as it was improbable that "for a hundred years to come" such an incident would be repeated, the "one conclusive mode" of preserving the neutrality of the canal was to place it under the control of the United States, as the government "least likely to be engaged in war, and able, in any and every event, to enforce the guardianship which she shall assume;" (7) that, since the treaty was made, the number of French and German vessels frequenting the Central American coasts had greatly and relatively increased; (8) that the expected aid in the construction of the canal from British capital, which the treaty was designed to secure, had not been realized, and that, owing to the great development of the United States, foreign capital could not in future enter as an essential factor into the determination of the problem. In conclusion, Mr. Blaine said:

"It is earnestly hoped by the President that the considerations now presented will have due weight and influence with Her Majesty's Government, and that the modifications of the treaty desired by the United States will be conceded in the same friendly spirit in which they are asked. The following is a summary of the changes necessary to meet the views of this Government:

"First. Every part of the treaty which forbids the United States fortifying the canal and holding the political control of it in conjunction with the country in which it is located to be canceled.

"Second. Every part of the treaty in which Great Britain and the United States agree to make no acquisition of territory in Central America to remain in full force. As an original proposition, this Government would not admit that Great Britain and the United States should be put on the same basis, even negatively, with respect to territorial acquisitions on the American continent, and would be unwilling to establish such a precedent without full explanation. But the treaty contains that provision with respect to Central America, and if the United States should seek its annulment, it might give rise to erroneous and mischievous apprehensions among a people with whom this Government desires to be on the most friendly terms. The United States has taken special occasion to assure the Spanish-American republics to the south of us that we do not intend and do not desire to cross their borders or in any way disturb their territorial integrity, and we shall not willingly incur the risk of a misunderstanding by annulling the clauses in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which forbid such a step with Central America. The acquisition of military and naval stations necessary for the protection of the canal and voluntarily ceded to the United States by the Central American States not to be regarded as a violation of the provisions contained in the foregoing.

"Third. The United States will not object to maintaining the clause looking to the establishment of a free port at each end of whatever canal may be constructed, if England desires it to be retained.

"Fourth. The clause in which the two governments agreed to make treaty stipulations for a joint protectorate of whatever railway or canal might be constructed at Tehuantepec or Panama has never been perfected. No treaty stipulations for the proposed end have been suggested by either party, although citizens of the United States long since constructed a railway at Panama, and are now engaged in the same work at Tehuantepec. It is a fair presumption, in the judgment of the President, that this provision should be regarded as obsolete by the nonaction and common consent of the two governments. "Fifth. The clause defining the distance from either end of the canal where in time of war captures might be made by either belligerent on the high seas was left incomplete, and the distance was never determined. In the judgment of the President, speaking in the interest of peaceful commerce, this distance should be made as liberal as possible, and might, with advantage, as a question relating to the high seas and common to all nations, be a matter of stipulation between the great powers of the world.

"In assuming as a necessity the political control of whatever canal or canals may be constructed across the Isthmus, the United States will act in entire harmony with the governments within whose territory the canals shall be located. Between the United States and the other American republics there can be no hostility, no jealousy, no rivalry, no distrust. This government entertains no design in connection with this project for its own advantage which is not also for the equal or greater advantage of the country to be directly and immediately affected. Nor does the United States seek any exclusive or narrow commercial advantage. It frankly agrees and will by public proclamation declare at the proper time, in conjunction with the republic on whose soil the canal may be located, that the same rights and privileges, the same tolls and obligations for the use of the canal, shall apply with absolute impartiality to the merchant marine of every nation on the globe. And equally in time of peace, the harmless use of the canal shall be freely granted to the war vessels of other nations. In time of war, aside from the defensive use to be made of it by the country in which it is constructed and by the United States, the canal shall be impartially closed against the war vessels of all belligerents.

"It is the desire and determination of the United States that the canal shall be used only for the development and increase of peaceful commerce among all the nations, and shall not be considered a strategic point in warfare which may tempt the aggression of belligerents or be seized under the compulsions of military necessity by any of the great powers that may have contests in which the United States has no stake and will take no part.

"If it be asked why the United States objects to the assent of European governments to the terms of neutrality for the operation of the canal, my answer is that the right to assent implies the right to dissent, and thus the whole question would be thrown open for contention as an international issue. It is the fixed purpose of the United States to confine it strictly and solely as an American question, to be dealt with and decided by the American Government.

"In presenting the views contained herein to Lord Granville, you will take occasion to say that the Government of the United States seeks this particular time for the discussion as most opportune and auspicious. At no period since the peace of 1783 have relations between the British and American Governments been so cordial and friendly as now. And I am sure Her Majesty's Government will find in the views now suggested and the propositions now submitted additional evidence of the desire of this Government to remove all possible grounds of controversy between two nations which have so many interests in common and so many reasons for honorable and lasting peace.

"You will, at the earliest opportunity, acquaint Lord Granville with the purpose of the United States touching the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and in your own way you will impress him fully with the views of your Government.

"I refrain from directing that a copy of this instruction be left with his lordship, because in reviewing the case I have necessarily been compelled, in drawing illustrations from British policy, to indulge somewhat freely in the argumentum ad hominem.

"This course of reasoning in an instruction to our own minister is altogether legitimate and pertinent, and yet might seem discourteous if addressed directly to the British Government. You may deem it expedient to make this explanation to Lord Granville, and if, afterward, he shall desire a copy of this instruction, you will of course furnish it."

Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Lowell, min. to England, No. 270, Nov. 19, 1881, Correspondence (1885), 327; For. Rel. 1881, 554.

In another instruction to Mr. Lowell, Nov. 29, 1881, Mr. Blaine reviewed the discussions as to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty from 1850 to 1858, as they appear in the correspondence given above, and particularly in Mr. Cass' note of Nov. 8, 1858, to Lord Napier, supra, § 355. (Correspondence, 333; For. Rel. 1881, 563.)

"Lord Granville was, as usual, exceedingly courteous and friendly, but made no remark except that the publication of No. 270, before an opportunity was given him of replying to it, 'seemed to him, to say the least, unusual.' (Mr. Lowell to Mr. Blaine, Dec. 27, 1881, Correspondence,

339.)

H. Doc. 551-vol 3--13

Lord Granville's reply to Mr. Blaine's papers of November, 1881, is contained in two instructions addressed to the British minister at

Lord Granville's

reply.

Washington, and dated respectively January 7 and January 14, 1882. In the first of these notes Lord Granville declared that Her Majesty's Government could not admit that the analogy, which was sought to be drawn from the conduct of Great Britain in regard to the Suez Canal, was correct or justified by the facts, especially as that Government had never tried to restrict the use of the canal by the naval forces of other countries; that, when the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was made, and even when President Monroe published his message of 1823, there was a clear prevision of the great future reserved to the Pacific coast; that Great Britain had large colonial possessions, no less than great commercial interests, which rendered interoceanic communication a matter for her also of the greatest importance; that in her opinion such communication concerned not merely the United States or the American continent, but, as was recognized by Article VI. of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the whole civilized world, and that she would not oppose or decline any discussion for the purpose of securing on a general international basis its universal and unrestricted use; that, if provision should be made on the one side for a different state of affairs, it would find its natural and logical counterpart on the other; that Her Majesty's Government could conceive no more melancholy spectacle than a competition among the nations holding West Indian possessions and others on the American continent in the construction of fortifications to obtain command over the canal and its approaches; and that, when the claim to do this was accompanied by a declaration that the United States would insist on treating the canal "as part of her coast line," it was difficult to imagine that the states to which the territory lying between that waterway and the United States belonged, could practically retain their independent position. As against these consequences, which would almost certainly follow from a claim on the part of the United States to assume the supreme authority over the canal and all responsibility for its control, Her Majesty's Government, said Lord Granville, held that the principles which guided the negotiators of the treaty of 1850 were intrinsically sound and continued to be applicable to the later state of affairs. He added that an extension to all maritime states of the invitation contemplated by the treaty of 1850 would obviate any objection that the treaty was not adequate, in its present condition, for the purpose for which it was designed. In this relation he referred to Mr. Fish's circular of 1877.

In his instruction of January 14, 1882, Lord Granville entered into an extended review of the discussions relating to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and maintained (1) that those differences, which had "long since been happily disposed of," did not relate to the general principles to be observed in regard to interoceanic communication, but to terri

torial questions; (2) that Mr. Blaine's proposal to retain that part of the treaty which prohibited the two governments from acquiring territory in Central America, but to cancel the parts that forbade either contracting party to fortify the canal and hold political control of it, was distinctly at variance with the declarations of the United States while the controversy lasted; (3) that the United States did not then seek to limit the principle of neutralization so as to exclude Colombian or even Mexican territory, or urge that its application would be inconsistent with the treaty between the United States and New Granada of 1846; (4) that, when the controversies concerning the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were in progress, the British Government was led to contemplate the abrogation of the treaty, on condition of reverting to the state of things before its conclusion; (5) that this solution, as the United States then pointed out, would have been fraught with danger to the good relations between the two countries, and that by the voluntary action of Great Britain the points in dispute were practically conceded to the United States, and a settlement reached which was declared by President Buchanan to be entirely satisfactory and which had for twenty years remained undisputed.

Lord Granville to Mr. West, January 7, 1882, Correspondence in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal (Washington, 1885), 340; same to same, January 14, 1882, id. 343.

These two papers may also be found in For. Rel. 1882, 302, 305.

Mr. Frelinghuysen's views.

A reply to Lord Granville's two papers was made by Mr. Frelinghuysen in an instruction to Mr. Lowell, May 8, 1882. In this instruction Mr. Frelinghuysen maintained that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was concluded to secure a thing which did not then exist and which was no longer capable of existing, namely, the construction of a canal under the grant from Nicaragua of 1849; that, in order to secure this, the United States consented to waive the exclusive and valuable rights which had been offered to it, and agreed with Great Britain not to occupy, fortify, colonize or assume dominion over any part of Central America; that the United States was not called upon by any principle of equity to revive those provisions of the treaty which specially related to the concession of 1849 and apply them to any concession since made; that, in view of the development of the United States, the need of foreign capital for the construction of the canal no longer existed, and that the United States held itself free to protect any interoceanic communication in which its government or citizens might become interested under agreements with the local sovereign powers; that the President was still ready, on the part of the United States, to agree that the reciprocal engagements of 1850 respecting the acquisition of territory in Central America and the