5, 20, and 40 centavos. Unlike the paper currency reform, the old coins may be exchanged for new ones at any time without identification, and there is no loss to the holders. The reason for this is the recovery value of the silver in the old coins. In late 1968 it was estimated that between 8 and 12 million pesos worth of silver had been recovered from the old coins turned in through that date. Residents of Cuba, including foreigners, cannot own, export, or import gold. Neither may they own silver coins, foreign currency, foreign securities, or maintain foreign bank accounts. Further, they cannot export national currency. As of early 1970 the Cuban peso had been officially at par with the dollar since November 7, 1914. Despite the official rate, there are multiple import rates that are used in foreign trade transactions and vary according to the essentiality of the import. These import rates ranged from 1.32 Cuban pesos to 2.04 Cuban pesos equal US$1. In addition, the various bilateral trade and payments agreements in force between Cuba and other countries use different exchange rates for the Cuban peso (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). In 1968 there were twenty-one such agreements, each of which specified a different rate of exchange. Despite the theoretical parity of the Cuban peso with the dollar, there has been a de facto depreciation that is evidenced by a blackmarket rate. Domestic black-market transactions were known to have been averaging around 100,000 Cuban pesos daily in the early years of the Revolution, but by 1968 the market was very small. The exchange rate reached a high of 25 Cuban pesos to US$1 in 1965 but had dropped to 7 Cuban pesos by mid-1968. Strict control has reduced black-market operations in Cuba, but small dealings are reported to occur in several Western Hemisphere countries. Foreign exchange has been rationed since December 1960. In an effort to increase its holdings, the National Bank of Cuba purchases not only silver coins but also any gold or silver objects that can be sold abroad for foreign exchange. Prices are set in Cuban pesos based upon the gold or silver content of the article, and purchases are immediate, no identification or proof of ownership being required from the seller. The bank is permitted to accept other precious metals if it so desires. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution are also authorized to receive gold and silver articles from private persons who are reluctant to go to the bank. The exchange control authority is the National Bank of Cuba. Any foreign currency obtained by any person must be exchanged for Cuban pesos at the bank within ten days of receipt. Transfers from abroad in favor of persons or enterprises must be made through the bank, which in turn gives the Cuban peso equivalent to the beneficiaries. All remittances going abroad also have to be done through the bank; exports of foreign exchange, checks, or securities may be made if prior approval is obtained. The approval may be granted depending upon the essentiality and urgency of the case. Foreign tourists can export foreign currency only up to the amount registered upon entering the country minus expenditures made in Cuba. Foreign specialists working in Cuba may remit money abroad, but individual limitations are set by the bank. SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY CHAPTER 24 PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY The norms of public order and internal security are measured, with some differences, by Communist standards. Public order is concerned with ordinary criminal activity, but much greater emphasis is accorded to adherence to the dictates and regulations of the state. The government controls and regulates nearly all aspects of daily life to the detriment of the personal freedom of its citizens. Internal security means the security of the regime; any opposition, or even disagreement with the government in power, is a criminal offense subject to prosecution. In the ten years since the 1959 Revolution, sweeping changes have been made in both the structure and operation of the country's security apparatus. The National Police and Rural Guard have been eliminated, and ordinary metropolitan police have disappeared from the scene. In their place the army and the militia perform a variety of police functions, as does the Ministry of the Interior, which operates a number of agencies concerned with surveillance, security, and criminal investigation. The court system, headed by the Supreme Court, which had served the republic since early independence, has been done away with and has been replaced by revolutionary courts. These courts are casual, ill defined, and presided over by magistrates who are popularly elected in their communities and who have little or no legal training. Guarantees and rights of an accused are largely disregarded and frequently violated. Although they handle ordinary criminal cases, most of the courts' energies are taken up with the prosecution of cases involving deviation from so-called correct Communist thinking. The citizen is under constant surveillance, not only by the authorities, but by his neighbors as well. A widespread net of security units has been organized since 1960 on a neighborhood basis, and each city block or rural district has its vigilance group. Each is called the Committee for Defense of the Revolution (Comité de Defensa de la Revolucion CDR), and is charged with observing all activity in its area and reporting any actions that might be sus pected of being counterrevolutionary. In 1969 the CDRs were reported to have over 2 million members. The Constitution of 1940, which was in force at the time of Castro's takeover, has been suspended since 1959. The country is ruled by decree, and the only semblance of a national charter is embodied in Castro's First and Second Declarations of Havana, which outline the regime's basic revolutionary philosophy. Its tenets are enforced by the Fundamental Law of the Republic of Cuba. Many of the statutes and procedures incorporated into the Fundamental Law rely on precedents that go back as far as acts passed under Spanish rule in 1882. International jurists have described the judicial system as archaic, oppressive, and a betrayal of the basic fundamentals of the rule of law. There are nearly 200 penal institutions, including concentration camps and penal farms, both on the mainland and on offshore islands. Executions of most political prisoners have been carried out at La Cabaña, the old colonial fortress guarding Havana Harbor. Estimates of the number of political prisoners vary widely, but most observers agree that there were probably over 100,000 in 1969. In spite of the rigid security measures and the punishment accorded offenders, counterrevolutionary activities continue to take place. As recently as mid-1969 there were still many cases of sabotage and attacks on government installations. There were indications of growing dissatisfaction among many of the peasants, and reports of small rebel bands operating from inaccessible mountain hideouts. Castro, nevertheless, has had ten years to consolidate his position; the departure or imprisonment of large numbers of dissidents, along with other increasingly stern repressive measures, appeared in 1969 to have largely eliminated the threat of effective, large-scale opposition. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM Historical Background Before 1959 Cuba's judicial system had presented a dichotomy of probity and corruption. It was respected for its organization and competence but was frequently the subject of debate, criticism, and attempted reform. The career judiciary generally had a reputation for integrity and independence, but the system at large was subject to political manipulation and frequently evolved into an instrument of venality and abuse. An attempt was made in the Constitution of 1940 to remedy the faults by devising an independent and rigidly controlled approach to the appointment and promotion of judicial personnel. Some improvement resulted, but the wide powers in the hands of the executive branch largely negated the progress made, |
