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dividuals were of no account in this war--each must do what the country calls him to do.
To another officer he also said, that the country needed every available man to figbt the coming great battle, and no individual had a right to stand in the way of the utmost harmony of action. “Myself, and all other Generals in the army," said HOOKER, "bad better be sacrificed than that there should be a want of harmony and cordial co-operation on the part of all concerned.”
If malice, pique, rivalry, offended dignity, or ill-will had been a present motive it would not have expressed itself thus.
Lofty patriotism, bigh conception of duty, and the loyal performance of it, conscientiously understood and faithfully sustained by candid effort and fearless execution—this was HOOKER. His march to Pennsylvania was recognized by Congress, in a resolution thanking bim for “the skill, energy, and endurance which first covered Washington and Baltimore from the meditated blow of the advancing and powerful army of rebels, led by GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE."
To the Army of the Potomac, HOOKER's was a genial character. They loved him, trusted him, and received his command without thought or question.
The march to Gettysburg was the carrying out of HOOKER'S campaign and ideas by the organization inspired and carried forward by his energies. The same staff HOOKER had selected and advanced guided and posted the troops, provided them with supplies and ammunition, and administered and nerved them. ery thing was in place as he disposed it; nothing was changed in matter or spirit,” is the remark of one who loved and trusted him, “ except that in person HOOKER was absent, while still present in spirit and inspiration ;-every-where, from Oak Ridge to Round Top, from the Granite Spur to Culp's Hill.”
No one man is the hero of Gettysburg. Every soldier present is a sharer in that honor. HOOKER was not present, but be helped to win it. Let HOOKER, then, share that bonor also.
The influence of HOOKER never left the Army of the Potomac
until it was mustered out of service under the shadow of the Capitol.
It is rare that an army commander, thus retired into obscurity in the height of hostilities, should respond with alacrity when subsequently called by his government for service in a subordinate position. It was HOOKER's high nature to serve his country wherever it should require his services. In the stress of the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga, it was necessary that ROSECRANS should be succored, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were selected to be dispatched from the Army of the Potomac for that purpose. Officers of high rank and acknowledged leadership were essential to the movement. Not only was this body of men to be promptly transferred from the fields of Virginia to the capital of Tennessce, but they were to open up a long line of communications through a country threatened by cqually powerful forces of the enemy. Celerity, discretion, boldness, and the highest military sagacity were required for successful co-operation with the besieged and starving army under ROSECRANS.
This was accomplished under HOOKER's command. How and by what means and the details of an experience which forms in itself a separate campaign, must be left to the historian. They can not be recited bere. The swift movement by rail of this large body of troops from the banks of the Potomac to the Tennessee was one of the marvelous accomplishments of modern war. The details of this movement were entirely in the hands of COLONEL and QUARTERMASTER THOMAS A. Scott, afterwards President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and GENERAL BUTTERFIELD, HOOKER's efficient chief-of-staff.
The battle of Waubatchie, where the choicest corps of the enemy precipitated itself, in a night attack, upon Hooker’s columns, wearied and exhausted by the day's marching and skirmishing, and the dispersement by the assailed command in a general enagement of an enemy which sought its destruction in order to close in upon the last defile by wbich ROSECRANS’ Army of the Cumber
land could be circuitously approached, added renown to a trusted, but hitherto unfortunate commander.
Under less skillful leadership, a failure of this movement, delay in delivering any battle or skirmish during the march from Nashville to Chattanooga, or default in accomplishing its plan, might bave been unfortunate and disastrous in its results to the Army of the Cumberland and to the country. The Chattanooga of 1863 might have been the Valley Forge of 1778.
On the reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland, the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were consolidated, and with other troops formed the Twentieth Corps, to which HOOKER was formally assigned.
That Thomas and not HOOKER was assigned to the command of the Army of the Cumberland might bave been a source of discomfort to some men. It was not to HOOKER. He received and obeyed his orders with his usual spirit of loyalty to his superior officers.
Then came the battles of Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, in the plan of which HOOKER again was assigned a subordinate part. His was the duty of “ demonstrating ” against the impregnable Lookout Mountain, while the grand effort should be made by SHERMAN on the left to carry Mission Ridge.
All of HOOKER's command, except one division (under GEARY) had been withdrawn from bim to participate in the forthcoming battle.
HOOKER felt his isolation and apparent uselessness in this situation, and eager to participate in the general engagement about to occur, applied for permission to join the largest part of his command, which had been detached from bis immediate supervision to participate in the assault. This request was refused. While the troops were passing through HOOKER's camp to engage in the assault, the bridge they were using to cross the river br and became useless. In this emergency, it was decided that in case the troops could not get over HOOKER should assume command of all' unable to cross. It was expected that OSTERHAUS' division of the Army of the Tennessee and CRUFT's division of the Army of the
Cumberland would have been able to have crossed the pontoon bridge and join the assaulting columns in front of Chattanooga. Indeed, the attack was deferred for that
purpose. It was under these circumstances that HOOKER was directed to take these two divisions and his own and make a demonstration on Lookout Mountain, provided the bridge could not be repaired in time to cross for the assault as contemplated. This order reached HOOKER about six o'clock in the evening before the battle. It proved impossible to restore the bridge in season: so between sunset and sunrise HOOKER's plans were formed, troops disposed, and every thing made ready for the “ demonstration” he was ordered to institute against Lookout.
It was not expected that the troops thus under HOOKER's command should be able to accomplish anything more than to divert the enemy in favor of the grand assault upon his right. HOOKER'S tent, however, had been facing that grand old mountain not in vain. Its occupant had not been idle. He had studied the ground, the enemy's forces, defenses, and their approaches; and when, at last, the opportunity to participate in the grand attack of the Army of the Cumberland was not to come to bim, but instead thereof came orders that he should make a demonstration, a plan was quickly formed by him that contemplated carrying the mountain. How a force was swiftly moved around its base, and across its brow, under cover of the morning mists, and a heavy fire in front—is a story often told in prose, in verse, in household words, and pictured in enduring art for the admiration of generations to come.
When at last the sun broke through the mists on the mountain sides, it was no figure of words that led a distinguished officer to report that HOOKER's colors were “ above the clouds.” His troops were on the summit of Lookout Mountain. At this, none, it is likely, were more surprised than the great commanders to whom HOOKER's signals reported bis success. It was after this, that beyond on the left, across the valley, the impetuous soldiers of SHERMAN and Thomas drove the enemy from Mission Ridge, and the Army of the Cumberland avenged Chickamauga.
Next came the campaign of 1864, from Chattanooga to Dalton, Resaca, and on to Atlanta. From May 2d to July 30th it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that there was almost continuous fighting Millcreek Gap, Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, Cassville, Dallas, Pine Mountain, skirmishes on the Chattahoochie, and bloody collisions almost daily, brought the army near Atlanta. At Resaca and Peach Tree Creek the inevitable result of HOOKER'S actual personal leadership, when in contact with the enemy, was felt throughout the field.
At Snake Creek Gap, before the battle of Resaca opened, the Twentieth Corps, obedient to orders, was restrained from the attack, which HOOKER would have precipitated twelve hours before the battle did actually begin. To the Twentieth Corps was afterward assigned the task of carrying the two redoubts which were to be stormed.
The exploits of this attack, conducted under HOOKER's personal direction, will ever shine with luster in the annals of the Army of the Cumberland.
Before he left that army, HOOKER's friends were all who knew him. HOOKER's leadership, as one of its honored generals, was universally acknowledged. Why, at last, he asked to be relieved from duty in it will never be imputed to a desire to quit its service. It was the result of an honest conviction of an honest mind. HOOKER deliberately concluded that it was not intended in all quarters that he should be fairly treated. He was willing, he thought, to overlook inany intentional offenses; but when the gallant and unfortunate McPherson fell, what more natural for HOOKER to expect than that his rank, subordination, services, and success should entitle him to be named as McPHERSON's successor. Whether, in this respect, HOOKER was rigbt, need not be discussed here. Let it be debated by men who think they would have acted otherwise. Suffice it to narrate, that GENERAL HOWARD (who had commanded the panic-stricken corps* in HOOKER's army at Chancel
*The extremne foresight and carefulness of HOOKER, in all his official acts, can not be more aptly illustrated than by his reply when, after Chancellorsville, it