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indeed in sums: first, $40, then $12, $18. On 26 December, 1898, the sum of $180, then later $50 and then $25; now is the sum $325 today not yet paid with interest. Detroit, the 2 Dec. 1905."
A number of requests to charge were preferred on the part of the plaintiff and refused, and exceptions were taken. The question presented by the assignments of error is, whether the action is barred by the statute of limitations; it being admitted that the last item of money involved in this suit was given to defendant December 11, 1898, and the first demand was made December 2, 1905.
OSTRANDER, J. (after stating the facts). The writing prepared at the instance of the plaintiff indicates that interest was due, and that interest was expected is conceded in the brief for plaintiff. It seems, then, that each transaction amounted to a lending of money, upon interest, payable within a reasonable time after demand. It is not perceived in what respect the case would be different if each time plaintiff gave defendant money he had received a demand note or a receipt for money to be accounted for on demand. And if it be assumed that an actual demand was contemplated by the parties and was necessary before an action to recover the money could be maintained, no demand was made until nearly seven years had expired after the last money was given to defendant. The court therefore was not in error in holding that the plaintiff could not recover. Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Mich. 487 (24) Am. Rep. 605); Freeman v. Ingerson, 143 Mich. 7 (106 N. W. 278).
The judgment is affirmed.
BIRD, C. J., and HOOKER, MOORE, and STONE, JJ., concurred.
CUSICK v. KINNEY.
Plaintiff was leading his horse along the highway when defendant approached in his automobile. The horse became frightened while the car was some distance away, and, as defendant came nearer, reared, struck plaintiff down and injured him. Plaintiff did not signal for the driver to check the machine. Held, that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury.'
Error to Livingston; Miner, J. Submitted October 28, 1910. (Docket No. 157.) Decided December 22, 1910.
Case by William Cusick against Asa M. Kinney for personal injuries. A judgment for defendant on a verdict directed by the court is reviewed by plaintiff on writ of error. Reversed.
W. E. Robb and Louis E. Howlett, for appellant.
HOOKER, J. The plaintiff has appealed from a directed verdict.
He was injured by a horse that was frightened by an automobile. Plaintiff was leading a horse by a headstall, when defendant's automobile came over a hill 25 rods distant. The horse was restive. Plaintiff did not signal for the driver to stop, and he came along toward the horse, which finally reared and struck plaintiff down and ran away. The court directed a verdict upon the ground of contributory negligence, holding that the plaintiff should have let go of his horse.
We are of the opinion that this was error. Both the question of defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contribu
As to law governing automobiles, see note to Christy v. Elliott (Ill.), 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215.
tory negligence should have been submitted to the jury. It is quite possible that they might have found contributory negligence, or that the defendant was not negligent; but the testimony was not undisputed and a case for the jury was made.
The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered. BIRD, C. J., and OSTRANDER, MOORE, and STONE, JJ., concurred.
MAY v. WILSON.
1. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-SEDUCTION WORDS AND PHRASES-STATUTES.
An action for seduction under a promise of marriage is barred, unless commenced within three years, by Act No. 155, Pub. Acts 1899, relating to actions for personal injuries.
2. SAME-WORDS AND PHRASES.
A personal wrong is an invasion of a personal right; it pertains to the person, the individual, as contradistinguished from an injury to property.
3. APPEAL AND ERROR TRIAL DIRECTING VERDICT ON STATEMENT OF COUNSEL.
The direction of a verdict, upon the opening statement of plaintiff's attorney, will not be reversed, on error, if no protest against the action of the court was made at the trial, and the attorney does not claim that he could make a stronger case by his evidence than he presented in the opening, which was insufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations.
Error to Wayne; Donovan, J. Submitted October 28, 1910. (Docket No. 154.) Decided December 22, 1910.
Case by Clara May against Seneca C. Wilson for se
duction under a promise of marriage. A judgment for defendant on a verdict directed by the court, is reviewed by plaintiff on writ of error. Affirmed.
Thomas Hislop, for appellant.
George F. and Peter J. Monaghan, for appellee.
BIRD, C. J. The defendant was apprehended on a capias to answer to plaintiff in an action on the case for having seduced her under promise of marriage. The case was begun on the 27th day of May, 1909. Defendant pleaded the general issue and gave notice of the statute of limitations. When the case came on for trial, plaintiff's counsel made his opening statement to the jury, in which he stated that the seduction occurred on the 24th day of June, 1905. The defendant's counsel then moved the court for a directed verdict for the reasons:
(1) Because from the statement of counsel, that the seduction took place on the 24th day of June, 1905, the action is barred by the statute of limitations.
(2) Because another suit of like character was begun on the 7th day of March, 1906, and plaintiff was defaulted for failure to file her declaration within the time prescribed by the rules of court, and the court afterwards refused to set aside the default.
The trial court was of the opinion that both grounds were well taken and accordingly directed a verdict for defendant.
1. It is the claim of defendant that an action for seduction is an action for personal injuries, within the meaning of Act No. 155, Pub. Acts 1899, which reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. That no action shall hereafter be brought in any courts of this State to recover damages for personal injuries, unless the same shall be brought within three years from the occurrence upon which the claim for liability is founded.
"SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts in anywise contravening any of the provisions of this act are hereby repealed."
Prior to the passage of this act, the statute of limitations applicable to actions of seduction was six years. Section 9728, 3 Comp. Laws. The question, then, is whether an action for seduction is an action for personal injuries. If it is, it follows that the foregoing statute applies and the limitation on such actions is reduced to three years.
This court has said that, "a personal wrong or injury is an invasion of a personal right; it pertains to the person, the individual" (People v. Quanstrom, 93 Mich. 254 [53 N. W. 165, 17 L. R. A. 723]), as contradistinguished from injuries to property (Norris v. Grove, 100 Mich. 256 [58 N. W. 1006]). The injury complained of by plaintiff in her declaration is one against her person, and the damages which she claims are traceable directly to that injury. She alleges that by reason of the injury she has given birth to a child and has suffered great physical and mental pain and loss of health. How could her injuries have been more of a personal nature if she had been run down by a street car and injured, and, as a consequence, been greatly injured in body and mind and suffered a loss of health?
In Hutcherson v. Durden, 113 Ga. 987, 991 (39 S. E. 495, 496, 54 L. R. A. 811), the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the seduction of his daughter and upon the trial the same question was raised as is raised here. The section of the Code relied upon was as follows:
"Actions for injuries done to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, except for injuries to reputation, which shall be brought within one year."
When passing upon the question, the court said:
"It is, we think, therefore, evident that the meaning of the expression 'injuries to the person' as understood by the codifiers and within the scheme of classification adopted in the Code, was not confined to mere physical or bodily injuries, but embraces all actionable injuries to the individual himself, as distinguished from injuries to his