. 414 Refutation of Aspersions on the British Army. stroy it! The Major-as a military man-can see nothing wrong in the destruction of a bridge of such an unconscionable length-but Mr Stuart affirms, "it would puzzle him to shew in what way the wanton destruction of one of the greatest bridges in the world, which was not in the way of the British army in the slightest degree, was justified by the Americans themselves having rendered impassable two bridges, by which they thought the approach of the British might be facilitated." We hope the Major will not think of puzzling himself by any such attempt. He has done quite enough in the way of puzzling Mr Stuart. Perhaps the British were carried away by the force of example-and were unable to look on the Americans "rendering two bridges impassable"-which they assuredly were entitled to do without trying their hand at a third -and a very tempting one too"the greatest bridge in the world." It is consolatory to know that all the three bridges are now as flourishing as ever-and at this moment admiring themselves in their watery mir rors. One word more to Mr Stuart-and we have done. "I admitted," says he, "in the narrative, that the commanders had directed private property to be respected, but stated that the soldiery could not be restrained." At the bottom of the 19th page of his "Refutation of the Aspersions," &c., does he think it necessary to say this to the gallant Major, who, long before, had proved that such charge against the soldiery was false? But what new argument does he bring forward in page twenty? "This has happened on many occasions, such as the retreat of Sir John Moore, and of the army under the Duke of Wellington in Spain, in Nov. 1812, when he wrote a letter to the commanding officers of battalions in the army under his command, containing these memorable expressions- It must be obvious, however, to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. gularities and outrages of all deIrrescriptions were committed with im [March, punity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred.'" retreat no allude to this worse than ungenerMajor Pringle does not deign to ous-this base argument against his brothers in arms. Sir John Moore's through mountain-roads-and was indeed disastrousroads-in the winter-snows, with Soult pressing upon him with an army more numerous far-and hateful ever has it been to a British army to shew their backs to their foes-to Frenchmen. But when they offered battle at Lugos, they shewed what they were-and so did they at Corunna. such as to subject the army to the The retreat from Burgos, too, was anger of Wellington. The Great Lord then reproved the heroic host that had conquered at Salamanca ; and they felt the reproof of him under whom in every field they had been invincible and victorious; but what purpose who is he that now recalls-and for words?" those "memorable of a battle knows no more than a One "who the division spinster"—and to fasten ignominy on an army that their bitterest enemies owned were as humane as they were brave-whose discipline, indeed, nothing had happened to relax or disturb-and whose moderation people they had overcome, and in in victory was declared by the very the heart of a captured city, to be unexampled in the annals of war fare!" details, given on unquestionable auMr Stuart having thus "proved by thority, that he is guiltless of the slightest error in point of fact," and convicted Major Pringle of all kinds of ignorance and inaccuracy, gives his unfortunate antagonist the coupde-grace with a fatal clause from a speech of the American President. "However deeply to be regretted on (alluding to the enterprise of the our part is the transient success" British against Washington, and the neighbouring town of Alexandria) only the ordinary public business at "which interrupted for a moment the seat of Government, no compensation can accrue for the loss of violation of private property, and this character with the world by this destruction of public edifices, pro tected as monuments of the arts by the laws of civilized warfare." As he inflicts this merciless and murderous blow, Mr Stuart exclaims"Here is an authority of far more value than the quotations from American newspapers, to which Major Pringle has resorted-the speech of the President, delivered within a month, in the very city where the destruction of private property took place." The blow rebounds off the breast of the gallant Major, and hits his would be executioner in the face. Many are the gross mistatements and misrepresentations to be found in the speeches of American Presidents, as all the world knows; but it so happens, that here there is not a single syllable touching the point in debate. Nobody denies that at Washington some property was destroyed by order of the British commanders, which an American President or a Scottish Writer to the Signet might, without saying any thing much amiss, call private; but Mr Stuart elsewhere says, "It is material that Major Pringle should recollect that I did not in my narrative describe the violation of private property at Washington as contrary to the usages of war." We know not what his friend the American President would say to that; but we do know that in his speech he was stigmatizing the British Government, and the commanders of the British army who acted under the orders of the British Government -not the soldiery; and that if the soldiery had acted like marauders, and could "not be restrained" from plunder, he would have accused them of their shameful crimes-and not left that duty to be performed by Mr Stuart. That the President says not one word in vituperation of the conduct of the soldiery, in a speech "delivered within a month, in the very city where the destruction of private property took place," is indeed proof positive and irrefragable that their conduct was without reproach. We see no reasonso far as we have yet gone-why Major Pringle-as Mr Stuart haughtily says "should feel that his time might have been better employed than in attempting to weaken the authority of a book, no part of the details in which was written without ample consideration, and the most minute, scrupulous, and pains-taking examination of documents." Mr Stuart is here very panegyrical and eulogistic on Stuart's Three Years in America; but he must not be surprised though that "work" be not thus buttered by less patriotic reviewers. Let us now attend to Mr Stuart's account of the attack on the lines before New Orleans. Major Pringle has pointed out what he thinks some considerable errors in that account, but Mr Stuart, in his Refutation, proceeds to shew that all his statements are substantially true." The points disputed are, first-the relative force of the British and of the Americans; second-the length of the American lines; third-whether or not the British reached the ditch. Mr Stuart says in his "Three Years,"-" The British were understood to have had between 10,000 and 12,000 men in this engagement, and the Americans between 3000 and 4000." Major Pringle says that "the reverse is much nearer the truth; and having an official return of every regiment of the British army employed on that expedition, he gives the list of British Infantry employed in the attack on the lines of New Orleans on the morning of the 8th January, 1815:-4th foot, 479; 7th do. 750; 21st do. 800; 43d do. 820; 44th do. 427; 85th do. 298; 93d do. 775; 95th do. 276-making in all 4893 rank and file British-to which add 200 seamen and 400 marinestotal, 5493. The first perusal of such very distinct testimony by a field-officer who was present upon the occasion "startled me," quoth Mr Stuart, "and led me to think I must have relied on defective information." Yet he somewhat inconsistently says, in almost the next sentence, that the whole information communicated by him "is by no means conveyed in positive terms." But from whom had he his information on which he relied, while he by no means conveyed it in positive terms? From American, French, and Dutch authorities. The Americans generally stated the British at 12,000 Marbois, one of the French Ministers of State," and one of the fairest and most liberal writers of the age," at 14,000, (most liberal indeed,)—the Duke of Saxe Weimar at from eight to ten thousand in the field-and Levasseur at 12,000 who were "perceived," he says, by General Jackson, at break of day, advancing on him in three columns. From all these contradictory assertions-and they are all of them mere assertions -Mr Stuart had formed a sort of medium estimate, which he set down, not in positive terms, at from ten to twelve thousand; so that no wonder the Major's official return" startled him," and "for the first time led him to think he must have relied on defective information." The truth is, that he had relied on what was no information at all-but a number of guesses-some of which-especially that by Monsieur Marbois, one of the fairest and most liberal writers of the age," (14,000!), are so outrageously extravagant as to lose the name of falsehood. Mr Stuart, on recovering from the alarm produced by so novel an appearance as that of an official return, betook himself to the London Gazette of the 10th of March, 1814, where be found Sir John Lambert's despatch, containing an account of the battle. But before bringing it to murder the Major, he thinks it necessary to inform or remind him that "nothing is better known to a military man, than that the rank and file of a regiment, or of an army, comprehend merely the men armed with the bayonet, and that the whole of the officers, non-commissioned officers, the staff of the army, military as well as medical, the drum-majors, drummers, fifers, &c., are not comprehended under that description. This is a serious objection to Major Pringle's detailed and conclusive information, &c." It seems to us rather a ludicrous than a serious objection-and so thinks the gallant Major, who has nothing to say to it, except that it is all very true, "and that it certainly would be new to him to include medical men with their lancets, or musicians with their clarionets, in the list of fighting men." Mr Stuart then has recourse to Sir John Lambert's Despatch, and, in the most prosing style possible, ineffectually attempts to prove from it that Major Pringle has made many unfair omissions in his statement of the British force. From the beginning to the end of this tedious enumeration, he shews that he either does not know, or pretends not to know, that Major Pringle had given an official return" of the British infantry employed in the attack on the Lines at New Orleans." He accuses the Major of "a gross omission" in not mentioning two squadrons of the Fourteenth Light Dragoons! Of what use would dragoons"asks the good-natured Major-"have been in an attack on lines situated in very wet ground, with a parapet of great height, and a deep ditch into the bargain?" At all events, dragoons are not infantry. And why did not the Major mention the artillery? Because of what use would they have been in an action where the troops were to march as fast as consisted with good order, to the attack of lines where they were to come immediately in close contact with their enemy." Mr Stuart gives a droll reason why the royal artillery and engineers should have been included among the "infantry employed in the attack on the lines at New Orleans on the morning of the 8th of January". that they were employed the night before and the night after! The sappers and miners too, Mr Stuart says, should not have been omitted but were they employed in the attack? The 5th West Indian regiment too-the Niggers-ought to have been included, "in point of numbers the strongest that landed on the shores of Louisiana." But they were with Thornton on the other side of the Mississippi, and so was the 85th regiment, consisting of 298 rank and file, which Major Pringle had erroneously included in his account of the "British Infantry employed in the attack"-so that his account stands right after all Mr Stuart's recondite studies of that rare document, Sir John Lambert's Despatch except that one of the finest regiments in the service-the EightyFifth-must be deducted from it. That regiment and other British under the gallant Thornton, stormed the American batteries on the right bank of the river-but not till after the failure of the attack on the lines. Major Pringle gives a list of the killed, wounded, and missing, of all the regiments-and the 5th West Indian regiment," the strongest, ac cording to Mr Stuart, that landed on the shores of Louisiana," appears to have been in a situation of comparative security on the right bank of the river-for while the 21st, to which Major Pringle belonged, lost in the attack 3 officers, 2 sergeants, and 65 rank and file killed-4 officers, 6 sergeants, 1 drummer, and 144 rank and file wounded-and 9 officers, 8 sergeants, 2 drummers, 217 rank and file missing, (taken prisoners within the enemy's lines)—the Blacks hadone sergeant wounded. Our own firm belief is, that the whole effective force of the British army under Pakenham did not exceed, if it reached, 8000 men-and of these that not more, if so many as 4000, moved on in three columns to the attack of the lines, although Levasseur assures us that General Jackson perceived 12,000 advancing against him! And what may have been the numbers of the Americans? Mr Stuart had taken an average-he says between the two European authorities of Marbois and Levasseur-stating them at between three and four thousand. Marbois, we have seen, spoke of the defeat of "fourteen thousand by four;" and it is neither unfair nor illiberal towards "one of the fairest and most liberal writers of the age" to think it not very unlikely that he may have underrated the number of the Americans as much as he has exaggerated that of the British. Levasseur tells us that General Jackson, with 3200 men "perceived the English army, 12,000 strong, advancing in three columns ;" and Mr Stuart took an average between these trust-worthy authorities. He has now, however, seen the American official account, which to him is gospel, and it gives, including marines, "4698, a great part of whom, however, were without night with "5000 men." So said Sir John Keane in his Despatch-a man not given to exaggeration-" from the best information I can obtain, the enemy's force amounted to 5000 men. But Mr Stuart says that Sir John Keane was mistaken-" it was afterwards well known, that at the period in question, General Jackson had no such force as Sir John Keane, from the information he had got, presumed him to possess." Marbois and the Duke of Saxe Weimar agree with the Americans that he had but two thousand men-that is to say, the Americans told them so, and they believed it. Major Pringle is of opinion that the number of the Americans in the lines must have been far beyond 3000 or 4000; and "has always understood from officers present in the action, and who had gone through the Peninsular War, that from the extent of the lines, and the tremendous fire kept up, the Americans must have had within them between 8000 and 10,000 men." The Major suggested that the amount of the American force might be pretty fairly estimated by supposing the men to stand four deep, (Mr Stuart says, in many places, they stood six,) and each file at one yard distance from the other (good elbow room, as every soldier will allow), then as the lines were "a mile in length," this mode of computation would give upwards of 7000. That the Americans had many more is, however, his firm belief; as General Jackson was much too skilful an officer to throw up lines a mile long, unless he had masses of men to fill them-and "such a torrent of fire as poured on the British troops that day along the whole extent of the line was perhaps never witnessed, not even at St Sebastian." Mr Stuart says, Major Pringle frankly says, "that he cannot prove, by any wellauthenticated account, the precise amount of the American force within the lines of New Orleans. Mr Ducros and other American prisoners had spoken of there being 13,000 or 14,000 men within the city; but that might have been " with a view to intimidate, by exaggerating the force we had to encounter." On the 22d December, General Jackson had attacked the British army during the arms. "that Major Pringle may rest assured that his fanciful calculation, when weighed against the statements in the official despatches of three British commanders, will meet with no credit in this country." The calculation seems to us any thing but fanciful-not to be compared for a moment, as a flight of imagination, with Mr Stuart's proposal to include two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons among "the Infantry," employed in the attack of and patriotic. But the Major is not to be put down by this champion. He knows much more than Levasseur about "the depths of this swampy wood." It was part of the American Lines. And the despatch of Quarter- Master General Forrest, which Mr Stuart calls in "to confirm in a great measure Levasseur's explanation," confirms Major Pringle's; for he states, that "the wood on the left was, in general, distant from the river about one thousand five hundred yards." Now, supposing the wood two hundred-and-fifty yards broad, you have lines in length one mile, and "all full of men." And here we must quote from Major Pringle's own letter, for it gives us some important and interesting information, altogether new to the public. lines "situated in very wet ground, with a parapet of great height, and a deep ditch into the bargain." But what does he mean by saying that the "fanciful calculation" is against the statements in the official despatches of three British commanders? Sir John Lambert, Quarter-Master General Forrest, and Sir Alexander Cochrane, speak of the lines as being about "one thousand yards"-so they thought-speaking immediately after the battle and from no actual admeasurement. But Major Pringle speaks on what Mr Stuart surely ought to admit to be the best of all possible authority, and which could not have been known to the three British commanders," a very beautiful plan of the operations, and of the American lines before New Orleans, executed by Major Lacarriere Latour, principal engineer of the Military District, U. S. army," which lines, to use the Major's own words, mile in length, and filled with men." To this Mr Stuart sensibly and courteously replies, "Latour's calculation of the length of his line may perhaps regiment, having himself reconnoitred be explained by a statement of Levasseur, though if his explanation be correct, it will not redound to the candour of Major Pringle, who having accompanied the army, could not fail to know the real state of the case." An insinuation of want of candour made on a perhaps and an if! But what says Levasseur ? were a "The position chosen by the American General to wait for reinforcements, and to arrest the advance of so formidable an enemy, appeared to me to be judicious. He threw up intrenchments about five miles below the city, along an old canal, the left of which was lost in the depths of a marshy wood, while the right rested on the river. The total length of this line was about eight hundred toises, but as three hundred toises of the left were unassailable, the enemy was confined in his attack to a part of about five hundred toises, and obliged to advance in full view, over a perfectly level plain." Mr Stuart, then, prefers the account of Levasseur to that of the engineer himself, who constructed the lines! because it cuts off 300, or rather 375 toises-750 yards. "Now, sir, I shall proceed to shew that the swamp or wooded marsh towards the left of the American lines, and in front of them, was not impassable. Lieut.-Col. Rennie, of the 21st the wood, made a report to General Gibbs, offering to conduct a body of troops through it. General Gibbs no sooner heard Colonel Rennie's report than he accompanied him to the Commander of the forces, Sir E. Pakenham. The consequence was, that, on the 28th of December, a demonstration of the whole army was ordered, and Colonel Rennie, in command of his own light company of the 21st regiment, was ordered to penetrate into the wood, as far as he could, and gain the enemy's left. He executed his orders in the most admirable manner, succeeded in getting the whole of his men through, and debouched from the wood upon the American left. According to the orders he had received, he kept up a brisk fire until he was de sired to retire. Sir Edward Paken ham, not thinking himself authorized to attack such strong lines with his very small force, withdrew his troops, determined to wait the arrival of the 7th and 43d regiments, which reached us on the 6th of January. On the 8th of January, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the 4th regiment, was put in command of a body of troops, I believe about 400, to make his way through the wood and gain the enemy's left flank, in fact, to pursue the route, as nearly as possible, which Colonel Rennie had done on the 28th. Colonel Jones succeeded, as Colonel Rennie This is not a "fanciful calculation"-it is merely philosophical had done, in conducting his force through |