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Section V

This Section relates to the principle upon which it will be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into consideration population, resources, geographical situation, length and nature of maritime communications, density and character of the railways, et cetera.

The views of the American Government are in general accord with the reply to this question contained in the Report of Sub-Committee A and it does not appear to be necessary to restate those views in this document. It may be observed, however, that the conclusions reached by the Joint Commission in reply to this question indicate with a fair degree of clearness that the only factor which can be applied with any accuracy is that of population and that the application of this factor in the matter of limitation or reduction of armaments should be merely a basis for the determination of the maximum allowable amount of personnel in the armed forces.

Section VI

This Section deals with the influence of the material resources of a country on its war strength.

It is noted that the Joint Commission has approached the consideration of this question apparently with a view to pointing out those factors which it would be necessary to equalize or to compensate for in order to allow the various countries of the world to wage war upon one another on a more or less equal footing.

The American Government does not desire to comment in detail upon the observations of the Joint Commission in this regard since it will be readily admitted that in order to wage an effective war a country must have either within its own borders or accessible to it elsewhere the necessary supplies of raw materials, manufactured goods, and financial resources. With respect to these materials, each country is faced with a separate problem which, in a general sense, can never be solved by artificial international agreements. Those countries rich in raw materials and industrial facilities cannot be deprived of that wealth nor can countries poor in such wealth be provided with it except through the normal course of agricultural and industrial development.

Section VII

This Section indicates certain elements of a country's war-time power which are, in the opinion of the Joint Commission, capable of being expressed in figures.

It may be pointed out in passing that the list of the raw materials indicated by the Joint Commission as essential for waging war does not appear to be complete.

Section VIII

The final Section of the report contains the Joint Commission's views relative to the possibility of considering areas or regions of the world as essentially self-supporting economically. This question was raised in connection with the consideration of the practicability of regional agreements for arms limitation.

The American Government believes that the problems of land and air armament are particularly susceptible of regional limitation agreements quite regardless of whether the regions covered by such agreements might be economically self-contained or not. While the observations of economic experts on this subject are perhaps of interest, the practicability of regional agreements will be determined eventually by political conditions and by decisions of governments as to whether they wish to adopt a policy which promises an immediate limitation of land and air armaments.

500.A15 a 1/77: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 7, 1927-6 p. m.

[Received March 7-3:30 p. m.] 57. The following is authoritative, but is not yet to be made public. On assembling of Preparatory Commission on March 21, Cecil 24 has been authorized to lay before it a draft convention which embodies following plan: The high contracting parties are to bring their proposals on strength in land, sea, and air forces before the final Conference, and appropriate subcommittees are to consider these proposals separately. That this plan is squarely opposed to French idea of interdependence of arms is recognized, but it is conceded to Cecil so that League may have all possible opportunity to reach practical result through the Preparatory Commission. Admiralty believes that Cecil's draft convention will not be acceptable and that impasse will be reached before Easter holidays. At all events, no great time will be permitted for discussion. The Admiralty expect that the Three-Power Naval Conference will meet in June.25

HOUGHTON

"Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, British delegate on the Commission.

See pp. 1 ff.

258346-42-vol. 1-17

500.A15/440: Telegram

The Chief of the American Representation on the Preparatory
Commission (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, March 21, 1927-9 p. m.
[Received March 22-1:56 a. m.]

186. Preparatory Commission convened this afternoon. Cecil presented his draft convention outlined in my 176, March 14, 6 p. m.,26 with statement that this was merely a framework for discussion and that he would welcome alternative drafts from other delegations and proposed that any effort to reconcile them be made by special subcommittees. Paul-Boncour 27 in conciliatory speech stated that he preferred beginning by general discussion of the reports of technical subcommittees but that under the circumstances he was prepared to adopt British method and would tomorrow or Wednesday press the alternative draft embodying French views and expressed his hope that the other delegations would present drafts and suggestions.28 The Italian delegate read long prepared statement to the general effect that Italy would not consider present armaments as a basis of discussion and that regardless of the forces of other European countries Italy would demand total strength equal to that of any other European country. Japanese delegate read a declaration in which he associated himself with Italian view that the armaments of each country must be settled entirely by that country. I took no part in the discussions aside from expressing satisfaction over the agreement to take British and French drafts as a basis of consideration and added that the generous manner in which the French delegate subordinated his preference in the method of work was a good augury for future success.

There is no work before the Preparatory Commission until the French draft is made available but a meeting will be held tomorrow merely because of the fear which was openly expressed that failure to hold a meeting might have an unfortunate effect upon public opinion.

26

27

28

GIBSON

Not printed; see telegram No. 57 from the Ambassador in Great Britain, supra. French delegate on the Commission.

The texts of the British and French drafts are printed in Great Britain, Cmd. 2888, Miscellaneous No. 4 (1927): Report of the British Representative to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

500.A15/438: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chief of the American Representation on the Preparatory Commission (Gibson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1927-6 p. m. 95. In reply to the inquiry made February 24 in your private letter to Mr. Dorsey Richardson of the Division of Western European Affairs," on position to take should necessity arise of defining this Government's attitude toward an economic blockade which the Council of the League of Nations might declare under article XVI of the Covenant of the League, you will be guided by the following statement:

"1. The Government of the United States cannot become a party to any agreement involving an undertaking on its part to sever either trade or financial relations with any state in any contingency, nor can it participate in any blockade which may be decreed by any power or by any group of powers, whether the blockade is decreed under the auspices of the League of Nations or otherwise. No arrangement directly or indirectly contemplating possibility of prohibiting or restricting carrying on of trade or commerce by American citizens with any other country or countries by institution of an economic blockade can be entered into by the Government of the United States.

2. This Government will not agree to any form of international supervision or control of armaments. This Government considers that, as far as it is concerned, sole sanction for reduction and enforcement of any convention for reduction or limitation of armaments is the good faith of all the nations which are concerned; this good faith naturally requires scrupulous observance on their part of their treaty obligations.

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KELLOGG

500.A15/444: Telegram

The Chief of the American Representation on the Preparatory Commission (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

GENEVA, March 23, 1927-11 a. m.

[Received 12:30 p. m.]

191. The entire character of the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission will change with the presentation of the British, French, and possibly other texts as basis for work instead of the original agenda.

The French draft is based entirely upon the idea of enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles by the League of Nations; nominally the British draft is also largely based on League enforcement but in this "Not printed.

respect its provisions are more readily susceptible of being worked out by organizations and procedure which does not bear the label of the League, as Cecil has indicated in his statement. Such action, however, would meet with determined opposition from the French bloc. We must decide how far our course of action is to be affected by this change. We have two courses open to us, in my opinion: (1) To continue to present our views on all questions with view to having them adopted in draft of convention; (2) to set forth our views making known the sort of treaty we would be in position to accept and leave to other delegations adoption, or otherwise, of such a draft, placing on them the responsibility for adoption of a draft which would make our participation impossible.

Adoption of first course would lead inevitably, I think, to deadlock, providing those who hold other views with pretext for throwing on us responsibility for failure to solve problem of disarmament; certainly the tension with the French would be increased, as well as with nations supporting them, and it would lead to multiplicity of arguments, merits of which a large part of the continental press and possibly a portion of the American press would inevitably distort. I do not see how, by such methods, we could arrive at a generally acceptable treaty draft.

Second method, if well presented, would enable us, on the other hand, to state our views with equal clarity and would at same time allow for recognition of fact that measures which we could not accept for constitutional or legal reasons might be desirable and practicable for other countries. Essential obstacle to a plan generally acceptable is that large number of delegations desire to have entire machinery of disarmament placed under supervision and control of League in order to make disarmament contingent on security under League, on international inspection and control, and to put measures of sanction under jurisdiction of the League Council. We might express desire to enter into general scheme for limitation and reduction of armaments and then leave to the others the decision as to which was more important: Abandonment of use of League in this matter in order to obtain American participation, or agreement upon what they deemed to be effective measures under League, with full knowledge that this action would thereby eliminate us from any final arrangement.

I shall cable you a tentative outline of statement on this subject for your consideration. If it proves acceptable I should appreciate your full instructions for exact form in which matter is to be presented. Urgent that I have instructions early, as the situation may develop so rapidly that our attitude will have to be made clear in course of next few days.

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