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applies to parties occupying that relation, or Appellee and her husband, at the time of those representing them, and for a debt creat- the birth of the child, and during their mared by the purchase of the homestead."
ried life, lived immediately adjoining appel It is not contended by counsel for the lants, and her husband worked for them. Applaintiff that he is entitled to be subrogated pellee was released from the hospital as to the rights of Bryant under the principles cured, and soon thereafter disagreements of law decided in the case of Rodman v.
arose between appellee and appellants, and Sanders, 44 Ark. 504, or Carr v. Caldwell, 10 the evidence is sharply conflicting as to the Cal. 385, 70 Am. Dec. 740, cited in their causes of these disagreements, and is esbrief. Even if this were a suit in equity and pecially so as to the extent to which appelthey made this contention, they could not lants were responsible for the separation of successfully maintain it; for the reason appellee and her husband. According to apthat it was within the issue involved in the pellee's version, appellants, without legal juschancery court instituted by the plaintiff tification or excuse, brought about the separa. against the defendant to have a lien de- tion, as a result of which appellee's husband clared on the land in question for the money took away their child, when it was only seven loaned the defendant by the plaintiff.
weeks old, since which time appellee had appeal was taken from the judgment in that never been permitted to see the child. She case, and the plea of res adjudicata of the recovered judgment in the sum of $2,500, and, defendant would be a bar to the right of the a motion for a new trial having been overplaintiff for subrogation.
ruled, this appeal has been duly prosecuted. It follows that the judgment must be affirmed.
E. B. Buchanan and Gus Fulk, both of Little Rock, for appellants. Henry C. Reigler
and W. T. Tucker, both of Little Rock, for WEBER et al. v. WEBER. (No. 64.) appellee. (Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 22, 1914.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (8 1001*) — VERDICT SMITH, J. (after stating the facts as EVIDENCE-REVIEW.
above). A number of exceptions were sared The court, in testing the legal sufficiency at the trial both to the admission of evidence of the evidence of plaintiff to sustain a verdict in her favor, must give that evidence the high- and the giving of instructions, and these er. est probative value.
ceptions have been considered by us; but we [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and do not find any prejudicial error or question Error, Cent. Dig. $8 3922, 3928–3934; Dec. of sufficient importance to require discussion. Dig. $ 1001.*]
 It is also earnestly insisted that the eri. 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE (8 325*)--ALIENATION dence is insufficient to support the verdict ;
OF AFFECTIONS OF HUSBAND-RIGHT OF AC-
but when appellee's evidence is given its highUnder Kirby's Dig. 8 6017, authorizing a est probative value, as we must give it, when wife to sue alone as to any separate property testing its legal sufficiency to support the vermaintain
an action for damages for the aliena- dict, we cannot say that the evidence is legaltion of the affections of her husband, whether ly insufficient to sustain the verdict, nor can the cause of action is denominated a personal we say the amount recovered is excessive. or a property right.
 A question is raised, however, which [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Husband and is one of first impression in this state, and Wife, Cent. Dig. $ 1119; Déc. Dig. § 325.*]
which has received our earnest consideration. Appeal from Circuit Court, Pulaski Coun- This question is the right of the wife to mainty; G. W. Hendricks, Judge.
tain an action for damages for the alienation Action by Ida Weber against Englebert of the affections of her husband. There is Weber and another. From a judgment for conflict among the authorities as to whethplaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
er this right of action existed in favor of This suit was instituted to recover damages the wife, or not, at common law, and, although against appellants, for the alleged alienation there are numerous cases which hold that she of the affections of the appellee's husband, had no such right, the better view appears Joe Weber. The appellee married Joe Weber, to be that she did. Common-law causes of ac the only child of appellants, in the city of tion for a personal injury to a married Little Rock on the 22d day of November, woman belonged to her; but the husband was 1910, and they lived and cohabited together required to sue with her to recover compensaas husband and wife until the 30th day of tion because of her disability to sue. The August, 1911, when there was born to them a husband's right of action abated at the death male child. Thereafter appellee was taken of the wife; but the cause of action survived seriously ill, and to such an extent that she to the wife and could be maintained by her lost the control of her mental faculties, and, after the death of her husband. Her right at the instance and recommendation of the of action existed, but could not be set in mofamily physician, was, by proper order of the tion unless her husband joined, and, by reaPulaski county court, adjudged insane and son of the disability of coverture, it remained placed in the State Hospital for Nervous in abeyance and could not be prosecuted in Diseases, for treatment.
her own name. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17, 6 L. R. A. 553; Smith v. me to be perfectly clear. The statutes provide: Smith, 98 Tenn. 101, 38 S. W. 439, 60 Am. St. That the real and personal estate of every fe
male, acquired before marriage, and ali properRep. 838.
ty, real and personal, to which she may afterThe case of Bennett v. Bennett, supra, is a wards become entitled by gift, grant, inheritleading authority on this subject, and the ance, devise, or in any other manner, shall be opinion in that case reviewed the authorities male, and shall not be liable for the debts, ob
and remain the estate and property of such feupon this question, and, in upholding a judg- ligations, and engagements of her husband, and ment in favor of the wife, it was there said: may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged,
“We think the judgment appealed from conveyed, devised, or bequeathed by her, in the should be affirmed, upon the ground that the same manner and with the like effect as if she common law gave the plaintiff a right of ac
were unmarried.' How. Stat. p. 6295. 'Action, and that the Code gave her an appropri- tions may be brought by and against a married ate remedy."
woman in relation to her sole property, in the
same manner as if she were unmarried; and in In 1 Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) p. 475, it was cases where the property of the husband cansaid:
not be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise incumber"At least 20 states now hold that such an ac
ed without the consent of his wife, to be given tion may be maintained, some basing their con
in the manner prescribed by law, or when his clusion upon common-law principles and some, property is exempted by law from sale on exeutes in favor of married women, which have in her own name,' with the like effect as in casmore or less, upon the various enabling stata cution or other final process issued from any
court against him, his wife may bring an action been passed in recent years.”
es of actions in relation to her sole property as A number of cases support the wife's right aforesaid.' How. Stat. 6297. Under these statto recover for the alienation of the affections utes it has been held that a wife is entitled to of her husband, as an invasion of her person and may sue for and recover in her own name al rights, while other cases regard the wife's from assault and battery (Berger v. Jacobs, 21
damages for her personal injuries and suffering right to the consortium of her husband as a Mich. 215; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Id. 180, 198), property right. One of the leading cases tak- and for injuries to her person through the neging this latter view is that of Jaynes v.
ligence of another (Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. v.
Coleman, 28 Mich. 440), also for slander Jaynes, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 40, in which case it (Leonard v. Pope, 27 Mich. 145). If the damis there said:
ages in such cases are her individual property, “These reciprocal rights may be regarded as
as expressly held in Berger v. Jacobs, I cannot the property of the respective parties, in the see why, in reason and on principle, the dam. broad sense of the word 'property, which in- ages arising from the loss of the society and cludes things not tangible or visible, and ap- support of her husband are not also her inplies to whatever is exclusively one's own.”
dividual property. Surely the support and
maintenance which she is entitled to from her And it is there further said:
husband, and which she loses by his abandon“But as, at common law, the husband and ment, is capable of ready and accurate measwife were regarded as one person, and her per, urement in dollars and cents, and can be said sonal rights were suspended, or incorporated to be a property right, which she has lost by with his, during coverture, so that if she were the wrongful interference of the defendants. injured in her person or property she could The loss of the society of her husband, and her bring no action for redress without her hus- mental anguish and suffering, are not so easily band's concurrence, and in his name as well as ascertained when compensation is sought, and her own,
she was practically pre to be gauged by a money standard; but damcluded from suing for damages caused by alien- ages for such anguish and suffering are given, ating the affections of her husband and entico as best the jury can, and are permissible, in ing him away: * Her disability in that most actions of tort. * There has never respect, we think, has been removed in this been any reason urged against the right of the state by legislation. À married woman may husband to sue for the loss of the consortium of now, while married, sue and be sued in all mat- his wife. And if, as shown, the wife is now, ters' having relation to her sole and separate under either the liberal letter or spirit of our property,' or for an injury to her person or marriage laws, entitled, as of her own property, character, the same as if she was sole,
to the damages arising from her personal inand it is not necessary or proper to join her juries—the injuries of her body or mind-there husband with her as a party in any action or can be no good reason why she cannot sue for special proceeding affecting her separate prop, and recover damages for the loss of the consorerty.
* If we are correct in holding that tium of her husband that does not equally and the right, which the plaintiff alleged was in- as well apply to the suit of the husband on acvaded by the defendant in this action, was her count of the loss of her society. The wife is separate property, the case is within the stato entitled to the society, protection, and support utes referred to. If it be not property in the of her husband as certainly, under the law, and sense in which the word 'property' is used in by moral right, as he is to her society and serv, the statute cited, it is a personal right, and as ices in his household. * * It is an old the statute extends to all injuries, whether to maxim, and a good one, that the law will never property, person, or character, it seems to be suffer an injury, and a damage without resufficiently comprehensive to embrace an in-dress. Will the law aid the husband and not jury to the right in question.”
help the wife in a like case? Not under the In the case of Warren v. Warren, 89 Mich. present enlightened views of the marriage re123, 50 N. W. 842, 14 L. R. A. 545, the wife's lation and its reciprocal rights and duties.
The reasoning that deprives the wife of redress right to sue and recover damages for the when her husband is taken away from her by alienation of the affections of her husband the blandishments and unlawful influences of was said to exist under the statute which was others is a relic of the barbarity of the com
mon law, which in effect made the wife the set out in the opinion. It was there said:
mere servant of her husband, and deprived her "Under the statutes of this state relative to of all right to redress her personal wrongs exthe rights of married women, and the decisions cept by his will." of our own courts in relation thereto, the right of the wife to bring this action, as well all other
In the case of Bennett v. Bennett, supra,
and treated it as of the nature of a personal, such married woman separately in her own injury to the wife, and it was there said: name, and the nonjoinder of her husband shall
"An injury to the person, within the meaning not be pleaded in any such action." of the law, includes certain acts which do not The Court of Appeals of New Jersey reinvolve physical” or personal injury. "Thus versed the action of the trial court in suscriminal conversation with the wife has long been held to be a personal injury to the hus- taining the demurrer, and in doing so used band * and the seduction of a daughter the following language in construing the act a like injury to the father."
above quoted: And it was there further said:
“The question therefore presented in this case, "The basis of the action is the loss of con
in the light of the act of 1906, is res nova, and sortium or the right of the husband to the con- the conclusion we have reached is supported by jugal society of his wife. It is not necessary
the great weight of authority. That this act that there shall be proof of any pecuniary loss was intended to confer the power upon a marin order to sustain the action. Hermance y.
ried woman to protect and enforce her rights James, 32 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 142; Rinehart is the specific announcement contained in its V. Bills, 82 Mo. 534 (52 Am. Rep. 385). Loss title. The body of the act declares that she of service is not essential, but is merely matter may maintain an action, as a feme sole might of aggravation and need not be alleged or prov- lawfully do, and without joining her husband ed. Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 125 (45 therein, for all torts committed against her or Am. Rep. 307]."
her property. Keeping in mind the old law and Cooley says that the gist of the action is the legislative intent which inspired this reme
the existing mischief, it becomes manifest that the loss of consortium which includes the dial measure could have been only a desire to husband's society, affections and aid. 1 Coo- confer upon the married woman that equality
of remedy as an independent suitor, which ley on Torts, p. 478.
would enable her to vindicate her right in perIn the case of Anna Nolin v. Marion Pear- sonam for a tort committed against her, and son, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 890, 4 L. R. A. thus remedy the inequality to which she was (N. S.) 643, 114 Am. St. Rep. 605, 6 Ann. Cas.
subjected by the common law." 658, which was a suit by the wife for the
It will be seen that our statute giving mar. alienation of the affections of her husband, ried women the right to sue, which will later the right of the wife to maintain the suit be set out, is broader and more comprehenwas upheld, and many cases are cited in the sive than the New Jersey statute which the opinion of the court and in the briefs of Court of Appeals of that state said was sufficounsel; other cases are collected in the cient to authorize the maintenance of a suit footnote, and, after a review of the Ameri- by the wife, such as we have here. can cases, the following statement is made by
In the case of Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. the editor of the footnote:
236, 39 Atl. 884, 40 L. R. A. 549, 64 Am. St. "In the United States, Wisconsin, Maine, and Rep. 646, involving the question here under New Jersey seem to stand alone in denying to consideration, the Supreme Court of that the wife the right to sue for the alienation of state said: her husband's affections and enticing him-away from her, thus depriving her of his support, un
“Where the wife has been freed from her der statụtes giving her the right to sue and be common-law disabilities, and may sue in her sued in her own name.
own name and right for torts done her, we see
no reason to doubt her right to maintain an acBut New Jersey can no longer be classed tion against one who has wrongfully induced among the states which deny the right of her husband to leave her. Generally this right the wife to maintain this cause of action.
has been recognized and sustained in jurisdic
tions where she has the capacity to sue." In the case of Sims v. Sims, 79 N. J. Law, 577, 76 Atl. 1063, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, an
One of the earliest American cases holding appeal was taken from the order of the trial the wife has the right to sue for the loss of court sustaining a demurrer which was inter- consortium of her husband is the case of posed upon the general ground that a suit [32 Am. Rep. 397], and this has become one
Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 627-633 would not lie, which was instituted to recover damages for maliciously enticing away of the leading cases, and is cited in many of the plaintiff's husband, and thereby alienat- the subsequent cases on this subject. It was ing his affections. The opinion in that case
there said: recited that plaintiff based her right to sue of the husband over the property and personal
“If, in this state, the common-law dominion upon an act entitled “An act for the protec- rights of the wife has been taken away from tion and enforcement of the rights of mar- him and conferred upon her, and remedies in ried women" (P. L. 1906, p. 525). This act accordance with the spirit of the civil law have provided that any married woman may main- of injuries to her person, property, and personal
been expressly given to the wife for the redress tain an action in her own name and without rights, all of which I hope to show has been joining her husband therein, for all torts done, then it must follow that she may main. committed against her or her separate prop- the consortium of her husband against one who
tain an action in her own name for the loss of erty, in the same manner as she lawfully wrongfully deprives her of it, unless the conmight if a feme sole, provided, however, that sortium of her husband is not one of her per: this act shall not be so construed as to inter to the consortium of the husband one of her
sonal rights. * * * Is the right of the wife fere with or take away any right of action at personal rights? If it is, then the statute law or in equity now provided for the torts makes the right of action, growing out of an above mentioned. The second section provid- injury to the right, the separate property of the
wife, for which the Code gives her a right to ed that:
sue in her own name. Before marriage the "Any action brought in accordance with the man and woman are endowed with the same provisions of this act may be prosecuted by personal rights. If under no disability, each is
competent to contract. When the agreement to good reasons for the rule that the husband marry is entered into, but before its consumma- should join in a complaint for damages resulttivn, each has the same interest in it, and either ing from an injury to the person, property, repmay sue for a breach of it by the other. In utation, or feelings of the wife in every case this state neither the husband nor wife uncon- other than that before us. Whenever in any of ditionally surrenders their personal rights by these she suffers, presumably he suffers; he consummating the contract of marriage. On has a direct pecuniary interest in the result; the contrary, each acquires a personal as well and the defendant is rightfully entitled to proas legal right to the conjugal society of the oth- tection from a second judgment. But, in the er, for the loss of which either may sue sepa- case before us, it is the pith and marrow of the rately."
complaint that in alienating the husband's conIn the third edition of Cooley on Torts, to deny his conjugal society to her, in persuad
jugal affection from the wife, in inducing him vol. 1, p. 477, the case of Foot v. Card, 58 ing him to give his adulterous affections and Conn. 1, 18 Atl. 1027, 6 L. R. A. 829, 18 Am. society to the defendant, the latter has inflicted St. Rep. 258, is quoted from at length with upon the plaintiff an injury by which from the
nature of the case it is impossible for the busapproval, and we find there the following band to suffer injury, for which it is impossiquotation from that case:
ble for him to ask redress either for himself or "Whatever inequalities of right as to prop the wife can only ask for damages by and for
for his wife.
* In a case of this kind erty may result from the marriage contract: herself; the law cannot make redress otherhusband and wife are equal respect, namely, each owes to the other the full-wise than to her solely, apart from all others, est possible measure of conjugal affection and especially apart from her husband. For no society; the husband to the wife all that the theory of the law as to the merger of the rights wife owes to him. Upon principle this right in of the wife in those of the husband could inthe wife is equally valuable to her, as proper- clude her rights to his conjugal affection and ty, as is that of the husband to him. Her right society. Although all other debts and rights to being the same as bis in kind, degree, and val- her might go to him, there yet remained this ue, there would seem to be po' valid reason why particular debt from him to her absolutely the law should deny to her the redress which alone and beyond the reach of the law of merit aifords to him. But from time to time ger.” courts, not denying the right of the wife in this We are not called upon to approve all that regard, not denying that it could be injured, we have here quoted from this Connecticut have nevertheless declared that the law neither would nor could devise and enforce any form case; but the significance of that opinion is of action by which she might obtain damages. that a recovery was permitted without referIn 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, 143, the reason for such denial is thus stated: “The inferior
ence to any enabling act permitting the wife hath no kind of property in the company, care,
to sue alone. or assistance of the superior, as the superior Many other cases are cited in the cases is held to have in those of the inferior; there- we have quoted from; but those quoted from fore the inferior can suffer no loss or 'injury.' Inasmuch as by universal consent it is of the show upon what theories and under what essence of every marriage contract that the par- circumstances recoveries have been permitties thereto shall, in regard to this particular ted. The absurdity and cruel injustice of the matter of conjugal society and affection, stand common-law fiction of the identity of husband upon an equality, we are unable to find any sup and wife has long been recognized, and the port for the denial in this reason, and, the right, he injury, and the consequent damage be- tendency of all modern legislation has been ing admitted, there comes into operation anoth- towards the emancipation of the wife. But er rule, namely, that the law will permit no this amelioration of the wife's condition must one to obtain redress for wrong except by its instrumentality, and it will furnish a mode for come through the legislative function, and obtaining adequate redress for every wrong. her disabilities at the common law exist, exThis rule, lying at the foundation of all law, cept in so far as they have been removed by is more potent than, and takes precedence of, the reason that the wife is in this regard with constitutional conventions or legislative enout the pale of the law, because of her inferior- actments. Some of the disabilities under ity."
which the wife still labors, as the result of In this case of Foot v. Card, supra, a recov- the common-law fiction of the legal unity of ery was permitted without reference to any the husband and wife, are pointed out in the enabling act authorizing the wife to sue opinion in the case of Kies v, Young, 64 Ark. alone. The complaint had been demurred to 381, 42 S. W. 669, 62 Am. St. Rep. 198. But, upon the ground that the wife could not alone while she still labors under the disabilities maintain this action, but that her husband there recited, we think the Legislature has was a necessary party to the action, if any clearly manifested its purpose to manumit cause of action existed. That contention was her, so far as maintaining an action to endisposed of in the following language:
force any legal right she may have, or to "Wherever there is a valuable right and an secure redress for any actionable wrong ininjury to it, with consequent damage, the ob- flicted upon her, where the recovery would ligation is upon the law to devise and enforce such form and mode of redress as will make inure to her benefit. the most complete reparation, A technicality "Where a married woman is a party, her husmust not be permitted to work a denial of jus- band must be joined with her except in the foltice. The defendant has no possible interest in lowing cases: First. She may be sued alone requiring the husband to be coplaintiff, other upon contracts made by her in respect to her than that she should have security for her sole and separate property, or in respect to any costs in the suit, and be protected from a sec- trade or business carried on by her under any ond judgment upon the same cause of action in statute of this state. Second. She may mainhis name. As she is in no danger of a second tain an action in her own name for or on acjudgment, and can compel the plaintiff to give count of her sole or separate estate or propsecurity for costs, it is simply an empty tech- erty, or for damages against any person or body nicality which she here interposes. There are corporate for any injury to her person, char
acter, or property.
Third. Where the , was greater than that of rebuilding it at the action is between herself and her husband, she old location, where the Commission gave the may sue and be sued alone." Section 6017, Kir- railroad company a hearing and the difference by's Digest.
in the expense was not so great as to make
the order unreasonable and arbitrary. These words "person, character, or property" are of the broadest signification and im- tional Law, Cent. Dig. 88_832–834; Dec. Digis
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constituport, and would appear to include any cause of 297;* Railroads, Cent. Dig. 88 130, 131, 133, action which could arise in favor of a married 135, 136; Dec. Dig. § 58.*] woman, out of any relation which she can 4. RAILROADS (8 9*) — COMMISSIONS — Pow. legally occupy. Although she still labors EBS OF. under some disabilities, she is given by this
The Legislature, which has the power to statute the right to enforce in her own name railroad company, having delegated that power
direct the establishment of new stations by a any right which she legally possesses. While to the Railroad Commission, its order should it appears from a study of the cases, which not be declared invalid by the courts as unreahold that a wife may sue for the alienation sonable, unless it is arbitrary and without any
basis in justice. of the affections of her husband, that in some of the states, where the courts so hold, the Cent. Dig. 88 12-19; Dec. Dig. $ 9.*]
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, statutes have entirely manumitted the wife from her common-law disability with refer. 5. RAILROADS ($ 9*)—COMMISSIONS-ORDERS
VALIDITY. ence to suing in her own name, it will also
In an action by a railroad company to vaappear, from cases which we have cited, and cate an order by the Railroad Commission re, from other cases therein cited, that the right quiring the relocation of a station, evidence held of action has been upheld in the wife's favor insufficient to show that the order which re
quired the station to be established upon a where the enabling acts were not as broad as grade and on a curve, was arbitrary and unrea. those of this state.
sonable. So that, whether this cause of action be [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, denominated a personal right or a property Cent. Dig. $8 12–19; Dec. Dig. & 9.*] right, the wife, under the laws of this state,
Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; may sue if it is either; and the judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.
Jno. E, Martineau, Chancellor.
Bill by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company against George W. Bellamy and others as the Railroad Com
mission, From a decree for defendants, ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. BELLAMY et al. (No. 40.)
plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
More than 15 citizens of the town of (Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 15, 1914.)
Benton, Saline county, Ark., presented a pe 1. RAILROADS (8 58*) — COMMISSIONS — Pow-tition to the Railroad Commission of ArkanERS OF
Under the statute (Laws 1907, p. 357), au- sas, in which they stated that they were thorizing the Railroad Commission to consider shippers and patrons of the St. Louis, Iron petitions for depots and stations, and to de- Mountain & Southern Railway Company, and termine the amount, degree, and character of that the depot of said company at Benton construction, equipment, changes, and enlargements of stations and depots,' the Railroad had been recently destroyed by fire; that Commission has power to direct a railway com the company was preparing to build a new pany to relocate its stations.
depot on the old site, which was on the ex[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. $$ 130, 131, 133, 135, 136; Dec. Dig: treme edge of the city and not accessible to $ 58.*]
travelers without passing a distance of 1,500
or 1,700 feet along the right of way of the 2. RAILROADS (8 58*) — COMMISSIONS - Pow
company and between its tracks where travel Under the statute (Laws 1907, p. 357), au- was made extremely dangerous by the pas thorizing the Railroad Commission to consider sage of trains on the main line and switches all petitions for the enlargement, equipment, of the railway. They urged the Commission and discontinuance of depots and stations, provided the petition shall be signed by at least to require the railway company to build its 15 bona fide citizens residing in the territory depot at a point immediately south of where sought to be affected, the Railroad Commission its line known as the Little Rock & Hot may, under a petition signed by 15 citizens of the city, direct the relocation of a station at a
Springs Western was intersected by East point in the city other than that requested by street and Main street. The Commission took the petitioners.
the petition under consideration, visited the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, town of Benton, examined the location menCent. Dig. $$ 130, 131, 133, 135, 136; Dec. Dig. tioned in the petition, heard many witnesses, § 58.*]
and concluded that it would be unwise to 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ($ 297*)-RAILROADS require the railway company to build its
(8 58*) — DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS-WHAT CONSTITUTES.
new depot at the point named in the petition. The property of a railroad company is not But it issued an order requiring the railway taken without due process by an order of the company to build its new depot building at Railroad Commission requiring the relocation of a station at a new point, though the expense
a point between where its depot had been of establishing the station at the new point located and the location asked by the peti. •For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes