where the proof shows, or tends to show, that the putative father had, or had had, supernumerary fingers and that the child also had them, we think such evidence is competent as tending to show the paternity of the child, when accompanied by the further evidence that supernumerary fingers are usually hereditary and by the positive testimony of the prosecutrix that he is the father of the child. Such evidence ought to be regarded as a mere circumstance that might be of value in deciding a doubtful case. In Beck's Medical Jurisprudence, in speaking of this character of evidence, the author makes use of the following words: "It has been suggested that the resemblance of a child to the supposed father might aid in deciding doubtful cases. This, however, is a very uncertain source of reliance. We daily observe the most striking differences in physical traits between parent and child, while individuals born in different parts of the globe have been mistaken for each other. And even as to malformations, although some remarkable resemblances in this respect have been noted between father and child, yet we should act unwisely in relying too much on them."

It is further suggested by plaintiff in error's counsel that the evidence in this case is overwhelming that plaintiff in error had no such fingers. This is merely a question for the jury when properly presented to them without errors in the record. In this opinion we are not passing upon the weight of the evidence but merely as to its admissibility.

There was evidence in this record tending strongly to show that the plaintiff in error had a good reputation for chastity. There was also evidence introduced by the People to the contrary. In his opening argument to the jury the prosecuting attorney said, "Did you notice that there was no effort made to make any investigation of the official records in this county?" He also made other insinuations in his argument that plaintiff in error had been arrested on charges involving chastity, although the record contains no

such evidence and could not properly contain such evidence, as it is clearly inadmissible. While the court sustained an objection to the foregoing remarks, still it is not possible for us to say what effect the prejudicial remarks had on the jury. Their natural tendency must be considered as prejudicial to the plaintiff in error's case.

The eighth instruction contained a slight error. The concluding part thereof read thus, "You are not at liberty to disbelieve as jurors if you believe as men." The instruction should have concluded with the words, "if from the evidence you believe as men."

By reason of the foregoing errors we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court should be reversed and the cause remanded for further trial.

Reversed and remanded.

FARMER and COOKE, JJ., dissenting.

(No. 11015.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. H. Dedert et al. Appellants, vs. D. H. MYERS et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed December 21, 1916.

1. APPEALS AND ERRORS—when a franchise is involved. An appeal from an order denying leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto to test the legality of the organization of a high school district is properly taken to the Supreme Court on the ground that a franchise is involved, where the assignments of error question the legality of the organization of the district.

2. QUO WARRANTO-when leave to file an information to test legality of organization of a high school district should be granted. Where an information in the nature of quo warranto to test the legality of the organization of a high school district alleges that the district was organized under the High School act of 1911, which was held invalid in the case of People v. Weis, 275 Ill. 581, leave should be granted to file the information, but the question whether judgment of ouster shall be entered depends upon the evidence presented at the hearing.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Adams county; the Hon. ALBERT AKERS, Judge, presiding.

FRED G. WOLFE, State's Attorney, and HARTZell, CavANAGH & GREEN, for appellants.

HOMER M. SWOPE, and WILLIAM SCHLAGEN HAUF, appellees.

for

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: This was a petition filed in the circuit court of Adams county asking leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto to test the legality of the organization of the Mendon Township High School District. The petition questioned in several particulars the legality of the order organizing the district, among others the posting of certain notices, and the unconstitutionality of the act of June 5, 1911, under which the district was organized. The court entered a rule nisi, requiring the defendants to show why the information should not be filed, and the matter was heard upon affidavits. On the hearing the circuit court refused leave to the appellants and dismissed their petition. From this order this appeal was prayed to this court.

Counsel for appellees insist that there was no assignment of error that would justify the bringing of this cause directly to this court. The assignments of error clearly questioned the legality of the organization of the district, therefore a franchise is involved and the cause was properly brought directly to this court. The constitutionality of the act was raised in the court below and is raised in the briefs here. While the assignments of error might well have pointed out more specifically the question as to raising the unconstitutionality of the statute here, we think the assignments were so worded that they can be construed to raise that question.

On the reasoning of this court in People v. Weis, 275 Ill. 581, and the cases that have followed that decision, the statute under which this district was organized has been held unconstitutional. It follows, therefore, that the court erred in not allowing the information to be filed. Whether or not a judgment of ouster should be granted on the hearing will depend, as pointed out in People v. Weis, supra, upon the evidence presented at such hearing.

The order of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

(No. 10775.)

CARL BUSHNELL, Plaintiff in Error, vs. THE INDUSTRIAL BOARD OF ILLINOIS et al. Defendants in Error.

Opinion filed December 21, 1916.

1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION—what notice of accident must be given the employer. The Workmen's Compensation act of 1913 contemplates that the employer shall have notice of the accident, either by formal notice or by knowledge of such facts as will apprise him that his employee has sustained injuries of such a character as to entitle him to compensation and that he may reasonably expect that such claim will be made.

2. SAME what is not sufficient notice of the circumstances of the accident. The mere fact that an injured employee of a carpenter told the foreman, in response to a question as to what caused him to limp, that he had wrenched his leg in attempting to tear up a floor he was working on, without making at that time any claim for compensation or suffering any interruption of his work, is not, alone, sufficient notice of the circumstances of the accident to entitle the injured man to compensation under the provisions of section 24 of the Workmen's Confpensation act of 1913. (ParkerWashington Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 498, distinguished.)

3. SAME-Section 24 of Workmen's Compensation act, requiring claim for compensation within six months, is mandatory. The provision of section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation act requiring a claim or demand for compensation to be made within six

months from the date of the accident is mandatory, and unless the claim is made within the required time recovery will be barred.

4. SAME burden is on claimant to prove a demand within the required time, and such proof is jurisdictional. The making of a claim for compensation, as provided by section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation act of 1913, is jurisdictional and a condition precedent to the right to maintain the action, and the burden is on the claimant to prove, as a part of his case in chief, that such claim was made, and in absence of such proof the committee of arbitration and the Industrial Board are without jurisdiction to proceed in the matter.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. OSCAR M. TORRISON, Judge, presiding.

WILKERSON, CASSELS & POTTER, (RALPH F. POTTER, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.

FARRELL & THOMPSON, (HOPE THOMPSON, of counsel,) for defendants in error.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to review the judgment of the circuit court of Cook county affirming the decision of the Industrial Board awarding to defendant in error Arthur W. Stewart the sum of $300 as compensation under the Workmen's Compensation act for injuries received by him while at work for plaintiff in error as a carpenter in the city of Chicago. It is admitted that both parties are governed by the provisions of that act. The circuit court has granted a certificate that the cause is a proper one to be reviewed by this court, and this writ of error has been sued out pursuant to such certificate.

Two reasons are urged for a reversal of the judgment: (1) That no notice of the accident such as is required by the statute was given to the employer within thirty days. after the accident; and (2) that the record contains no evidence of any demand having been made upon the em