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females any number of hours in one day; second, that it has the effect to divide men and women into classes; and, third, that after women have been set aside as a class, to then divide women into two classes—that is, that women who work in mechanical establishments or factories or laundries are only permitted to work ten hours in any one day, and that women who are not employed in mechanical establishments, factories, or laundries are permitted to work any number of hours in any one day-is special and class legislation, and unconstitutional and void.
The business places which are enumerated by the statute-that is, mechanical establishments, factories, and laundries--form a class by themselves, and differ from mercantile establishments, hotels, restaurants, etc., in this: That the product of those establishments enumerated in the statute is largely produced by machinery, or the employees of such establishments work with machinery, or the pace at which the employees work in such establishments is set by other employees who work with machinery. It would seem, therefore, that the legislature has not arbitrarily carved out a class of establishments in which women whose time of employment is limited to ten hours a day are to work, but that the line of demarcation between the establishments to which the ten-hour limit applies, and tho-e to which it does not apply, is clearly defined.
We do not think the statute objectionable on the ground that it amounts to special legislation.
The appellees have raised other objections to the constitutionality of the act of 1909 limiting the number of hours which women shall have the right to work in mechanical establishments or factories or laundries to ten hours in any one day. While these objections have not been overlooked, we deem them of too slight importance to justify their discussion in this opinion.
We are of the opinion the act of 1909 is constitutional in all of its particulars and as an entirety.
SAFETY APPLIANCES ON RAILWAYS-COMMERCE-STATE REGULATION—Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Railway Company v. State, Supreme Court of Ohio, 91 Northeastern Reporter, page 869.—The company named was convicted of a violation of a law of the State which requires railroad cars operated between points within the State to be equipped with couplers, coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars. (Act of March 19, 1906, 98 O. L., p. 76.) The company appealed on the ground that the law in question was invalid in view of the fact that it amounted to an interference with interstate commerce and that the subject-matter was exclusively within the powers of the Federal Congress. This contention the supreme court rejected, and affirmed the judgment of the court below on grounds that appear in the following extracts from the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Summers:
The regulation of commerce among the States is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, but it is well settled that a state statute.
enacted in the exercise of its police power, not regulating or directly affecting interstate commerce or in conflict with federal regulations, but merely regulative of the instrumentalities of commerce, is not void; and when such state regulations do conflict with federal regulations they are not void on the ground that the State has exercised a power exclusively in Congress, but because the Constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land.
In Missouri Pacific Railway Company ư. Larabee Flour Mills Company, 211 U. S. 612, 29 Sup. Ct. 214, in which a peremptory writ of mandamus was allowed by the supreme court of Kansas, commanding one railroad company to transfer cars to and from a mill on another railroad, and which was affirmed, it is said by Mr. Justice Brewer:
" The roads are, therefore, engaged in both interstate commerce and that within the State. In the former they are subject to the regulation of Congress; in the latter to that of the State, and to enforce the proper relation between Congress and the State the full control of each over the commerce subject to its dominion must be preserved." Again he says: "Running through the entire argument of counsel for the Missouri Pacific is the thought that the control of Congress over interstate commerce and a delegation of that control to a commission necessarily withdraws from the State all power in respect to regulations of a local character. This proposition can not be sustained."
It follows that the questions propounded by counsel should receive a negative answer, and the judgment is affirmed.
SUNDAY LABOR_CONTRACTS TO BE PERFORMED ON SUNDAY-RecoyERY OF COMPENSATION—Knight. 2. Press Company, Limited, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 75 Atlantic Reporter, page 1083.—John S. Knight sued the Press Company in the court of common pleas of Philadelphia County to recover compensation for services rendered in the distribution of papers on Sundays and verdict was brought in in his favor, but notwithstanding the verdict judgment was given for the defendant company, whereupon Knight appealed. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the supreme court adopting the opinion as therein handed down by Judge Ferguson. The opinion is in part as follows:
The service for which the plaintiff claims compensation was rendered by him on Sundays. He was employed by the defendant and working during the week, and the present suit is for compensation for the Sundays during which he worked and for which he says he was not paid. There is a presumption that one who is paid by the week and receipts for his weekly wage is paid for all the services which he may render in the week, but the plaintiff testified to a special contract for compensation for his work on Sundays covering the period employed. The consideration rendered by him and for which he contends the defendant promised to pay him was rendered on Sunday. It was not a contract which was executory, having its incipiency on Sunday and its conclusion on a secular day, but was to be performed on Sunday, and, presumably, to be paid for each Sunday as the work was done. In Weeks v. Lippencott, 42 Pa. 474, Mr. Justice Woodward, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ Contracts which offend against the common law and public policy are void."
By act April 22, 1794 (3 Smith's Laws, p. 177), section 1, worldly employment on the Lord's Day, commonly called “Sunday," is prohibited, and it has been held that selling newspapers on Sunday by a carrier is a performance of worldly employment within the meaning of the said act. (See Com. v. Matthews, 152 Pa. 166, 25 Atl. 348.) And in that case it was held that such employment did not come within the exceptions of the act of 1794, in that it was not a work of charity or necessity.
It is the plaintiff's contention that he was employed to distribute newspapers on Sunday. The work, therefore, for which he alleges he was employed being a service held to be one prohibited by the act of 1794, it was an illegal contract and unenforceable, and judgment must, therefore, be entered for the defendant.
DECISIONS UNDER COMMON LAW.
COXTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT—CONSIDERATION-RELEASE OF CLAN FOR DAMAGES-BREACH OF CONTRACT—Mlinois Central Railroad ('ompany v. Fairchild, Ippellate Court of Indiana, 91 Vortheastern Re. porter, page 836.--Chester Fairchild had been employed by the company named as yard brakeman, and while so employed received injuries resulting in the loss of his leg. It was in evidence that the company agreed to pay Fairchild the sum of $250 and to reemploy him during the period of his natural life at such labor as he would be able to perform and pay him a reasonable and fair compensation therefor. Fairchild was employed at Evansville, Ind., and went to Chicago to see the general claim agent of the company who proposed settlement in accordance with the above terms. To this Fairchild agreed and returned home understanding that the release, the voucher for payment, and a letter to the local superintendent securing him employment would be at once forthcoming. The voucher and release were received in a few days, but the matter of employment was not promptly attended to, whereupon Fairchild wrote asking that the matter be looked after at once. IIe had not executed the release and the claim agent wrote in reply urging him to execute the release and stating that he had nothing to do with the matter of employment, adding: “ However, you could not expect to be placed at work until you had executed a release. This release is embraced in the voucher and I do not see any purpose in holding it. After you have advised me that you have executed the release and cashed the voucher, I will take the matter up with Mr. Sheuing and see whether it is consistent for him to do anything for you." Fairchild hesitated to sign the release and was taken, at the order of the superintendent, into the freight
office and shown the job that would be given him the next day, March 1. No employment was actually given until August, when, after a short time, Fairchild was transferred to Mattoon, Ill., and given a job that he was not able, on account of his crippled condition, to perform, and he was presently discharged and no subsequent employment given. On a suit to recover damages for the failure to comply with its contract a judgment was rendered against the company in his behalf, whereupon the company appealed. The judgment of the lower court was on appeal affirmed. While the evidence was conflicting, it was presented by Judge Roby, who spoke for the court, in the above form. The concluding paragraph of the opinion is as follows:
Appellant's principal contention is that the contract is claimed to have been made with the claim agent, and that the letter of the claim agent denying his authority or intention of making such a contract conclusively shows that the essential meeting of minds never took place, and that therefore no contract was ever made. This is too narrow a view. The claim was that the contract was made by the appellant corporation, and the evidence clearly shows that, through the representations and promises of employment by appellant's agents acting within the scope of their respective duties, appellee was induced to execute the release in question. Indeed, the letter of the claim agent relied upon does not bear the construction placed upon it by counsel. The denial referred to is instantly qualified by, “However, you can not expect to be placed at work until you have executed a release." The implication that the execution of the release would procure the employment is irresistible, and, when taken with the subsequent statements and actions of those who did have authority “to furnish positions to employees," the letter comes very far from sustaining the contention. It is suggested that what was said and done with regard to employment was said and done as a matter of humanity to a faithful and unfortunate employee. The suggestion does not accord with what was done in that regard after the release had been procured.
That the consideration for the release included the promise of employment being proven, the principle espressed by the maxim, "He who derives the advantage ought to sustain the burden," applies, and appellant, while it holds and asserts the release, can not refuse to pay the price for which it was given.
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT_REDUCTION OF RANK OF EMPLOYEEVIOLATION OF CONTRACT-DUTY TO SEEK OTHER EMPLOYMENTCooper 1. Stronge & Warner Company, Supreme Court of Jinnesota, 1.26 Vorthwestern Reporter, page 541.-Maude E. Cooper was employed by the company named as manager of a millinery department in a store, at a salary of $25 per week for a fixed period. Before the termination of this period she was superseded as manager and asked to continue at the same pay, but to act as saleswoman.
This she refu-ed to do, but offered to accept a position as manager in some other store. The employer failed to furnish another position, and Miss Cooper thereupon sued to recover on her contract. From a judgment in her favor the company appealed, the appeal resulting in the judgment of the court below being affirmed, as appears from the following quotation from the opinion, as delivered by Judge O'Brien:
The contentions of the respective parties as to the terms of the contract were fully submitted to the jury; but the instructions were to the effect that, if the contract of hiring was that plaintiff was to be employed as manager, she was not required to accept employment as saleswoman. Defendant claims this as error, arguing that there is practically no difference in such employments, inasmuch as the manager of the department acts also as a saleswoman, her duties as manager being merely additional responsibilities, and that relieving the plaintiff of them involved no degradation or loss of caste, and imposed upon her no duties which were dissimilar to some of those formerly performed by her.
The authorities seem to support the conclusions upon this subject given in Wood's Master & Servant, section 127. The servant, discharged in violation of the contract of hiring, prima facie is entitled to recover the agreed wages for the full term, subject to his duty to be reasonably diligent in seeking other employment of a similar kind, and, if obtained, the compensation received therefor is to be deducted from the aggregate agreed amount. - By other employment is meant employment of a character such as that in which he was employed, or not of a more menial kind."
Under the evidence in this case, we consider it a very close question whether the positions of manager and saleswoman in one of defendant's departments are so dissimilar that an employee, when tendered the same salary, is not required to accept either (Squire r. Wright, 1 Mo. App. 172), but have concluded that, if the master deliberately enters into a contract providing for the employment of another as manager, the employee has a right to insist upon retaining that grade, in the absence of any showing which would justify the master in reducing the rank of the servant. The grade of the employment may have been the inducing cause for this contract. When the change was proposed, the season for obtaining positions of that character had advanced, and while, perhaps, a very slight cause might have been sufficient to have justified defendant's action, we think, in the absence of a showing of some cause, the defendant must be held to have broken the contract.
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT_TERN-RENEWALBREACH-ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS--Allen 1. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 91 Vortheastern Reporter, page 887.-In this case James S. Allen, jr., sued the company named under an assignment by one Hammack to recover salary and commissions due said Hammack as an employee of the company. From a judgment in Allen's favor the company appealed, the appeal result