of horses to the points here indicated under a valuation of $75 per head, the lowest valuation accepted by the company:

To this table was appended the following note:

This table is prepared for the purpose of showing the comparative rates and expenses. Those items of expense only are included which are directly chargeable against each particular shipment. This is for the purpose of showing the comparative expense, and does not represent the absolute expense to the company of doing the business, nor does the item marked "net" state the absolute profit to the company on each shipment, but is greatly in excess thereof. In order to arrive at the absolute expense it would be necessary to include not only terminal expenses, which are referred to in the testimony, but also the proportionate share of officers' and agents' salaries and all other general operating expenses of doing the company's business. I have not attempted to enter into this calculation for the reason that I understand that the only question is whether the rates New York-Columbus, Columbus-Kansas City, etc., are unreasonable, as compared with the rates New York-St. Louis, St. Louis-Kansas City, etc.

From this table it would appear that a dealer may transport a carload of horses upon the local rate from New York to St. Louis for $300 and may at a later time transport the same or a different carload of horses from St. Louis to Kansas City for $150, making a rate of $450 for the two movements, as against a rate when the same horses are stopped at Columbus of $550 (New York-Columbus, $200; Columbus-Kansas City, $350). To transport a carload of horses from New York to Chicago costs $250, and if the same or another carload is transported from Chicago to St. Paul the charge is $200, making a combined rate of $450 from New York to St. Paul, whereas if the horses were stopped at Columbus the rate would be New York to Columbus, $200, Columbus to St. Paul, $350, or $550. It is against this discrimination as to Columbus as a shipping point that this complaint is directly urged.

The column headed "Transportation " gives the amount which the Adams Express Company under its contract with the rail carriers pays for transportation of the car. This amount in each case is based upon a contract made between the Adams Express Company

and the rail carrier. The contract between the defendant and the Pennsylvania Railroad requires that the former shall pay to the latter 56 per cent of the rate which it receives, while the Burlington receives 57 per cent of the express rate. Thus, on shipments from Columbus to St. Louis the Pennsylvania Railroad receives $112 out of the $200 rate charged, and on the haul from St. Louis to Kansas City the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway receives $86.25 out of the $150 rate, making a total of $198.25 which the express company pays to the railroads for the transportation of the car from Columbus to Kansas City, for which service the express company charges $350.

The next column, headed "Stalling," gives the cost to the express company of building stalls in the car which the railroad company furnishes. It is a uniform charge of $21.20. A messenger is also provided, whose compensation varies with the distance of the journey.

The column headed "Total" therefore includes the total expense outside of terminal expenses, general operating and office expenses of the company, which, together with the profits of the company, are included under the heading “Net.”

The distances between the points here concerned (according to the Official Railway Guide) and the rates per car mile figured from the above tables are as follows:

From these figures it appears that the defendant charges 18 cents per mile more for shipments between Columbus and Kansas City than it does for shipments between New York and Columbus and 15 cents per mile more on the Columbus-St. Paul shipment than the New York-Columbus movement.

A further comparison, which is not without suggestion, is that which can be made between the special, or through, rates between New York and Kansas City and between New York and St. Paul, with the local rates applying to and from St. Louis and Chicago. The New YorkKanses City through rate is $400; the New York-St. Louis rate plus the Kansas City rate is $450. The New York-St. Paul through rate is $400 and the New York-Chicago rate plus the Chicago-St. Paul rate is $450. In both cases it is seen that the express company's local rates make a sum of $50 in excess of their through rate. When

the local rates in and out of Columbus are combined, however, there is a difference between the local and the through rate of $150.

From all the facts presented, and after consideration of the questions here involved, it appears to us that the rates west of Columbus are unreasonable and excessive; and it is herein ordered that the rate between Columbus and Kansas City shall not exceed $250 per car and that the rate between Columbus and St. Paul shall not exceed $250 per car.

No. 1078.

J. H. LEONARD

v.

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY

COMPANY.

No. 1184.

ARKANSAS FUEL COMPANY

2.

SAME.

No. 1075.

LANING-HARRIS COAL & GRAIN COMPANY

v.

SAME.

No. 1211.

STAR COAL COMPANY

v.. SAME.

No. 1220.

MAYER COAL COMPANY

v.

SAME.

No. 1222.

GRAY-BRYAN COAL COMPANY

v.

SAME.

Submitted October 22, 1907. Decided November 4, 1907.

In the transportation of coal by defendant to Kansas City consignees desire delivery on the lines of other carriers which assess switching charge of $3 per car. At one time defendant absorbed said switching charge in its transportation charge, later discontinued the practice, and subsequently resumed

it. Complaints allege that inasmuch as defendant indulged in the practice and after discontinuance resumed it that it has committed itself to the unreasonableness of requiring shippers to at any time pay said switching charge, and therefore reparation is asked for switching charges paid during the period when defendant required that such charges should be paid by shippers. The reasonableness of the charge of $3 per car for the service performed is not attacked, and no substantial showing is made as to the difference in commercial conditions which may have obtained at the different times. Held, that to support the contention of complainants in these cases would be to say that transportation charges must in every instance remain at a fixed figure or be reduced by the carrier at the peril of being called upon to respond in damages on all charges that have before that time been collected under the rates so reduced. It is admitted that no discrimination as between shippers was indulged in in the application of the tariff charges and no showing is made in these cases that the tariff charges were unjust or unlawful. Complaints dismissed.

Burney & Sutton for complainants.
William Ellis for defendant.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION.

CLARK, Commissioner:

The complaints in these cases are alike, and it was stipulated by representatives of complainants and defendant that they should be submitted on the record and treated as a whole. They will, therefore, be included in one report.

The facts alleged in the complaints and admitted by the defendant are that prior to December 31, 1903, it was the custom of the defendant to absorb out of its freight earnings a switching charge of $3 per car on coal brought to Kansas City by it and delivered to industries. located on the lines of other carriers, this switching charge being the charge made by such other carriers for the service performed by them in making delivery on their tracks; that on January 1, 1904, defendant discontinued this practice, and from that date to June 12, 1905, required shippers to pay said switching charge of $3 per car; that on June 12, 1905, defendant resumed the practice of absorbing this switching charge and continued that practice until December 18, 1906, when its rule was modified to limit such absorption to carloads upon which its net revenue is not less than $15 per car.

Complainants allege that defendant, having discontinued this practice and again resumed it, has tacitly admitted the unreasonableness of the requirement that shippers should pay the switching charge during the period when they were required to make such payments, and reparation is demanded as to the shipments that moved between January 1, 1904, and June 12, 1905.

It is agreed that defendant had in its published tariffs no provision that shippers would be required to pay the switching charge; and it

is understood that it did not have any provision in its tariffs that said charge would be paid by it. As before noted, the switching charge was a charge assessed by another carrier for its services, and it was collected by defendant for and turned over to such other carrier, except during the periods when defendant absorbed it—that is, paid it itself instead of requiring shippers to pay it.

The record is not clear as to whether or not shippers had formal notice of the changes in the practice of defendant as to these absorptions. The practice at that time of absorbing switching charges without a specific tariff provision therefor was very general among the carriers. If offense against the law was involved in such practice it would rest in the absorption rather than in requiring shippers to pay, because the switching charge, being the charge of another carrier, should appear in its tariff. No switching or other terminal charges should be absorbed except under a plain and specific tariff provision therefor. No irregularities in tariff construction or application which might affect these cases could be lawfully adjusted by now awarding the reparation prayed for.

As said in cases 1073 and 1074, Laning-Harris Coal & Grain Company v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 12 I. C. C. Rep., 479, in the absence of tariff provision to the contrary the transportation rates shown in carrier's tariff to a given point include delivery on its own rails, and if shipper or owner of consignment requires delivery on the rails of another carrier he must pay the lawful charges of that other carrier for its services.

It is not alleged that the charge of $3 per car is unreasonable for the service performed, but it is claimed that the payment should be made by the defendant company and not by the shipper.

To support the contention of complainants in these cases would be to say that transportation charges must in every instance remain at a fixed figure or be reduced by the carrier at the peril of being called upon to respond in damages for all charges that have before that time been collected under the rates so reduced.

No showing of any moment is made as to reasons for the change in practice on the part of this defendant or of conditions which may have led to or influenced its action. It is admitted that during the period when the shippers were required to pay the switching charge the tonnage shipped was less.

The assessment of switching charges upon business to or from competitive points taken from or delivered to a competing carrier is universal. Under tariff regulations carriers now absorb such switching charges or require payment of same by shippers in accordance with the competitive conditions that obtain and the circumstances that surround the transportation.