1. In the first place, the party tie, of necessity, binds the President and the members of his party in Congress. Although they may from time to time engage in controversies more spectacular than edifying, yet on fundamental matters of policy, the President and Congress must come into a sort of working agreement. Furthermore, the President is regarded as the leader of his party, and it is to him, rather than to Congress, that his party looks for the enforcement of any specific promises laid down in the platform or made officially during the presidential campaign. Congress cannot, therefore, ignore the leadership of the President, and, however much it may oppose his policy, it must give heed to those measures in which he has unquestioned national party support.

Within recent years, we have come to recognize more frankly than ever this position of the President as party leader. Mr. Roosevelt was largely responsible for the policies which the Republican party has made national issues. In his speeches made at different points throughout the country, and in his presidential messages, he advocated doctrines and measures which Congress was compelled, even against its will, to accept because it realized that he had behind him powerful national interests which could not be disregarded.' As party leader he issued, in 1906, a general letter endorsing the Republican members of Congress and calling upon the country to support them in the coming election; two years later he singled out individual members of Congress and gave them special letters of commendation.2

Mr. Taft likewise frankly assumed the position of party leadership. He was largely instrumental in the adjustment of differences between the Senate and the House of Representatives over the tariff bill of 1909. While it may not be said that his conclusions on every matter were accepted, there can be no doubt that his frequent meetings with the members of the joint conference committee charged with the settlement of those differences were of the greatest significance in securing harmony and "a reasonable compliance with the party pledges for tariff revision" that were laid down in the platform on which he made his presidential campaign. Mr. Taft also followed the example

1 Readings, p. 265.

2 New York Times, May 28, 1908.

of his predecessor in making a general appeal to his countrymen by means of public addresses. In the autumn of 1909, he made a tour throughout the West and South, discussing party problems and stating his own policies in short, he assumed the rôle of political leader not unlike that assumed by the Prime Minister of England, who, in a series of public addresses at different points in Great Britain, strikes the keynote for harmonious party action.

Mr. Taft expressly declared that he believed it to be the duty of the President to assume the position of leadership in his party. "Under our system of politics," he says, "the President is the head of the party which elected him, and cannot escape responsibility either for his own executive work or for the legis lative policy of his party in both houses. He is, under the Constitution, himself a part of the legislature in so far as he is called upon to approve or disapprove acts of Congress. A President who took no interest in legislation, who sought to exercise no influence to formulate measures, who altogether ignored his responsibility as the head of the party for carrying out ante-election promises in the matter of new laws, would not be doing what is expected of him by the people. In the discharge of all his duties, executive or otherwise, he is bound to a certain extent to consult the wishes and even the prejudices of the members of his party in both houses, in order that there shall be secured a unity of action by which necessary progress may be made and needed measures adopted."1

2. The party tie is by no means the only bond of union between the executive and legislative departments. By vesting the appointing power to a large number of important offices in the hands of the President and Senate, the Constitution draws the two departments together. The extent to which the President may use his power over appointments to influence his party friends in Congress, or the extent to which the Senate may employ its confirming power to bend the President to its will, depends upon circumstances; but it is perfectly clear that either may take advantage of the opportunity offered by this constitutional connection. An excellent illustration of the way in which the President may influence legislation is afforded by Mr. Dana's account of President Lincoln's manœuvres to secure the adop

Four Aspects of Civic Duty, p. 100.

tion of the Thirteenth Amendment. It is so eloquent that it deserves quotation in full.

Lincoln was a supreme politician. He understood politics because he understood human nature. I had an illustration of this in the spring of 1864. The administration had decided that the Constitution of the United States should be amended so that slavery should be prohibited. This was not only a change in our national policy, but it was also a most important military measure. It was intended not merely as a means of abolishing slavery forever, but as a means of affecting the judgment and the feelings and the anticipations of those in rebellion. It was believed that such an amendment to the Constitution would be equivalent to new armies in the field, that it would be worth at least a million men, that it would be an intellectual army that would tend to paralyze the enemy and break the continuity of his ideas.

In order thus to amend the Constitution, it was necessary first to have the proposed amendment approved by three-fourths of the states. When that question came to be considered, the issue was seen to be so close that one state more was necessary. The state of Nevada was organized and admitted into the Union to answer that purpose. I have sometimes heard people complain of Nevada as superfluous and petty, not big enough to be a state; but when I hear that complaint, I always hear Abraham Lincoln saying, "It is easier to admit Nevada than to raise another million of soldiers."

In March, 1864, the question of allowing Nevada to form a state government finally came up in the House of Representatives. There was strong opposition to it. For a long time beforehand the question had been canvassed anxiously. At last, late one afternoon, the President came into my office, in the third story of the War Department. . . .

"Dana," he said, "I am very anxious about this vote. It has got to be taken next week. The time is very short. It is going to be a great deal closer than I wish it was."

"There are plenty of Democrats who will vote for it," I replied. "There is James E. English, of Connecticut; I think he is sure, isn't he?"

"Oh, yes; he is sure on the merits of the question."

"Then," said I, "there's 'Sunset' Cox, of Ohio. How is he?" "He is sure and fearless. But there are some others that I am not clear about. There are three that you can deal with better than anybody else, perhaps, as you know them all. I wish you would send for them."

He told me who they were; it is not necessary to repeat the names here. One man was from New Jersey and two from New York.

"What will they be likely to want?" I asked.

"I don't know," said the President; "I don't know. It makes no difference, though, what they want. Here is the alternative: that we carry this vote, or be compelled to raise another million, and I don't know how many more, men, and fight no one knows how long. It is a question of three votes or new armies."

"Well, sir," said I, "what shall I say to these gentlemen?"

"I don't know," said he; "but whatever promise you make to them I will perform."

I sent for the men and saw them one by one. I found that they were afraid of their party. They said that some fellows in the party would be down on them. Two of them wanted internal revenue collector's appointments. "You shall have it," I said. Another one wanted a very important appointment about the custom house of New York. I knew the man well whom he wanted to have appointed. He was a Republican, though the congressman was a Democrat. I had served with him in the Republican county committee of New York. The office was worth perhaps $20,000 a year. When the congressman stated the case, I asked him, "Do you want that?"

"Yes," said he.

"Well," I answered, "you shall have it."

"I understand, of course," said he, "that you are not saying this on your own authority?”

"Oh, no," said I; "I am saying it on the authority of the President." Well, these men voted that Nevada be allowed to frame a state government, and thus they helped secure the vote which was required. The next October the President signed the proclamation admitting the state. In the February following, Nevada was one of the states which ratified the Thirteenth Amendment by which slavery was abolished by constitutional prohibition in all of the United States.'

3. The imperative necessity under which Congress is placed of securing information from executive departments with regard to legislative matters, and the desire of executive officers to secure new laws and amendments to old laws, constitute another important bond of union between the executive and the legislature. Congress is constantly making demands upon the executive for papers, documents, and special information of one kind or another, and in so far as the President regards these demands as reasonable and compatible with public interest he complies with them. As a matter of right, Congress may call upon the

1 C. A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, pp. 174-177.

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executive for information, but it has no power, under the Constitution, to compel him to furnish papers and documents.

In practice, the anxiety of the administration to secure favorable consideration of its own measures in Congress leads it to comply quite readily with requests for information. This is as it should be, for frequently those who have charge of the execution of the laws know more about the actual conditions to which the laws must apply and the actual effect of the laws than do the legislators themselves. Furthermore, it is wise that those who are called upon to execute the laws should know the spirit and intention of those who have passed them.

4. Quite an intimate relation is established between Congress and the executive through the practice of the former in inviting the assistance of departmental chiefs in drafting bills. Very frequently the Attorney-General, who is supposed to be merely the legal adviser of the President, is asked to give his opinion before a committee or to advise members of Congress on some particular matters up for legislative action. It is also sometimes the practice for heads of departments to draft complete measures, transmit them to Congress either through a friend in that body, or even directly, and secure their reference to proper committees and ultimately their passage. It is a matter of common knowledge also that the President from time to time invites to the White House members of Congress who may be of influence in securing the enactment of laws favored by the administration. On the other hand, Congress has in a number of instances even assumed the right to advise the President, by a statute or by a resolution, to adopt some particular executive policy.

3

5. Another important line of connection is established between the executive and legislature through appropriations. The Treasury Department is by law placed in a special relation to Congress; for Congress has the power to call directly upon that department for financial information without going through the form of making a request to the President. The Treasury Department collects the estimates of the amount of money

It should be remembered that many members of Congress have seen long committee service and know more about administration than a new President or executive officer.

2 This is informally, of course. 3 Readings, pp. 196 and 267.