APPENDIX F

THE POLITICS OF RESEARCH

RICHARD J. BARBER

Public Affairs Press, in Washington, D.C.

1966

VIII. NEEDED REFORMS

"No national policy or purpose of the United States is unaffected by the present state or prospective scope of our scientific knowledge."

-Lyndon B. Johnson, February 15, 1965

If it ever was, the character of the federal government's scientific programs no longer is a subject of concern only for the nation's scientists and engineers. Over the last ten years the government has expanded its involvement in research and development to such an extent that its expenditures, amounting to more than $15 billion in fiscal 1966, now represent the principal source of support for scientific inquiry in the United States. If for no other reason but this alonequite apart from the problems that have arisen-such support should be subject to critical attention by the entire body politic. But more is needed than criticism. Meaningful reform is essential and a brief recapitulation of several of the more troublesome characteristics noted in the preceding pages will help point the way. First, the government's research undertakings reflect debatable selections stemming from a questionable and erratic sense of priorities. Most of the money goes for very limited purposes connected with applied research and development in fields closely tied to defense and space. Other functions, particularly those related to man's social problems, have generally been neglected or given meager support.

Second, the impact on civilian research has rarely been taken into account, though the long-term consequences here can be extremely grave. Many companies oriented to commercial markets have been forced to abandon or curtail their research because federal programs have soaked up scarce manpower.

Third, the largest federal programs have been administered in such a way as needlessly to accentuate trends to industrial concentration and to reinforce monopolistic positions with patent rights on inventions arising out of tax-supported research.

Fourth, with increasing flows of scientific information stemming from the multiplicity of government projects, negligible attention has been given to putting this knowledge to use by making it publicly accessible.

Fifth, research planning and coordination are principally distinguished by their absence. Within the executive branch 10 departments and 27 independent agencies contain units which plan, administer, or support scientific activities. (1) At the same time, for example, 11 deaprtments and agencies are doing research in health and medicine, 5 in space research, 7 in oceanography, 7 or 8 in water research, and 14 in meteorology. So poor is communication within the government that it is sometimes said that if a research project costs less than $100,000, it is cheaper to do it again than to find out if it has been done before. (2) More important, such deficiencies in communications reflect the intensely pragmatic orientation of government research with short-term or narrowly focused goals. Unless this myopia is corrected federal support can work incalculable harm, perhaps offsetting the apparent gains.

Program Selection: Organizational Inadequacies. Of the many problems involved, probably the most important concerns the matter of program selection. During the last dozen years the level of expenditure has advanced from $3 billion to more than $15 billion a year but the composition of the research effort has been accorded no serious attention.

Since research consumes human and other scarce resources it presents an unavoidable (though often unrecognized) question of choice among alternatives. One program competes against another and projects represent alternatives to other demands on the Treasury. These are elementary propositions, or so it would seem, yet they represent concepts that have played no visible role in the national budget and appropriation process in recent years. Instead, research undertakings in the defense and space area, in particular, have been hastily assembled, quickly endorsed by the executive, and speedily approved by the Congress. No effort has been made to establish a scheme of priorities that would permit deliberate comparison of projects and needs with one another and with non-research programs. The result is that federal research in general has gotten badly out of kilter and does not reflect choices consistent with our accepted social values.

The distortions that are readily discernible reflect serious underlying deficiencies in organization. At the present time neither the executive nor the legislative branch of the federal government is organized in such a way that funds for resources can be allocated in a rational fashion. There is now no suitable institutional machinery which permits the clarification of goals, a reasonably full understanding of the various programs, comparison of their relative merits, and judgment as to their overall social and economic consequences.

Since the end of World War II certain organizational improvements have been made to better equip the executive branch to deal with questions of science, but there is still no means to articulate clearly the allocative decisions that must be faced in assembling a research budget. In 1950 a major step was taken with the establishment of the National Science Foundation to sponsor basic scientific research. (3) But the Foundation is essentially an operative agency; it does not appraise the programs of the other parts of the government nor does it develop programs of its own designed to fill applied research needs not currently being met in the public and private sectors.

The President's Science Advisory Committee and the Federal Council for Science and Technology have some utility as staff agencies, evaluating proposals and coordinating some low-priority federal programs. However, the fact that the members of both of these agencies are formally concerned with their responsibilities only on a part-time basis, a feature noted in Chapter II, means that they cannot significantly influence the formulation of scientific policy or assist in the establishment of priorities. They are simply too far removed from the picture. The fact that the Federal Council's principal members recommended its abolition is no doubt a suggestive comment on what is its actual worth.

A much more valuable step was taken with the creation in 1962 of the Office of Science and Technology in the White House (4) (such a move was urged as early as 1947 by the Steelman Committee). (5) This places a full-time scientific adviser at the President's elbow, in much the same manner as the Council of Economic Advisers. But the Office is only a staff arm; while it can advise the President and the other components of the Executive Staff, and in this way perform an invaluable service, it does not serve as an allocator of funds. Moreover, it does not function as an effective means for expressing the nation's goals for the use of its scientific resources.

Ultimately allocative decisions pertaining to R&D must and should be resolved in the executive branch in accordance with an administration's policy, guided by its sense of priorities and hierarchy of values.

Operationally the existing staff unit best positioned to translate the President's value-perspective and to recommend a package of programs, R&D and otherwise, that accommodates it, is the Bureau of the Budget. Since all requests for appropriations must be submitted to the Bureau by the various government department and agencies, (6) it can make comparisons and submit recommendations as to the relative degree of merit of proposed agency programs. Regrettably. however, the Bureau now looks upon itself much less as an allocator than as an instrument of administrative management. Rather than admit forthrightly that its function entails explicit allocation it seeks primarily to force an agency to justify the relationship between a given request for funds and the actual needs of the program involved. Only the crudest effort is made to rank proposals in

terms of their harmony with the administration's policies and declared objectives. In short, the Bureau does not envision its role as that of a translator of national ends; instead it sees itself primarily as a manager of programs, not as a chooser among programs. The result, then, is that the budget as assembled in the Executive Office of the President is not consciously recognized as an allocative device.

Insofar as the military budget of the Department of Defense is concerned, the Defense Department Comptroller and Budget Bureau representatives work so closely together that once a defense budget is completed, the Bureau does not thereafter review it in comparison with the budget requests of other departments and agencies. (7) Under these circumstances the Brueau of the Budget, even though it can draw upon the expert advice of the Office of Science and Technology, is not performing the crucial job of appraisal and selection. In the final analysis the budget performs an allocative function only implicitly and indirectly. It is not a deliberately and carefully structured arrangement of effort.

In the Congress the situation is far worse for here there is no organizational apparatus at all that is even remotely tailored to face the allocative challenges presented by federally-supported research. Program authorizations are chopped up along departmental and agency lines among a maze of communities in both legislative chambers. The House Science and Astronautics Committee and its mate, the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, oversee the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Armed Services Committees deal with the Department of Defense; the Atomic Energy Commission is assigned to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; etc. No single committee is concerned with the broad sweep of scientific effort. And even programs that relate to a common problem are examined by different committees if, as is often the case, a number of departments sponsor the programs. Thus, projects in meteorology, now being sponsored by 10 agencies, are reviewed by nine different committees in each house. Complicating the matter still further is the separation of the appropriations process from the authorization process. (8) The correlation between the two related tasks is poor, made worse by the role of the quasisovereign appropriations subcommittees.

In spite of indeed, in part because of-the number of committees and members who are involved, Congress does not face up squarely to the fact that its appropriations are the final and critical element in the federal allocative process. The amounts authorized for the various departments and their programs represent choices among competing uses with their relative social value, as seen by the members of Congress, reflected by the comparative amounts of dollar authorization enacted into law. This is an inherent characteristic of the appropriations process, but its fundamental allocative significance is not forth-rightly recognized in the legislature. The pieces are not seen in proper perspective and the allocative function-the fact that choices are being made-is not recognized for what it is. Small wonder that the end product resembles a patchquilt rather than a coherent arrangement of effort.

Reform: Facing the Question of Allocation. Can the situation be materially improved? Perhaps, given the will to examine the matter in a constructive mood and to institute badly needed organizational changes.

During the 88th Congress both houses took steps leading to an investigation of the government's research programs. The most advanced of these emanated from the House, which established a nine-member Select Committee to conduct inquiry into the scope, conduct, and progress of federal research programs. (9) This committee might have been able to perform an extremely valuable service but with the end of the 88th Congress it was allowed to go out of existence, long before it could reasonably have been expected to complete its important work. The fact that Congress did not extend the committee's life indicates just how difficult it is to accomplish the kind of reform that is imperative if the federal research effort is to be an effective instrument of national policy rather than a grab-bag of individual projects.

What is clearly necessary is basic Congressional reorganization taking full account of the allocative character of the appropriations process, whether it pertains to research or any other element of the federal budget. Given the competing demands of many programs and needs, in and out of the research area, choices among alternative uses are inevitable in the budget-appropriations process. The important thing is to recognize the process for what it is and to establish procedures that will permit the greatest possible "payoff" in terms of the national value-structure. Edward C. Banfield put it this way: "What is needed is a comprehensive perspective of the possible uses, viewed in the di

mension of time as well as of volume, and the deliberate, reflective assignment of priorities to the various uses in accordance with controlling social purposes." (10)

If this need is to be met, changes must be made in the way in which research fund requests are presented for consideration by both the responsible decisionmaking executive and legislative officials. At the present time the federal research budget is either on a piecemeal basis or is seen as a huge lump sum. Requests for research funds submitted by the departments and agencies are considered a part of their sponsors' budgets even though the programs to which they relate involve similar outlays by other agencies. Medical research is an example. In fiscal 1966 seven different federal agencies sought more than $1.3 billion in funds for health research. While the bulk of the request came from the National Institutes of Health (transmitted formally by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare), another $400 million was sought by departments other than HEW, (11) included the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. All of this money, however many hands are involved in its administration, relates to the common theme of medical research. The immediate agency undertakings are far more sensibly appraised when seen as part of a single government health research program than when chopped up in small bits, lost in the goliath budgets of such agencies as Defense and Atomic Energy.

Slowly the Bureau of the Budget is coming to recognize that the government's R&D is more sensibly presented in terms of defined program areas, regardless of sponsor. Beginning with the budget for fiscal 1964 the Bureau has restated a part of the R&D budget along program lines; both this has been done so far only on a highly unrefined basis and then only for about half of the total R&D commitment. (12) Even so, it still represents a distinct improvement at the executive level. (13)

However, when the President's budget reaches the Congress the utility of presenting the R&D budget along program lines vanishes because there is now no organization in the legislature that can look at the budget or parts of it in functional terms for Congress is completely structured along departmental and agency lines. Thus the Armed Services Committees scrutinize the entire defense budget, whether requests for medical research funds are involved or the procurement of tanks and planes; the Space committees do the same for NASA; the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for AEC; and so forth. No decision-making group exists in the Congress to consider "medical research," or "meteorological research" (now conducted by ten agencies), or "water research" (sponsored by five departments and three agencies, including the Tennessee Valley Authority). Even when authorization and appropriations measures come up for final passage before the House or Senate as a whole, they retain their departmental flavor. At no time does the legislature see research in terms of its functional properties. Inevitably this leads to confusion and to irrational allocative choices. Moreover, any long-range planning is made almost impossible since appropriations are approved only annually. (14)

If the federal R&D budget were presented to and considered by the Congress in terms of its functional characteristics it woulddirectly confront the members with the allocative character of their appropriations action. They would then have to decide whether a given proposal conforms with their own appreciation of the political consensus as respects the ordering of public effort. To demonstrate the nature of existing R&D allocations Table 15 portrays the fiscal 1965 budget along program lines. (It should be emphasized that this presentation on page 78, is necessarily an approximation since the research budget is not now generally arranged in this manner.)

In looking at the table several questions come to mind in regard to the scheme of priorities reflected in the distribution. Do we want to spend $6.9 billion on space research and only $57 million on research in transportation? Or $5 billion on military research and only $37 million on research for education? (15) Or $1.1 billion on nuclear research and only $22 million on vocational rehabilitation? Should we spend more on research in oceanography than the total amount allocated for research in transportation and education, functions of great immediate consequence to the entire nation? Do we want to spend $200 million on research in agriculture and less than a fifth of that amount in the field of education? In each case the question presented is perfectly legitimate, even if one acknowledges the worth of research in all of the program areas. To answer the questions demands an articulation of values and their expression in a set of priorities.

Judged in such a perspective the distributional emphasis embodied in Table 15 demonstrates an odd assignment of priorities, one that hopefully does not truly reflect our country's hierarchy of preferences. Of the $15 billion attributed to R&D, more than $13 billion goes either for military, space, or nuclear research. Except for medical research many of the problems that most seriously confront civilization and that urgently require scientific analysis receive no significant attention. This simply makes no sense. When boldly confronted by this kind of presentation one suspects that most Americans would assign lower orders of priority to the other identified problem area. And one would hope that Congress would react in that fashion as well-if it were compelled to face the priority requirement in this way, if, to put it differently, it had to decide pointedly whether it wanted to spend $6.7 billion on space research and only three percent of that amount on educational research.

If the federal R&D budget were presented and considered by the Congress along program lines it would also enable the legislature to make discrete comparisons within programs and to effect appropriate reemphasis. For example, Table 15 discloses that most of the money being spent on transportation research is connected with aviation. (16) Very little is used for research in surface transportation, even though virtually all of the country's freight and most of its passenger movement (when allowance is made for urban transport) is accounted for by the railroads, motor carriers, and other forms of surface transit. (17) The authorization of funds by Congress in 1965 for research on improved rail passenger service in the Washington-New York-Boston corridor helps some to right the balance, but it still leaves relatively too much emphasis on air transportation. Either more should be spent on surface forms and less on the airways, or more should be spent on transportation research as a whole.

Similarly, an explicit programmatic approach might also lead to a reappraisal of the relative priorities of manned versus instrumented exploration of outer space. While there are advantages in using men on space missions, the additional cost it imposes is extremely high. It is estimated that as much as two-thirds of the $20 billion to be spent to place a man on the moon is attributable to the fact that a human will make the trip. Again, admitting that there is advantage in using a man on the voyage but also admitting that we have other research needs and given the fact that we have limited resources to apply to R&D, it might be wise to explore space only with instrumented craft and use the amount of money this would free for other problem areas that are now woefully neglected. (18)

While program presentation of R&D requests would facilitate comparison of the worth of one type of research undertaking with another, extension of the idea to the entire federal budget would permit a comparison of research requests with non-research requests. To suggest that what might be involved ponder the implications lurking in the fact that with the $20 billion it is estimated it will require to put a man on the moon we could do any of the following: give $10 million each to 200 small colleges (or, perhaps better yet, give $100 million to each of 20 institutions in different parts of the country, aiming to make them centers of educational excellence); grant a ten per cent raise to every teacher in the country over a ten-year period; create three new, publicly-controlled equivalents of the Rockefeller Foundation; build complete universities for every new nation added to the UN since its founding. (19) Or we could make a good start toward coping with the many serious problems of the cities-in housing, mass transit and public health. Or we could make a really serious effort to deal with poverty and to cope with the implications of automation. You can assemble your own list of possibilities. The important thing to recognize is that the R&D budget reflects choices among competing uses and it should represent a set of priorities that embodies our social preferences. At present it does not.

Approaches to Reorganization. If rational decisions are to be made in the allocation of resources to R. & D.-if the kinds of questions suggested above are to be articulated carefully and considered thoughtfully-important changes must be made in the organization of the government, particularly in Congress. Ultimately one hopes that the membership of both houses will alter the existing machinery for the authorization and appropriation of funds so that programs can be examined along functional lines rather than solely in relationship to their sponsoring agencies. Medical research projects should be scrutinized by one committee (or subcommittee), regardless of the number of departments which sponsor programs in this sector. The same is true of other types of research.