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RAILROADS. See "Negligence;" "Trespass;" "Street Railroads;"
"Eminent Domain;" "Carriers;" "Contributory Negligence;"
A company operating a private logging road is liable for fire
caused by the ignition of combustible material negligently
permitted to remain on land necessarily used by it as a
right of way. Craft v. Timber Co., 151.
A timber company building a railroad is liable for damages to
land done by one who built the railroad under a contract
with the company where it is shown that the work was
done under the supervision and contract of the company.
Craft v. Timber Co., 151.
An instruction by the trial court that it is the duty of an engi-
neer to ring the bell and blow the whistle when approaching
a crossing is erroneous. Edwards v. Railroad Co., 99.
The operator of a hand car may assume that persons on a
trestle will step off, and he owes no duty to them until he
discovers by their conduct that they cannot or do not in-
tend to leave the track, and this conduct must manifest it-
self positively and not be inferred from remaining on the
track. Wright v. Railroad, 327.
The filing and recording by the Secretary of State of articles
of association of a proposed railroad company, if not such
as required by law, is a nullity. Railroad Co. v. Stroud, 413.
In an action to condemn land for railroad purposes, the profile
required to be filed must show whether there will be any
"fills" or "cuts" on the land sought to be condemned. Rail
road Co. v. Stroud, 413.
Where the articles of incorporation of a railroad company are
upon their face void, the trial court will so declare in a pro-
ceeding to condemn land by right of eminent domain
claimed thereunder. Railroad Co. v. Stroud, 413.
The testimony of a tax lister that the owner of a mill listed it
at less than that claimed by them in an action for its loss
by fire, is some evidence that it was not worth the amount
claimed. Dobson v. Railroad, 900.
The failure on the part of a railroad company to keep automatic
couplers in proper condition and repair is negligence, as
much as if the cars had never been equipped with such
couplers. Elmore v. Railroad, 865.
If at any time during an assault by a man on a woman he has
an intent to ravish her, he is guilty of an assault with in-
tent to commit a rape. State v. Mehaffey, 1062.
An indictment for rape must allege that the act was done
forcibly and against the will of the prosecutrix, or words
equivalent thereto. State v. Marsh, 1000.
There is sufficient evidence in this case to be submitted to the
jury as to whether the accused made the assault with the
intent to commit rape. State v. Mehaffey, 1062.
In the trial of an indictment for an assault with the intent to
commit a rape a requested instruction that rape is a most
detestable crime and that the heinousness of the offense
may transport the jury and judge with so much indignation
that they may be over-hastily carried on to a conviction on
insufficient evidence was properly refused. State v. Me
Where a resident creditor of an insolvent bank brings suit in
another State, which hinders the collection of the assets of
the bank by the receiver, the receiver is entitled to enjoin
the creditor for the prosecution of such suit. Davis v.
Lumber Co., 233.
In a suit by a receiver for an injunction to restrain a resident
creditor from maintaining a suit in another State against
the corporation for which the receiver had been appointed,
it is no defense, that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy
at law. Davis v. Lumber Co., 233.
See "Judgments;" "Case on Appeal."
The power is inherent in every court to correct its record so as
to speak the truth. Ricaud v. Alderman, 62.
The findings of fact by the referee in this case, sustain the con-
clusions of law, that the time for the completion of the
work was impliedly and necessarily enlarged, that plaintiffs
are guilty of no unnecessary delay, that defendant cannot
recover damages for failure to complete the work at the
time specified, and that the defendant is indebted to plain-
tiffs in the sum found due by the referee, for work and labor
in excavating and lowering the bed of a tail race. Malloy v.
Cotton Mills, 432.
After an award has passed into final judgment, it is too late to
contest the same for alleged mistake in calculation of arbi-
trator, or that the arbitration had not been made a rule of
court, or that the amount was agreed upon by the parties,
or that the reference to arbitration was invalid. For an
erroneous judgment the only remedy is by appeal. McLeod
v. Graham, 473.
The findings of fact by a referee, supported by evidence and
sustained by the trial court, are not reviewable. Malloy
v. Cotton Mills, 432.
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS. See "Deeds."
In ejectment a sheriff will not be allowed to affix his seal to a
deed, having omitted it by mistake, unless such equity is set
up in the complaint. Fisher v. Owens, 686.
The mere fact that a tract of land intended to be conveyed was
described in the deed as 50 by 150 feet, whereas it in fact
contained only 50 by 116 feet, was not evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the grantor, such as to deprive him of
the right to reformation. Warehouse Co. v. Ozment, 839.
A court of equity may correct mutual mistakes in written in-
struments. Warehouse Co. v. Ozment, 839.
In this action for reformation of a deed for mistake, the issue,
set out in the statement of facts, is sufficiently comprehen-
sive. Warehouse Co. v. Ozment, 839.
The evidence in this case is sufficiently clear, strong and con-
vincing to warrant the correction of the mistake in the
deed. Warehouse Co. v. Ozment, 839.
In an action to reform a deed for a mistake, it is competent for
a witness to testify as to the intention of the parties. Ware.
house Co. v. Ozment, 839.
REGISTRATION. See "Deeds."
REHEARINGS. See "Supreme Court."
When a matter of law has been decided by the Supreme Court
it can be reviewed only on a rehearing, and cannot be again
questioned in the same case on a subsequent appeal. Holley
v. Smith, 36.
The Supreme Court will not review a ruling of its own, which
does not affect injuriously the complaining party, even
where the ruling is erroneous. Balk r. Harris, 10.
Where a new trial is granted without passing upon certain ex-
ceptions and upon a re-hearing of the exceptions upon which
new trial was granted, is reversed, the Supreme Court, the
personnel of the same having been partially changed, orders
in this case a re-argument of the exceptions not passed
upon, without a petition for the same being filed. Fleming
v. Railroad, 714.
In an action by an employee of a railroad company for injuries,
an instruction appearing in the original record as embody.
ing two separate and distinct propositions of law, is held on
a re-hearing of the case to constitute in fact but one in-
struction and not misleading. Fleming v. Railroad, 714.
Where an estate is vested in a trustee to preserve contingent re-
mainders and limitations, the court may, upon petition of
the life tenant and the trustee, with such of the remainder-
men as may be in esse, proceed to order the sale, and bind
all persons either in esse or in posse. Springs v. Scott, 548.
Since Acts 1903, Chap. 99, the court has the power, when there
is a vested interest in real estate and a contingent remain-
der over to persons who are not in being, or when the con-
tingency has not yet happened which will determine who
the remaindermen are, to order the sale by conforming to
the procedure prescribed by the Act. The Act is constitu-
tional, and applies to estates created prior to its enactment.
Springs v. Scott, 549.
Rents accruing after the death of the testator pass with the
property and must be paid to those to whom such property
belongs. Baptist University v. Borden, 476.
RESCISSION OF INSTRUMENTS.
See "Reformation of Instru-
RES ADJUDICATA. See "Former Adjudication.”
SALES. See "Judicial Sales."
A deed conveyed standing timber to a trustee, who was to per-
mit defendant, on payment of a certain sum, to cut the
timber, and afterwards, on measurement of the wood, and
payment by defendant of a certain price per cord, to convey
the wood to him. The trustee agreed to allow defendant
to remove the wood as fast as cut without prepayment-
it to be paid for as soon as measured by the person to whom
defendant sold. The title to the wood did not pass to
defendant until it was removed by him, so that he was not
liable for wood burned while awaiting shipment. Porter v.
A contract for the sale of brick, two-thirds hard and one-third
soft, kiln run, does not require the purchaser to take the
brick if the proportion is more than one soft for two hard
brick, and if the proportion of soft brick delivered is greater
he is entitled to an abatement from the price.
Cotton Mills, 271.
A deed of a sheriff without a seal attached is not competent
evidence in ejectment to show title. Fisher v. Owens, 686.
The instruction of the trial judge as to examplary damages in
this case by a father for the seduction of his minor daugh-
ter, is not erroneous. Willeford v. Bailey, 402.
In an action by a father for the seduction of his minor daughter,
an instruction that damages could be allowed the father
only for a wrong to himself, was properly refused. Wille-
ford v. Bailey, 402.
It is not necessary in order for a parent to maintain an action
for the seduction of his daughter that he show actual loss
of services. Snider v. Newell, 614.
A board of county commissioners cannot release a surety from
the official bond of a sheriff, and any other bond they may
take will be cumulative during any one term of office.
Fidelity Co. v. Fleming, 332.
See "Libel and Slander."
An indictment for slander of an innocent woman must contain
the averment that the defendant attempted to destroy the
reputation of an innocent woman. State v. Mitchell, 1033.
SPECIAL VENIREMEN. See "Jury."
In a prosecution for retailing liquor without a license, a special
verdict which fails to find that the defendant did not have
a license to sell is not sufficient to sustain a judgment of
guilty. State v. Bradley, 1060.
The evidence in this case is sufficient to be submitted to the
jury to show abandonment of a bond for title to land.
Robinett v. Hamby, 353.
Parol waiver of a written contract to convey land, amounting to