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Thus terminated the experiments upon the results of direct fire in breaching masonry. Those upon oblique fire and the penetration into different materials, would properly form the subject of another paper. But, in conclusion, it may just be observed that, while the battering train at the siege of the citadel of Antwerp had fourteen out of thirty-two guns rendered totally unserviceable by their own fire, these guns were comparatively uninjured. This is chiefly attributed by the Commission to the employment of cartridges made longer than the old pattern by four-tenths of the calibre, or nearly one-half, wads being placed over both powder and ball*.

The French are not ignorant of the formidable effects of our heavy iron ordnance; and, so long ago as 1811, one of their most eminent engineers, who possessed the confidence of Napoleon, observes," Perhaps it will one day be found both more advantageous and more economical to have all our heavy artillery of cast-iron." Still, however, the majority of their military men retain a partiality for the brass ordnance; partly on account of its superior portability, partly because, as they assert, it is less liable to be broken and rendered unserviceable by shot striking it. With respect to transport, their preference appears at first sight to be a just one. To take the 12-pounder of our service as an example: the brass gun weighs only 18 cwt., the iron 33 cwt., or almost double; and, in the interior of a country where draught cattle happen to be scarce, the roads bad, and watercarriage not available, the difference of weight would seem a very serious consideration; but, in truth, it is not so much the gun as its ammunition and appurtenances which are cumbersome on a march; and while an ample iron battering-train for the siege of a first-rate fortress can be brought to the ground by 800 horses, it requires 7000 or 8000 to transport

minutes, which divided by 2005 minutes nearly for each round; the same as that made use of in the experiments we are describing.

The scarp wall, which was battered in breach, was 44 feet thick at top, and 64 at the bottom. It was built of brick, and supported by counterforts 6 feet broad, at 13 feet intervals. The cordon was 294 feet above the bottom of the ditch, and there being a depth of five feet water in the ditch, the portion of revetment above the water was 24 feet high.

Breadth of ditch

Distance of crest of glacis from counterscarp

85 feet 49

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134 99

Total distance of battery from its object The guns were directed horizontally at first at the level of the water, each extending its fire right and left to meet that of the next. When the revetment was completely divided on this line, the fire was applied to form the vertical cuts, each gun piercing a section immediately in front of it.

After about fourteen hours' firing, the wall was almost entirely demolished to a distance of twenty-one and a half feet below the cordon, and over a lateral space of from eighty-two to ninety-eight feet. All the counterforts were exposed, and some much injured. The earth was beginning to descend; but the great mass, being supported by the counterforts, was nearly perpendicular. The following morning the whole of the guns were turned to destroy these counterforts; but, after two and a half hours, the order was given to cease firing, and the Commandant surrendered. At this moment the scarp had been demolished to within three feet of the water line, the counterforts began to fly off in splinters. Considerable falls of earth took place. The rubbish formed a slope reaching above the standing part of the wall, and extending to thirty-two feet in front of the foot of the revetment. Some soldiers were able to climb up it during the suspension of arms, but it was far from practicable. General Neigre says, "Encore quelques heures, et l'artillerie avoit complétement rempli sa tâche, en livrant à l'infanterie une brèche practicable et facile."

* In breaching the citadel of Antwerp before alluded to, the French used wads of unequal lengths for every discharge, in order to prevent as long as possible the enlargement of the bore which takes place in brass guns at the seat of the ball when frequently fired.

1000 rounds of powder, shot, and shell for it (the quantity prepared by the French for their last siege of the citadel of Antwerp.)

As to the brittleness of the material, the French have certainly some reason to distrust the cast-iron. Sometimes purchasing by contract from Sweden, at others trusting ignorant speculators; employing, likewise, a metal and workmen inferior to those in England, it is not to be wondered at that their trials have frequently proved abortive*. Thus, when arguing against the use of iron cannon, they cite the siege of Meppen, where thirteen heavy iron guns were destroyed by the ricochet fire of four brass 12-pounders. Again, they remind you that two of their new iron guns, under trial on board a frigate, burst, doing immense mischief, and that seven out of fifty-six failed in the same manner when proved at Toulon. Be this as it may, the French retain much of their prejudice in favour of brass ordnance, the whole of their battering-train at the siege of Antwerp in 1832 (nineteen years after St. Sebastian) having been of that material, with the exception of six iron 24-pounders, lent by the Belgians to assist in crushing their ancient, brave, and indulgent masters.

REMARKS ON CIRCULAR STerns.

BY THE LATE REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN MASON LEWIS.

AMONGST the defects sent in of his Majesty's ship Revenge, after the affair of Algiers, were-" Great part of the moulding and lining of the stern knocked away by the firing of the after-guns.'

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This is, I believe, the first instance of the after-guns of a round-sterned ship being brought into action; the effect of which is sufficient to show that any projection of wood is contrary to that essential principle for which the circular stern was constructed; and as the damage sustained, as well as the aptness of the light material of which it is composed to take fire, rendered a ship-of-war less fit for the service she is intended to perform, the evil should in future be avoided.

It will be allowed that one of the first qualifications a ship-of-war ought to possess is the power of annoying the enemy with as little injury to herself as possible; perhaps the propriety and respectability of appearance the next; and, if private convenience is not interrupted, it is as much as can be expected.

It is presumed that this may be accomplished, the ship be made more equal to service, appearance obtained, and the necessity of similar repairs done away, by the following adoption.

Instead of the present projections, let the water-closets, fitted as usual, be placed within-board, as they were originally intended, and the stern and quarter galleries be continued ranges of iron balustrade, with the bottoms of the same material.

The water-closets should be constructed with funnels, and their inboard

* It seems worth mentioning, while on the subject of iron, that M. Chaley, the able and enterprising French architect of the noble suspension bridge at Friburg, iu Switzerland, procured the requisite plate iron for his purpose better and cheaper from England, notwithstanding the great length of land and sea carriage, than he could have done from the best French forges in Franche Comté, only thirty leagues distant.

appearance would resemble that of any other cabin, the ingress or egress from which would occasion no greater degree of notice than the quartergallery door of a square-sterned ship; nor could they be carried away, which is frequently the case in the latter description of vessel.

The balustrade should open horizontally, and fall back in two parts, to afford space for the explosion of the guns during action. The bottoms being of the same material and make could not be injured by the firing, nor impede the smoke; and when not in action, foot-boards might be laid, if required. Over the upper gallery, as a protection from the sun and weather, instead of the present railing, which is liable to be blown away, or set fire to by explosion, a light iron railing should project from the cove, on which an awning of painted canvass should be laid, to be removed in action.

Three-decked should have two, and two-decked ships one gallery, has as been usual.

The middle-deck ports or windows, having no projections or buildings, would not require any berthing or finishing, except ornamental.

The rudder should reach to, and the tiller traverse on the lower gundeck. The present projected berthing or awning over the rudder-head would not be necessary. It disfigures the ship, and affords as good a mark as the rudder itself, with about as much security to it as a cap is to the head of a man.

By galleries of the above description, the admiral and captain in threedecked, and the admiral in two-decked ships, would be afforded the facility of an uninterrupted walk entirely round the stern and quarters of the ship, and at all times be enabled to observe the degree of sails, signals, and evolutions of his own and all other ships composing his squadron, with the exception, of course, of those right ahead.

Those who cavil at the present distorted shapes, would thus find their objections done away, and the whole fabric rendered light, handsome, convenient, and serviceable, while the blowing away the linings or mouldings of the stern, by the firing of guns, in the present mode of projected buddings and coverings, the attendant expense of repair, and the chance of fire, would be completely obviated.

MEMOIRS OF GENERAL AND FLAG-OFFICERS RECENTLY DECEASED.

REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN MASON LEWIS.

In this

THIS officer was educated at the Maritime School at Chelsea, and commenced his professional career in 1780, when he joined the Cambridge, 80 guns, Captain Broderick Hartwell, stationed at Plymouth. vessel he remained two years, and in 1782 was transferred to the Flying Fish, 12 guns, Captain Macdougall, cruizing in the North Sea.

In 1783 he was appointed Midshipman in the Proselyte, 32, Captain Jonathan Faulkner, jun.; and proceeded in her to Newfoundland and Quebec. In 1785 he joined the Triumph, 74, Captain Jonathan Faulkner, sen., as Midshipman; and in the same year he was appointed Midshipman in the Druid frigate, 32, cruizing in the Channel.

In 1790 he was made Master's Mate into the Discovery, 12, Captain Roberts, then lying at Deptford, preparing for a voyage of discovery to the polar regions, which was afterwards prosecuted under the command of Captain Vancouver.

In the same year he was appointed Signal-Midshipman on board the Queen Charlotte, 110, with the flag of Admiral Earl Howe, commanding the Channel fleet, then expecting a collision with the Spanish armament. On the 2nd December, 1790, he was made Lieutenant, and appointed first of the Assurance, 44, then lying in the Medway; and which ship he afterwards paid off at Chatham.

In 1791, Admiral Leveson Gower appointed him his Flag-Lieutenant in the Formidable, 98, in which ship originated his idea of circular sterns, of which he has left behind many plans and drawings.

In 1792 we find him in the Scourge, 14, Captain Brisac, cruising in the English Channel and Irish Sea.

In 1793, in the Hannibal, with the late Admiral (then Captain) Sir John Colpoys, cruising in the Channel; after which he proceeded with her to the West Indies, visiting Barbadoes, Martinique, &c., and cooperating in the Royalist cause. Leaving Jamaica the Hannibal came home with convoy, and in running up Channel, Lieutenant Lewis had the satisfaction of receiving from Sir John Colpoys, his acknowledgments for saving that ship twice.

Sir John Jervis then made him an offer to join him in the Boyne, 98, about to sail for the West Indies, but having so recently returned thence, he preferred a Lieutenancy in the Queen, 98, belonging to the Channel fleet, and commanded by Vice-Admiral Alan Gardner, with Capt. John Hutt as Flag-Captain; the third Lieutenant of the Queen having been left in England sick, Lieutenant Lewis (then ninth) had charge of that officer's quarters in the action of the 28th and 29th May, and 1st June, 1794.

On the 29th of May, at half-past nine A.M., the Queen engaged the vanship of the French fleet; but the enemy having the weather gage, preserved a long-shot distance.

At three quarters past eight A.M., on the 1st June, the enemy's van opened their fire on the British fleet, and at nine the signal was made for close action. At half-past nine the Queen opened her fire on the eighth ship of the enemy, who, taking advantage of the crippled state of the Queen from the previous engagement, shot a-head and left her. At ten the Queen broke through their line, a-head of, and in close action with their seventh ship, which, by edging out of the line of fire to prevent being raked, took the Queen to leeward. At a quarter past, the Frenchman's mizenmast went, and at half-past ten his mainmast; at eleven the Queen lost her mainmast, and shortly after the enemy struck, proving to be the Gemappe, of eighty guns.

On the 2nd June, the Queen, from her shattered state, having only her foremast, badly wounded, mizenmast, and bowsprit standing, and having dropped to leeward of the line, had become unmanageable, she and her prize lying close to each other. At a little after noon, twelve sail of the enemy's line, led by Le Montague, 120, bore away from the scene of action, and, passing the Queen, opened their fire on her in succession, except the Montague. The Queen returned their fire, but was unable to prevent them taking off the Gemappe. In these actions the Queen bad 103 men killed and wounded. In Jean Bon St. André's Journal, the Eole, the seventh ship, is among the list of those which suffered most. The Mutius Scævola, the eighth, was dismasted.

Le Terrible, 110, was one of the twelve sail led off by Le Montague, and was towed by three frigates, two of which cast off, and nearing the Queen, commenced a cannonade; but although dismasted, they found that her batteries were not disabled, and, after receiving a few broadsides, they rejoined their detachment.

It was after this action that Lieutenant Lewis again suggested the circular stern now in use in the Navy, and of which, at that time, he again

showed plans and drawings to his brother officers. These suggestions are inserted in the United Service Journal of February, 1836, in which the honour of the invention was claimed for him, and which remains till now uncontradicted.

On the 15th July, 1795, Lieutenant Lewis commanded the middle gun deck of the Queen in the action off L'Orient, under the command of Admiral Lord Bridport, on which occasion the Tigre, 74, struck to the fire of that ship and the London; three French line-of-battle ships, viz., Le Formidable, L'Alexandre, and Le Tigre, remained as prizes.

On the 14th April, 1796, he was made Commander into the Weazle, 12, stationed in the North Sea, English and Bristol Channels.

In 1798, he was appointed to the Snake, 18, and sailed in her to the Coast of Africa, under the command of the present Admiral Sir Charles Hamilton, in quest of a squadron of French frigates. He was to await final orders at Port Praya, in the Cape de Verds, but from having been ordered to take charge of a disabled Indiaman, and subsequently on account of the thick fogs prevalent at that time of the year, he was unable to make Port Praya, and consequently was without orders. Finding the ship drifting to the northward, and having a general knowledge that they were in pursuit of a French naval force, Captain Lewis shaped his course for the Coast, going on short allowance of provisions and water. After cruising there for some time, he fell in with the Magnanime, and running down the coast, made Prince's Island, which they were informed the French frigates had just quitted. He was then ordered home with convoy, and after a three weeks' passage arrived at Spithead, capturing a French brig of 16 guns by the way, and receiving the approbation of the Admiral commanding at Portsmouth.

What can be more gratifying to a gallant and honourable man, than the praise of a noble enemy, such as we have ever found the French? The following letter will explain the circumstance above alluded to.

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No. 2.

"Bristol Prison Ship, Chatham, 13th Nov., 1800.

SIR,-Previous to our departure from Teneriffe on board La Petite Mouche, we received the intelligence of a Spanish squadron which was to sail from Cadiz and cruise off Madeira for some time before it reached Teneriffe, where it was to receive further orders for an ulterior destination. It was composed of four ships of battle, and some frigates; one of the ships was the Monarque, one of the fastest sailing ships in their Navy; and nothing but the assurance of their cruising in that part of the world, could make us so bold as to come every day even into the roads of Funchal, as we did, certain as we thought that there could be no English cruisers near us. On the day after my being taken, the schooner being then in tow, you descried a large sail coming down upon you, and I told you then what I knew about the Spaniards cruising off Madeira, and indeed the appearance of that ship and her manoeuvres confirmed me in my opinion, which was, I think, that of every one on board; for my part, I thought of nothing then but to be retaken.

"I must say that I could not help, at the same time, admiring your cool and resolute behaviour at that moment, and, though an old sailor, it was a new scene for me to see a small ship of 18 guns wait firmly the attack of one of 50.

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My being a prisoner then forced me to go down, though it was not before I had seen the ship fire eleven guns, but at too great a distance to have any execution; when I came up again I was informed afterwards in what I had heard below, that the frigate on coming nearer, had bore up

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