 12; Darrington v. Branch Bank, 13 How. 12.

If the intention to create a currency is apparent, from the whole scope of the act, the emission is a bill of credit. State v. Hoge, 4 Rich. (N. S.) 185; State v. Auditor, 4 Rich. (N. S.) 311.

Although the issuing of bills of credit is a question of intent, yet the intent which must stamp the character of an instrument is that of the legislature which enacted the law, not of the officers who were to execute it, or of the persons who received the instrument. The legislative intent can be deduced from the legislative acts alone. In construing statutes, courts may look to the history and condition of the country as circumstances from which to gather the intention. Payaud v. State, 13 Miss. 491.

A State may grant acts of incorporation for the attainment of those objects which are essential to the interests of society. This power is incident to sovereignty, and there is no limitation in the Constitution in its exercise

by the States in respect to the incorporation of banks. Consequently the notes issued by a bank are not bills of credit within the meaning of the Constitution. Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257; S. C. 7 J. J. Marsh, 349; Craighead v. Bank, 1 Meigs, 199; Lampton v. Bank, 2 Litt. 300; Billis v. State, 2 McCord, 12; Bank v. Spilman, 3 Dana, 150; State v. Calvin, R. M. Charlt. 151; Owen v. Branch Bank, 3 Ala. 258; McFarland v. State Bank, 4 Ark. 44.

A bill of credit emanates from the sovereignty of the State. It rests for its currency on the faith of the State pledged by a public law. Whatever agency is employed to issue it, the State promises to pay it or to receive it in payment of public dues. When a particular fund is designated, out of which it is to be paid, it depends upon the faith of the State whether such fund shall be so appropriated. The State can not be sued ordinarily on such bill nor its payment exacted against its will. There is no fund or property which the holder of the bill can reach by judicial process. Such an instrument is altogether different in form and substance from a note issued by a bank whose capital is effectually chargeable with the redemption of its notes. Darrington v. Branch Bank, 13 How. 12; Curran v. State, 15 How. 304; S. C. 12 Ark. 321; Central Bank v. Little, 11 Geo. 346.

When a State becomes a stockholder in a bank, it imparts none of its attributes of sovereignty to the institution, and this is equally the case whether it owns the whole or a part of the stock of the bank. Darrington v. Branch Bank, 13 How. 12; Central Bank v. Little, 11 Geo. 346; Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257; S. C. 7 J. J. Marsh, 249; Billis v. State, 2 McCord, 12; Owen v. Branch Bank, 3 Ala. 258; McFarland v. State Bank, 4 Ark. 44; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190; s. c. 8 Ark. 236.

The mere fact that the directors of a bank whose stock is owned solely by the State are elected by the legislature, will not make its notes bills of credit. Darrington v. Branch Bank, 13 How. 12.

The bank notes are not bills of credit, although the bank is owned by the State, and its officers give bond to the State for the faithful discharge of their duties. Billis v. State, 2 McCord, 12; contra, Linn v. State Bank, 3 Ill. 87.

An act which is prohibited can not be done by a State, either directly or indirectly. A State can not, by any device that may be adopted, emit bills of credit. Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257; s. c. 7 J. J. Marsh, 349;. Bank v. Clark, 4 Mo. 59; Griffith v. Bank, 4 Mo. 255.

A State can act only through its agents. It would therefore be absurd to say that an act was not done by a State which was done by its authorized agents. Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257; S. C. 7 J. J. Marsh, 349.