CLAUSE 51, SEC. 6ss a.-"When a bill is presented through the postoffice, and returned by post dishonoured, it may be protested at the place to which it is returned and on the day of its return, if received during business hours, and if not received during business hours, then not later than the next business day."

This sub-section of the clause we are now considering is entirely fresh law, and removes a difficulty that bankers have often experienced as to obtaining a valid protest on foreign bills drawn on persons resident in places where presentation for payment cannot be made in the ordinary way.

Clause 57 legalises the recovery by the holder of a dishonoured bill from the drawer or indorsers, of the amount of the bill, of interest from the date of maturity, of the cost of noting or protesting, and in the case of foreign bills, of re-exchange, all of which has been hitherto customary, but it is very satisfactory to see these various items of claim legalised by the Act. The original draft of the Act also contained a clause explanatory of re-exchange, which, it is to be regretted, has been struck out.

CLAUSE 60 reproduces the substance of 16 & 17 Vict., cap. 59, sec. 19, an Act which has been of infinite service to bankers in relieving them from liability on forged endorsements to cheques to order; but it might have been preferable to have had the original wording of the Act reproduced.

CLAUSE 63, SEC. 3.-"A cancellation made unintentionally, or under a mistake, or without the authority of the holder is inoperative; but where a bill or any signature thereon appears to have been cancelled, the burden of proof lies on the party who alleges that the cancellation was made unintentionally, or under a mistake, or without authority."

This section is of considerable consequence to bankers in the matter of the cancellation in error of the drawer's signature to a cheque or the acceptor's signature to a bill, but it does not so clearly define the liability or otherwise of bankers in respect to such cancellations as stated by Byles: see "Byles on Bills," 11th edition, p. 196, which runs thus

"If a banker with whom a bill is made payable by the acceptor, cancel the acceptance by mistake, without any want of due care, and return the bill so defaced, refusing to pay it, he does not thereby necessarily incur any legal liability. But if the banker, in so doing, be guilty of want of due care, an action lies against him at the suit of the holder, for the special damage actually sustained by the cancellation of the bill.".

Clause 64, as to alterations of a bill and as to what are material alterations, should be carefully noted by bankers.

CLAUSE 65, SEC. 5.-Where a bill payable after sight is accepted for honour, its maturity is calculated from the date of the noting for nonacceptance and not from the date of the acceptance for honour."

This legalizes a custom, and it is very desirable to have it formulated in the Act.

CLAUSE 68, SEC. 2.-" Where two or more persons offer to pay a bill for the honour of different parties, the person whose payment will discharge most parties to the bill shall have the preference.'

This also satisfactorily legalizes a custom; the clause generally has been dealt with by Mr. Venn in his remarks (p. 525).

CLAUSE 69.-"Where a bill has been lost before it is overdue, the person who was the holder of it may apply to the drawer to give him another bill of the same tenour, giving security to the drawer, if required, to indemnify him against all persons whatever in case the bill alleged to have been lost shall be found again."

"If the drawer on request as aforesaid refuses to give such duplicate bill, he may be compelled to do so.”

This clause practically re-enacts an old statute, 9 & 10 William III., c. 17, s. 3, but it is well to call the attention of bankers to it. In the original draft of the present Act the second part of the clause concluded thus, " And a court of justice may compel him to give such duplicate bill." This seems preferable, as it is doubtful how a drawer can be compelled to give a duplicate bill except by the intervention of a court of justice.

CLAUSE 72, SEC. 1ss. a.-" Where a bill is issued out of the United Kingdom it is not invalid by reason only that it is not stamped in accordance with the law of the place of issue."

CLAUSE 72, SEC. 4.-" Where a bill is drawn out of, but payable in the United Kingdom, and the sum payable is not expressed in the currency of the United Kingdom, the amount shall, in the absence of some express stipulation, be calculated according to the rate of exchange for sight drafts at the place of payment on the day the bill is payable."

The whole of this clause should be carefully perused and the two sections read are particularly satisfactory as legalising customs.

Part 3 of the Act having reference to cheques on a banker will necessarily commend itself to the principal attention of bankers, although, as a cheque is there defined as "a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand," many of the provisions we

have been considering refer as much to cheques as to bills of exchange proper.

CLAUSE 74, as to the presentation of cheques for payment, and which is more or less new law, will doubtless be carefully perused: it gives satisfactory latitude as to the time a cheque on a banker may be in circulation, though the expression, "reasonable time," which must be considered in connection with Clause 36, sec. 3, may have to be more clearly defined.

Sec. 3, introduced by Lord Bramwell, is entirely new law and should have the attention of bankers.

CLAUSES 76 TO 82 are almost an exact reproduction of "The Crossed Cheques Act," of 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 81. The committee of the Council introduced one slight addition to supply an omission in the original Act, viz. :—

CLAUSE 77, SEC. 6.-"Where an uncrossed cheque, or a cheque crossed generally, is sent to a banker for collection, he may cross it specially to himself."

In the supplemental portion of the Act

CLAUSE 93, authorising noting only on the day of dishonour of a bill and subsequent extension of protest as of the date of noting; CLAUSE 94, making provision for protesting bills in places where there is no notary;

CLAUSE 95, extending the provisions relating to crossed cheques to dividend warrants; and

CLAUSE 97, SEC. 3, legalising the custom as to signing dividend warrants, are all of interest to bankers; and in the second schedule to the Act it will be observed that, amongst others, the Acts 48 Geo. III., c. 88, and 8 & 9 Vict., c. 37, s. 24, are repealed, and consequently that the negotiation of bills under twenty shillings is no longer illegal.

Some of the main provisions of the Act, which either introduce new law or legalise customs of which many are unaware, and to which it is desirable that the attention of bankers should be directed, have been referred to; but it must be clearly understood that the foregoing remarks do not embrace an exhaustive examination into the Act, which should be carefully perused by all Bankers as relating to matters so intimately connected with their everyday business.

THE MARRIED

WOMEN'S

PROPERTY ACT, 1882.

By J. R. PAGET, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-law, THE Married Women's Property Act, 1882, comes into force on the 1st of January, 1883. The leading idea of the Act--namely, the development of a married woman having separate property into a legal being possessing the rights and subject to the liabilities of a man or an unmarried woman, so far as that property is concerned-is materially affected and weakened by the retention of the old system of settlements and the doctrine of restraint on anticipation, and by the absence of any practical facilities for ascertaining the measure of responsibility of a married woman or the probable result of an action contemplated against her. Still the Act, both with regard to its legal effect upon existing relations and the possibility it affords of new ones, seems worthy of consideration from the point of view in which it may reasonably be expected to affect the banking community.

In the first place, then, there are certain definite provisions of this statute the effect of which is not in any way hampered by the elements of weakness and difficulty before mentioned, and the relations under which are comparatively simple. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act enact that all accounts standing in the sole name of a married woman on the 1st of January, 1883, or opened in her sole name subsequently to that date, shall be deemed, unless and until the contrary be shown, to be the separate property of such married woman, and the fact of their standing in her name shall be sufficient prima facie evidence that she is beneficially entitled thereto. With regard to accounts existing at that date, an indemnity clause is inserted which, apparently by an oversight of the draftsman, excludes from its benefits the partners in private banks. With regard to accounts opened subsequently no indemnity at all is provided. But, apart from this, the obligations of all bankers are clear. After the 1st of January, 1883, they must hold all accounts in the sole name of a married woman at her absolute disposal, and honour any cheque drawn by her upon the same. As a married woman will then be able to sue in tort as well as contract, the refusal to honour a cheque when sufficient funds existed to meet it might form the foundation of an action by her. Nor will bankers run any risk in so acting; the fact of the account standing in the married woman's name is sufficient authority for so dealing with it, and, inasmuch as it lies upon any person setting up an adverse claim to the fund deposited

to establish his title thereto, the banker would not be responsible for any monies paid out before such title was established or before he was restrained by injunction or other legal process from parting with the same. Where a question arises between husband and wife as to the ownership of a deposit in a bank, section 17 of the Act furnishes a speedy method of obtaining a decision thereon by which the bank may put itself in the position of a neutral stakeholder and secure immunity from all liability or cost. Even in the case, contemplated by the Act, of a husband depositing money in a bank in his wife's name in order to defraud his creditors, although such creditors could follow and claim such money, this right could not, of course, extend to render the bank liable for any sums previously paid out in the ordinary course of business.

The same rules apply to an account kept in the joint names of a married woman and any person or persons other than her husband, so far as relates to her interest therein. There need be no difficulty about cheques payable to a married woman or order paid in by her to such account. As the law at present stands, an indorsement of a negotiable instrument by a married woman passes the title thereto when it is made in relation to her separate estate. Under the Act the money represented by the cheque would constitute separate property, and so be disposable of by her by means of indorsement, the Act specifically including "choses in actions" under the term property.

Similar provisions are extended by the Act to all annuities granted by the Commissioners for the reduction of the National Debt or any other person, all sums forming part of the public stocks or funds, or of any other stocks or funds transferable in the books of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England or any other bank, so that after the commencement of the Act any married woman, in whose name alone or conjointly with any person or persons other than her husband such investments shall be standing, must be regarded as having all rights in relation thereto which would be possessed by a man occupying the same position.

So far all is pretty plain sailing: definite funds are declared to be separate property and a definite method of dealing with them. prescribed. It is when we come to questions of contract with married women that difficulties arise.

Section 2 of the Act enacts that "a married woman shall be capable of entering into and rendering herself liable in respect of and to the extent of her separate property on any contract, and of suing and being sued, either in contract or tort or otherwise, in all respects as if she were a feme sole, and her husband need not be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant, or be made a party to any action or other legal proceeding brought by or taken against her, and any damages or costs recovered by her in any such action or proceeding shall be her separate property and any damages or costs recovered against her in any such action or proceeding shall