course is right or wrong it will be adopted, and I have no doubt adhered to, no matter what happens with the appropriations. We have the right to vote money; let us annex conditions to it, and insist upon the redress of grievances. The right of the people to withhold supplies is as old as English liberty. Frequently the Commons, feeling that the people are oppressed, have at last obtained redress by refusing appropriations."

President and

This seemed like an attempt to force the Executive to consent to legislation under the threat of starving the Government to death. Notwithstanding the expressed determination of the House, President Hayes vetoed the bills and Congress was obliged to pass the appropriation bills without the riders. In his veto message President Hayes said, in substance: The new doctrine, if maintained, will result in a consolidation of the Legisunchecked and despotic power in the House lative Rider. of Representatives. A bare majority of the House will become the Government. It strikes at the independence of the departments. The House is not entitled to say that its peculiar function is to represent the people; all branches of the Government are representative of the people. The Constitution aims at the independence of the departments; this independence can be set aside only by the people themselves. The doctrine [of the rider] means the subjection to the House of Representatives of the Senate and the President in their legislative and administrative functions.

This precedent did much to settle the conflicts between the Legislature and the Executive on this point, and encourage the President to resist coercion by the rider. If the President should veto an appropriation bill because of the attachment of an objectionable rider, and Congress should then leave the Government without supplies, the country would hold Congress responsible, and that body

The Veto of

a Bill.

would be condemned by public opinion. If the President were allowed to veto single items in an appropriation bill without rejecting the whole bill it would be a Section of easy to meet the difficulty. He could then unhorse the rider by his veto and let the appropriation bill proper go through. In this way the President without delaying supplies, might also defeat petty jobs smuggled into a bill, and thus save the country much money.

The principle contended for by the Representatives in these conflicts, wherein they were seeking to impose the will of Congress on the Executive, is historic and of long standing in parliamentary government. But it applies in governments unlike our own, in which the Executive is subordinated to the legislature. In England, and in other constitutional governments in Europe, the legislature controls the Executive and may impose conditions to control executive conduct at any time, always saving to the Executive the right to appeal to the nation. The Executive can exercise no authority except what is conferred upon him by law, that is, by the law of the legislature. The popular struggles of the past have taken the form of an effort by the people to impose their will through their legislature upon their executive agents. But in America the President derives his authority, not from the law of the legislature, but from the law of the Constitution, the same source from which the legislature derives its authority. While the law must prevail against the mere will of the Executive, it must be the law of the Constitution, or statute law in harmony therewith. The Constitution was ordained, and all laws made in pursuance thereof should be designed, to secure Executive independence, and might many times defeat the will of the people as expressed through their Representatives in Congress. This may not secure such popular representative government as many would like to see, but it is the

kind of government our fathers established in our Constitution. There is a constant tendency in the legislature to subordinate the Executive. Some think that the tendency of the legislature is to become omnipotent in the state.' If, even under our form of government, a large preponderant majority of the people wish to have it so, they can accomplish it. When the two Houses agree by a two-thirds vote, the Executive is powerless. It is right that such a preponderant majority of the people should rule without the hindrance of a veto. When Congress possesses this sanction from the people the Executive is swallowed up, and there is no longer a balance of power among the departments. The Congress can bind the President, and if he refuses to respect the bounds assigned to him by Congress, he can be cast out. He becomes only an agent limited by express commands with. no volition or discretion left him."

So the chief source of executive strength is in his legislative function, the veto. If he be shorn of that, or if its strength be spent, he is at the mercy of Congress. If he is able to hold his own, it is not, as Mr. Bryce says,

"by virtue of any properly executive function, but because of the share of the legislative function which he has received; the Executive holds its ground not because of its separation from the legislature but because of its participation in a right properly belonging to the legislature."

Congressmen are exempt from arrest during their attendance at sessions and in their going to and returning from the same, except when treason, felony, Exemption and breach of the peace are charged against from Arrest. them. Jefferson thus explains the intention in this exception: "The laws shall bind equally upon all, and espe

I Note the growth of legislative power in appointments and treaties, pp. 165 et seq. See note in Ford's Federalist, p. 409.

See pp. 100 et seq., on Executive independence.

cially those who make them shall not exempt themselves from their operation." The sessions of Congress must not be interfered with by the enforced absence of any of its members, except on a charge of very great importance. If members were allowed to be arrested and could be compelled to await the processes of law, the people would be unrepresented, and corrupt politicians would trump up absurd and empty charges against a representative of another party, not for the purpose of convicting him of any crime or misdemeanor, but merely to weaken the opposing party in Congress by causing the temporary loss of some of its members. The Congressman at his trial might easily vindicate himself, but by that time the vote on a crucial point might have been taken and his district and principles be unrepresented.

The patronage of Congress is not extensive. The members all have clerks. The House employees, in addiCongress and tion to the clerks of the members, are apPatronage. pointed, supposedly, by the four officers of the House, the Clerk, the Doorkeeper, the Sergeant-atArms, and the Postmaster. But these officers do not really appoint the House assistants. These places are distributed to members for their influence in securing the election of the chief officers of the House, and many places are created for the henchmen of members. abuse has been lately exposed, and it has been found that a large number of men are on the pay-rolls of the House who, being nominally appointed to one kind of work, are found to be doing something quite different, or to be at home on a long vacation engaged in the political work of the members appointing them. Men who have a "pull" with some State delegation receive pay for work which other men perform. Extensive abuses in

2

This

In 1901 there were 357 employees of the House, in addition to the members' clerks, with a salary roll of $400,000.

A report to the House on this subject says: "Winthrop C. Jones

patronage by members rewarding their political workers have led to the suggestion that Congressmen should be debarred by law from recommending the ap- Abuses of pointment of persons not only to positions Patronage by under the control of the executive departments but to all positions under the National Government.

"Pull."

The "Third House" is the Lobby. Literally, the lobby consists of the halls and anterooms that surround the legislative chambers. It has come to mean The "Third the men and women-there are many female House." lobbyists-who hang about the legislative chambers and who make it their business to influence members in favor of, or in opposition to, certain measures. These are the professional lobbyists, and they are always paid for their services by the persons interested in the proposed legislation. They may do honorable work for their clients, but frequently their work is that of the corruptionist. On the other hand, many men advocate before committees measures in which they are especially interested, and such lobbying may be honorable and useful public service. When bills are before Congress whose passage would greatly affect private interests it is right that the persons whose interests are affected should be allowed to present their views. Lobbying is a valuable process for bringing out the facts and the arguments in a cause. If the decision can be left uninfluenced by other than the public interests no harm will be done. But men with private interests at stake are more insistent and unscrupulous than men who seek only to guard the public interest, and is carried on the roll as a locksmith at a salary of $1440, while in point of fact his duties as locksmith are performed by Daniel P. Hickling, who is on the doorkeeper's roll as a session folder at $75 per month. Thus the position of locksmith, the duties of which require only a payment of $75 per month during the session, pays to the man who performs none of its duties $1440 per annum." For account of other specific abuses in this direction see The Outlook, March 30, 1901, pp. 701, 702, and Mr. Moody's report to the House, March, 1901.