creditor on the dismissal of his action, and gave to the second attaching creditor the su- perior right to the funds in the hands of the clerk.-Tootle v. Miner, (Kan.) 34 P. 401. Bond for release of property.
6. In an action on a bond given to secure release of attached property, conditioned for liability in case judgment was rendered against defendant in attachment, a finding that a judg- ment was not rendered is not warranted where, in the record of the attachment suit subsequent to a judgment of nonsuit, appears a judgment for plaintiff therein, as to the legality of which there is no evidence, there being a presumption in its favor.-Moore v. Mott, (Cal.) 34 P. 345.
7. The lien of an attachment is not de- stroyed by the delivery of the property to the owner on his furnishing a delivery bond, and if the officer, after surrendering it, seizes it un- der other attachments, it is subject to disposi- tion under the lien of the first attachment, and the sureties on the delivery bond are relieved from liability thereon by such resumption of possession by the officer.-Schneider v. Walling- ford, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 1109. Judgment and findings.
8. As Code 1887, c. 6, authorizing an ac- tion aided by attachment on a debt not due in certain cases, permits defendant to traverse the affidavit, and provides that, if plaintiff fails to substantiate the cause alleged, the attachment shall be dissolved, and the action dismissed, a judgment for plaintiff on a trial by the court, where the affidavit has been traversed, cannot be sustained unless there is a finding on the facts alleged as ground for the attachment.- Woods v. Tanquary, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 737. Claim of preferred lien by laborers Dismissal by plaintiff.
9. An attaching creditor may dismiss his action and release the attachment before sale without being liable to laborers who have served labor claim notices therein, under 1 Hill's Code, § 3124, allowing laborers, in all cases of attach- ment, execution, and similar writs, having claims against defendant, to give notice thereof at any time before actual sale of the property, declaring them preferred claims, and providing that the officer shall pay them out of the pro- ceeds of the sale, and providing, further, in case the claims are disputed, for actions, in which case the officer is required to retain suffi- cient of the proceeds to await their determina- tion. Wells v. Columbia Nat. Bank, (Wash.) 34 P. 160.
as to the terms under which he will surrende his interest in the land to the railroad company for its right of way.-Haynes v. Tacoma, é. & G. H. R. Co., (Wash.) 34 P. 922. Liability for negligence.
2. In an action by an attorney to recre for professional services, defendant citize damages for incompetency and negligence, a there was evidence that he employed plata to prosecute certain actions to judgment for a fixed sum in each case, and that plaintiff w discharged before judgment for negligence and incompetency, in failing to file lis pendens two foreclosure suits. Held, that evidence the plaintiff explained to defendant the effect of filing and failure to file such notices, and the probable expense, and that defendant said be did not want to spend the money for fin them, was admissible.-Hinckley v. Krug, Cuk 34 P. 118.
3. In such case it is not error to exelnde er- idence that part of the property covered by me of the mortgages plaintiff was employed to fere close was conveyed by the mortgagor before. but the deeds were not recorded until after, the foreclosure suit was commenced, where it pears that the remaining property sold for enough to satisfy defendant's judgment.-Hits- ley v. Krug, (Cal.) 34 P. 118.
4. A client cannot recover of his attorney
damages on account of negligence, in the ab- sence of any injury to the client caused by such negligence.-Hinckley v. Krug, (Cal)
5. It is not unprofessional conduct for attorney to sue a just claim against a nonresi dent, and serve summons by publication, when employed to do so, with the hope that posely the defendant therein will pay the judgment obtained, on its being sent to the place wher he resides, though such attorney knows such action cannot be maintained, for want of jers diction.-Hinckley v. Krug, (Cal.) 34 P. 118. Compensation of attorney.
6. Where an attorney advised his client in an action against a nonresident, that service by publication was good, and a valid judgment could be obtained, such attorney cannot recover for services rendered therein. - Hinckley Krug, (Cal.) 34 P. 118.
7. In an action by an attorney to recover for professional services, where part of the services for which plaintiff seeks to recover mo sisted in examining the title to a lot, it is er ror to exclude evidence that, through the ad- fendant purchased the lot, and was afterwards vice of plaintiff that the title was clear, de compelled to redeem it from a prior tax lien.— Hinckley v. Krug, (Cal.) 34 P. 118.
10. Code 1881, c. 33, directs that, when property attached on a writ issued in another county is claimed by a third person, he shall file his affidavit and bond with the sheriff, who shall return them to the clerk of the county where the property was seized, and said clerk shall docket the claim as a cause for trial. Held, that the sheriff's failure to return the af- fidavit could not deprive the proper court of jurisdiction, nor the attaching creditors of their right to an adjudication. - State v. Superior See "Arbitration and Award.” Court of Mason County, (Wash.) 34 P. 151.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
Argument of counsel, see "Criminal Law," 22- 24; "Trial," 8, 9. Attorney's fees, liability of state, see "States and State Officers," 3, 4.
on foreclosure, see "Mortgages." 8. provision in note, see "Negotiable Instru- ments," 1.
Authority of attorney.
1. An attorney, employed by a railroad company to represent it on the trial of a partic- ular cause for the condemnation of a right of way, has no authority to enter into any contract with a third person, not a party to the action,
Autrefois Acquit and Convict. See "Criminal Law," 9-11.
In criminal cases-Bond on appeal.
1. The supreme court has no authority to reduce as excessive the amount of the appeal bond fixed by the trial court in a prosecution for manslaughter.-State v. Gile, (Wash.) 34 P. 151.
2. It is no defense for the sureties on a bail bond that the information was insufficient- ly verified, or that the arrest of the principal on a warrant issued on such information was illegal.-State v. Sureties of Krohne, (Wyo.) 34 P. 3.
3. The sureties on a criminal recognizance for the appearance of a defendant, and to abide the judgment of the court, and not depart without leave, are discharged from further lia- bility when the defendant has duly appeared, and received sentence, and thereafter has of- fered and submitted himself to the sheriff, to be taken into custody under the sentence im- posed by the court.-Jackson v. State, (Kan.) 34 P. 744.
See "Banks and Banking" "Carriers;" "De- posit in Court;" "Innkeepers;" "Pledge." Liability for moneys lost by failure of bank, see "Office and Officer," 8.
See "Elections and Voters," 7.
Bankruptcy.
National banks-Contracts.
5. A national bank has power to take an assignment of a mortgage on land to secure a loan made at the time of the assignment.- First Nat. Bank v. Andrews, (Wash.) 34 P. 913; Young v. Same, Id.
Best and Secondary Evidence. See "Evidence," 3, 4.
Bills and Notes.
See "Negotiable Instruments."
In bond, filling, see "Bonds." In deeds, filling, see "Deed." Board.
See "Assignment for Benefit of Creditors;" "In- Of county commissioners, see "Counties," 4. solvency."
BANKS AND BANKING.
Authority of president and cashier.
Of trade, see "Inspection."
Bona Fide Purchasers.
Of negotiable paper, see "Negotiable Instru-
ments," 3-5. 1. The president and cashier of a bank have no authority, by virtue of their office, to sell property belonging to the bank.-Greena- walt v. Wilson, (Kan.) 34 P. 403. Special remedy provided for winding up affairs-Bank commissioners.
2. Bank Commissioners' Act March 30, 1878, provides for the examination of all banks by commissioners appointed therefor. Section 11 of such act, as amended by St. 1887, p. 90, provides that if the bank commissioners find that any such corporation has violated its char- ter, or is conducting business in an unsafe manner, and refuses to discontinue its illegal practices, the attorney general may bring suit in the proper court to prohibit the transaction of further business, and to wind up its affairs. Section 21 provides that all acts are repealed in so far as they are inconsistent with the act. Insolvent Act 1880, § 8, provides that an ad- judication of insolvency may be made for causes enumerated therein on the petition of five or more creditors whose demands amount in the aggregate to not less than $500; and section 25 requires the assignee, "as speedily as possible, to convert the estate, real and per- sonal, into money." Held, that the insolvent act is superseded by the bank commissioners' act as far as banking corporations are concern- ed, and that an adjudication of insolvency against a banking corporation, and the appoint- ment of a receiver therefor, would not lie on the petition of creditors therefor.-People v. Superior Court, (Cal.) 34 P. 492,
3. A contention that the sole object of the bank commissioners' act is visitation and a re- port to the attorney general by the commission- ers, and that there is no suggestion therein for the sequestration of assets, is untenable; sec- tion 11 of such act further providing that if the court shall consider it unsafe for the corpora- tion to continue to transact business, and that it is insolvent, an injunction shall be issued, and thereupon such proceedings shall be taken against the corporation "as may be decided up on by its creditors," and sections 18 and 19 authorizing the commissioners to maintain ac- tions in the name of the people, under the court's direction. - People v. Superior Court, (Cal.) 34 P. 492.
4. The remedies provided by the two acts are not cumulative, nor the powers conferred by the bank commissioners' act auxiliary to those conferred by the insolvent act, the object of the bank commissioners' act being to provide an entirely different scheme for winding up the business of a banking corporation.-People v. Superior Court, (Cal.) 34 P. 492.
See, also, "Principal and Surety." For release of property attached, see "Attach-
Injunction bond, see "Injunction," 11, 12. Of contractor, see "Mechanics' Liens," 30. On appeal, see "Appeal," 15-17, 107, 108. - in criminal cases, see "Bail." Authority of obligee to fill in blanks. 1. The attorney for an attachment debtor presented to defendants for signature as sure- ties a redelivery bond, blank as to the specific description of the property attached and its value. Defendants signed the bond and justi- fication annexed, and gave the paper to the at- torney, who signed the jurat as notary. He thereafter filled in the blanks, and delivered the bond. Held, that defendants had made him their agent to fill the blanks, and were estopped to deny his authority. - Palacios v. Brasher, (Colo. Šup.) 34 P. 251.
2. When sureties sign an official bond, which is blank as to the penalty, and permit it to pass from their hands in that condition, they are estopped to claim that it was afterwards filled up without their authority. - Rose v. Douglass Tp., (Kan.) 34 P. 1046.
Conflict between field notes and monu-
1. While the corners of a survey as actual- ly established and marked on the ground by the United States government surveyors control the designation of such corners in the plats or field notes, yet the presumption is that the corners have been established at the places indicated by such field notes; and the proof that the actual establishment was different must be clear and convincing, where the actual location as claimed does not accord with the section lines in ad- joining sections, and will establish the claim in an irregular shape.-Cadeau v. Elliott, (Wash.) 34 P. 916.
Location of corner
veyor's footsteps.
2. In order to locate an intermediate post in a survey of land, which was run also by courses and distances, the footsteps of the sur- veyor should be followed, instead of taking a reverse course.-Blackburn v. Nelson, (Cal.) 34 P. 775.
The pipe was put in evidence, but there wun testimony as to where it was found. Had the the evidence did not justify an instruction a to the effect of possession of property recently stolen.-People v. Abbott, (Cal.) 34 P. 500. 4. It is error to charge that the possessin of stolen property soon after the taking, w not sufficient to justify a conviction, is a ty circumstance," and that defendant w bound to explain the possession in order to re move its effect, as this invades the province d the jury.-People v. Abbott, (Cal.) 34 P. 500
3. In an action to recover possession of land it appeared that plaintiffs owned land bounded by the meander line of a lake as first surveyed by the government in 1855; that the waters of the lake receded, and left the land in dispute lying between the present and orig- inal meander line of the lake; and that de- fendant took possession of and built a house on the land in 1879, and has ever since resided there. Defendant claimed, and witnesses tes- tified, that the land first settled on by him was an island, separated from plaintiffs' land by water several feet deep, and was part of the public domain. Several witnesses supported plaintiffs' claim that no such island ever ex- isted, and the plat of the original survey of the Of contracts, see "Equity," 5–9. township showed none. Held, that the evidence was sufficient to justify a verdict for defend- ant as to the facts in issue.-Moore v. Brown- field, (Wash.) 34 P. 199.
4. Under a deed purporting to convey a certain number of feet along a street commen- cing at a certain point, only that number of feet passed by the deed, and therefore evidence that the grantor, in measuring off the land granted, measured more than that number of feet, is incompetent to show that more than the number of feet stated passed by the deed. -Hogins v. Boggs, (Cal.) 34 P. 653.
5. On the question of the location of a point called for in a patent and survey, the court may consider the field notes and descrip- tion in the patent of an adjoining tract, the boundaries of the two tracts being coincident for a distance of several miles, and both hav- ing been surveyed by the same surveyor at about the same time.-Adair v. White, (Cal.) 34 P. 338.
See "Factors and Brokers."
BURGLARY.
What constitutes offense.
1. A buggy house "in which goods, wares, merchandise, and other valuable things are kept and deposited" is a "building" in which burglary may be committed, within the meaning of Gen. St. 1889, c. 31, § 68.-State v. Garrison, (Kan.) 34 P. 751.
Proof of corpus delicti.
2. In a burglary case it appeared that one evening a storekeeper had in his safe in the store certain money; that when he and his clerks left for the night, no one was there, and the doors were locked and windows closed; that neither of them returned until the next morning; that the storekeeper had not author- ized any one to enter the store during the night, and it could not be entered except through the doors or windows; and that in the morning the money was gone from the safe, and apparently a window had been raised during the night. Held, that the corpus delicti was established.- State v. Munson, (Wash.) 34 P. 932. Instructions.
3. In a burglary case it appeared that a Chinaman's trunk and pipe were stolen from the burglarized building. There was evidence that two persons carried a "China trunk" from the lot on which the building was situated about the time the crime was committed; that defendant and others were seen with such a trunk about that time; and that such China- man's trunk was found open two days after wards, a considerable distance from the build- ing. There was no evidence that a "China trunk" is any different from any other trunk.
CARRIERS.
See, also, "Railroad Companies." Limiting liability.
1 A railroad cannot, in consideration of reduced rate, exempt itself from all liabus of a carrier of live stock, not resulting fre defective trucks, wheels, or axles.-Union Pac Ry. Co. v. Rainey, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 986. Live-stock shipments shipper.
2. The defect in a car furnished to trans port horses, that the side slats are so far aper as to allow horses to get their feet thro them, is not so apparent to the shipper he ing his horses on the car as to convict him of negligence. - Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rainey. (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 986. Carriage of passengers sengers.
3. Where a person, believing he has a right to do so, rides on a freight train with the consent of the conductor in charge, and, whe so riding, is injured through the negligence of the trainmen, the company is liable to him as a passenger, though such train be one whic by the rules of the company, was not allowed to carry passengers.-Everett v. Oregon S. L. & U. N. Ry. Co., (Utah,) 34 P. 289.
Injuries to passengers.
4. In an action by a passenger against a stage company for personal injuries received from the upsetting of a stage in coming dow a mountain road, it appeared that one of the horses had been inclined to run away; that the road was muddy and slippery; that the horses were going at "a slow jog," when they were yards before the driver regained control: tha: frightened by a landslide; that they ran 10 flying mud and slush made it hard for the driv and that the horses were going in a trot, whe er to see, and tended to frighten the horses: they were so frightened by another slide that the driver lost control, and they ran away, 11 Held, that there was evidens for the jury as to whether defendant failed to upset the stage. Pacific Coast Stage Co., (Cal.) 34 P. S&S. provide suitable horses and driver.-Knight t
5. In an action against a cable-car en car alleged to have been prematurely started. pany for injuries received in alighting from a after instructing the jury that common carriers of passengers must use such vigilance and fore- sight as they can, under the circumstances, in view of the character and mode of conveyance adopted, to prevent accidents, it was not in- proper to instruct that "it was the defendant's business to know, before starting up the car. whether passengers getting off or on the ear were in a position to be injured, and it weeld be negligence to start the car suddenly, under such circumstances, without exercising every precaution for the safety of those who might be getting off or on."-Tobin v. Omnibus Cable Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 124.
lie to review the action of the court in commit-
arriage of passengers Contributory | perior court has no jurisdiction to review such negligence of passengers. proceedings on certiorari, though the time lim- ited for appeal has expired before certiorari is 6. In an action against a street-car com- brought.-Gregory v. Dixon, (Wash.) 34 P. 212. any for personal injuries, plaintiff claimed, nd the evidence tended to prove, that a car view contempt proceedings on certiorari.-State 3. The supreme court of Montana can re- as started while she was alighting therefrom, v. Fourth Judicial District Court, (Mont.) 34 hile defendant claimed, and gave evidence P. 39. > show, that the car was started before plain- 4. An order for payment of temporary ali- ff left her seat, and that she tried to get off hile the car was in motion. Held, that an in-mony being appealable, and such appeal, with truction making the defense of contributory the enforcement of the order, certiorari will not stay bond, furnishing a complete remedy against egligence dependent on whether defendant uld have guarded against such negligence was endered harmless by subsequent instructions at the verdict must be for the defendant if he injuries were caused either solely by plain- ff's negligence, or, jointly and concurrently, by e negligence of plaintiff and defendant or its ervants, and that if plaintiff, knowing the car 'as in motion, chose to run her chances, and et off by stepping directly out from the car, le must abide the risks she took.-Tobin v. mnibus Cable Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 124. iability for passengers' effects.
ting defendant for contempt in disobeying the order; the provision of Const. art. 8, § 3, that writs of certiorari in proceedings for contempt the justices of the supreme court may issue in the district court, not being intended to ap- ply where there is remedy by appeal.-In re Finkelstein, (Mont.) 34 P. 847.
7. In an action against a sleeping-car com- any for loss by a passenger of his coat while See "Fraudulent Conveyances;" "Sale," 1 his berth at night, the presumption of neg- gence on the part of defendant arising from uch loss is rebutted by the uncontradicted evi-
ence of the car porter that he was on duty, See "Venue in Civil Cases," 3.
nd engaged in watching the car, through the ight, till after the loss.-Pullman Palace Car
o. v. Freudenstein, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 578.
8. A railroad company is not bound, as a Evidence of, see "Criminal Law," 41. art of its contract to transport a passenger, ho is employed as a traveling salesman, to arry as his personal baggage a case of sam- le merchandise belonging to his employers; and here it receives and checks such case without nowledge of its ownership or contents, a part f which is afterwards stolen from its baggage oom without negligence on its part, it is not able to the owners.-Southern Kan. Ry. Co. F. Clark, (Kan.) 34 P. 1054.
Sheriffs and constables have not the ab- olute right, because of their office, to carry weapons at all times, since Act 1887, c. 30, 10. provides that sheriffs, constables, and oth- r officers "may carry weapons in the legal dis- harge of the duties of their respective offices, hen the same may be necessary, but it shall e for the court or jury to decide from the evi- ence whether such carrying of weapons was ecessary or not, and for an improper carrying r using deadly weapons by an officer, he shall be punished as other persons are punished."- Guyse v. Territory, (N. M.) 34 P. 295.
CERTIORARI
Review on, see "Contempt," 2.
1. Code Civil Proc. § 323, provides for a vrit of certiorari when an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, and there is no ap- beal, nor any adequate remedy. Const. art. 5, 23, provides that a writ of error shall lie From the supreme court to every final judgment of the county court. Held, that a writ of cer- iorari should not issue for the review by a dis- rict court of a judgment rendered by a county ourt within its jurisdiction, and from which here was no appeal to the district court, un- Her Gen. St. §§ 500, 501, since there was an adequate remedy by writ of error from the su- preme court.-Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bowler, Colo. App.) 34 P. 940.
2. Since Gen. St. § 784, provides that the proceedings of the county superintendent of schools organizing school districts may be ap- pealed to the county commissioners, the su-
See, also, "Fraudulent Conveyances." Liability of sheriff, see "Sheriffs and Consta- bles," 8.
1. A mortgage of a stock of goods was filed as soon as made, and the mortgagees' agents, who occupied the other side of the same building as the mortgagor, took possession, and put in charge a man who hired the mortgagor to help him, as clerk. New books were opened, and all moneys received, after payment of run- ning expenses, were applied on the mortgage debt. The mortgagor's name on the window was not erased. Held, that there was a change of possession, as against subsequently attach- ing creditors.-In re Fisher, (Or.) 34 P. 1024; Koehler v. McCamant, Id.
2. Under Code, § 776, subd. 40, providing that every mortgage of personal property capa- ble of immediate delivery which is not filed or recorded shall be presumptively fraudulent as to the mortgagor's creditors unless accompanied by immediate delivery and followed by an imme- diate change of possession of the mortgaged property, the possession of the mortgagee, where his mortgage is not recorded, must be exclusive, and accompanied with such outward acts of ownership as to apprise the public that the property has changed hands; and a joint pos- Peirce v. Kelly, (Or.) 34 P. 963. session with the mortgagor is not sufficient.-
3. A mortgage of merchandise, permitting the mortgagor to remain in possession and sell in the usual course of business, paying the pro- ceeds to the mortgagee till the debt is extin- guished, is rendered void against creditors by a parol' agreement that the mortgagor may re- tain from the proceeds a small allowance for the support of his family. - Wile v. Butler, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 1110. Description of property.
4. The return of the mortgagor's assignee, to whom the stock of mortgaged goods was turn- ed over by consent, showing that he sold more articles of some kinds than were described in the mortgage, does not show that the descrip- tion in the mortgage was inadequate as against
subsequently attaching creditors, there being no averment or proof that the mortgagor had any goods other than those described in the See "Pledge." mortgage. In re Fisher, (Or.) 34 P. 1024; Koehler v. McCamant, Id.
Release--Substitution of other security. Of taxes, see "Taxation," 9-14.
5. Though a contract for a pledge, by recit- ing that it is given in lieu of a certain chattel mortgage, shows an intention that it shall take the place of the chattel mortgage, it does not, in the absence of the delivery of the articles thereby agreed to be pledged, release the chat- tel mortgage; Civil Code, § 2988, providing that no pledge is valid till the property is delivered to the pledgee.-Irwin v. McDowell, (Cal.) 34 P. 708.
Seizure by mortgagee
6. Where the holder of a chattel mortgage, under his mortgage, takes possession of a part of the personal property mortgaged, but makes no sale or disposition thereof, as prescribed by the statute, he is liable to the mortgagor for the actual value of the same, at the time and place of taking possession thereof.-Miller v. McElwain, (Kan.) 34 P. 396.
Title of mortgagee after default.
7. Possession by a chattel mortgagee after the maturity of his debt does not vest in him a legal title which is subject to attachment.- Voorhies v. Hennessy, (Wash.) 34 P. 931.
See "Municipal Corporations."
Verbal land contract, see "Vendor and Pur- chaser," 1.
Against decedent's estate, see "Executors and Administrators," 7-9.
CLERK OF COURT.
Certificate by deputy to affidavit, see "Affida- vit."
Judicial power, see "Constitutional Law," 5. Liability for money lost by failure of bank, see "Office and Officer," 8.
Powers-To adjourn court.
When the judge is not present at the time fixed by law for the holding of a term of court, the clerk of the court cannot, in the ab- sence of statutory authority, adjourn the court to a future day. In re Terrill, (Kan.) 34 P. 457; In re McClaskey, Id. 459.
Collateral Attack.
See "Judgment," 25-27.
Effect of decision of secretary of interior, see "Public Lands," 18.
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSI- TIES.
State university-Board of regents. Const. art. 11, § 7, requires the members of board of regents of the state university to be "elected," and Act March 19, 1891, provids that "the board shall consist of three elective members, as now provided by law, and of the governor and attorney general, who shall be officio members of the board." Held, that the act does not inaugurate a new system of go ernment for the university, but merely incresse the number of regents, and that the attorney general in office at the time of the passage of the act is not entitled to act as a member of the board ex officio, since the act does not show the existence of an emergency at the time of 3 passage which requires the induction of the is creased number into office prior to their election by the people. State v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 121. and State v. Arrington, 4 P. 735, 18 Nev. 412, for lowed.-State v. Torreyson, (Nev.) 34 P. 870
In obtaining decree of divorce, see "Divorce," 3-5. Color of Title.
See "Adverse Possession," 4; "Public Lands," 15.
Bank commissioners, see "Banks and Bank- ing," 2-4.
Common Carrier.
Community Property.
See "Husband and Wife," 6-9.
Compensation.
Of attorney, see "Attorney and Client," 6, 7. Complaint.
See, also, "Payment;" "Release and Dis- charge." Effect of offer as admissions, see "Evidence," & Compromise as consideration.
The compromise by a wife of a suit for divorce against her husband, and her abandon ment of her alleged right of homestead in his property, is a valid consideration for a mor gage executed by the husband in her favor te secure a note.-McClure v. McClure, (Cal.) 34 P. 822.
Conclusion of Law.
Condemnation Proceedings.
See "Eminent Domain."
In policy, see "Insurance," 1, 2.
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