Whether the bimetallist's view is correct or not, it is entertained by too many and too eminent political economists to be cavalierly discarded as the product of folly or ignorance. What the author of the article "Money" in the Encyclopædia Britannica says respecting the English monometallists might be said with even greater force respecting the American monometallists in this campaign: "Not even yet does the question appear to have received that careful examination by monometallists which would be desirable." It is said on good authority that all the professors of political economy in England, with perhaps one exception, are bimetallists. That is not true in this country, but some of the most eminent economic authorities, including Dr. Francis A. Walker and President E. Benjamin Andrews, are and for many years have been bimetallists.

Some of the most eminent financiers of Europe belong to the same school. So little is it true that the great bankers of the world universally repudiate it that the greatest of them all. Baron de Rothschild, protested against the demonetization of silver by France, saying: "Had I to choose a system with the experience we have, I should not hesitate to accept that of a double standard." * Bimetallism, however, it will be observed, rests, in the theory of its advocates, upon the supposition that a worldwide demand for two metals for currency purposes will keep them at a parity. It does not at all follow that such a demand by one nation will have the same effect.

FREE COINAGE OF SILVER.

It will be clear to the thoughtful reader from these definitions that the free coinage of silver is not itself bimetallism. It may lead to bimetallism, it may delay or wholly prevent bimetallism, but it is not identical with bimetallism. The free coinage of silver as proposed by the regular Democratic party is simply this: That any man possessing 4121⁄2 grains of silver, which at present he can buy in the market for 53 cents of gold, may take it to the mint and have it converted into a coin having the value of one dollar in currency, and being full legal tender for that amount in the payment of all debts, public and private. To call this bimetallism is a misuse of terms. The essence of bimetallism is that gold and silver should be kept at a parity, and that the coinage should be so managed as to keep them at a parity. The free coinage of silver abandons all attempt to keep them at a parity, and the free coinage advocate concedes that the immediate effect would be a very considerable disparity between the two. It is hardly too much to say that he trusts to luck for the eventual re-establishment of the parity which would at first be destroyed by the act of free coinage. To the question, how it can be expected that the United States can alone create such a demand for silver as will bring gold and silver to

*"International Bimetallism," by Dr. F. A. Walker, page

166.

gether, we are answered by the rhetorical affirmation of the right of the American people to govern themselves, and without let or hindrance from without decide on every question presented for their consideration."* This is doubtless true. So the commander of an American steamship has a right to determine on its course without interference from England. But if he attempts to take a short course to Liverpool without going around through the Irish Channel, he will certainly come to wreck on the western coast of Ireland. No one questions our right to determine for ourselves whether we will have gold, silver, paper, or wampum for our currency; but in determining that question we must take into account the experience of the past, the conditions of the present and the probabilities of the future. The bimetallist believes that the experience of the past and the conditions of the present unerringly indicate that free silver coinage, without the co-operation of other nations, would join the United States to the silver monometallic nations of the world, of which India, China and Mexico are the most conspicuous examples.

NATIONAL BIMETALLISM IMPRACTICABLE.

The notion that America can establish and maintain a parity between gold and silver at a fixed ratio without the concurrence of other nations is supported neither by economic philosophy nor by economic history. The common objection to bimetallism, that whatever metal was undervalued would be exported, is a conclusive objection to the attempt to establish national bimetallism, since the only answer to it is that if the same ratio existed over the greater part of the commercial world there would be no temptation to export either metal, and neither would be sold except in the improbable event of a demand for it for manufacturing purposes exceeding the demand for coinage purposes. †

Speaking for myself, I am opposed to the free coinage of silver because I am a bimetallist. If I were a monometallist, I should think that much might be said in favor of silver rather than of gold as the standard of values. But it seems clear to me that the free coinage of silver by the United States alone would postpone indefinitely the establishment of bimetallism, as the coinage of four hundred millions of silver by the United States alone has operated to postpone it for more than a decade. It has taken off the strain upon gold, it has lessened the evils of a too narrow coin currency, it has caused the expor

* Mr. Bryan, in his Madison Square Garden Speech, August 12, 1896.

+ Modern bimetallists freely admit that two different bi. metallic systems, that is, having different ratios, could not exist, for each would drain the other of one metal Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Money," page 763, note.

"The silver standard was preferred by Ricardo, who fully accepted the argument against the double standard as conclusive. His view was that silver was steadier in value than gold and was the standard money in other countries, while the objection to it on account of its greater bulk was, he thought, obviated by the use of paper money for circulation." Article" Money," Ency. Brit., page 763.

tation of our gold to foreign countries, and made it easier for them to establish a gold standard, and it has confused the public mind respecting what is in its essential character a simple issue. The free coinage of silver by the United States would send the rest of our gold to Europe, if it did not draw European silver to our shores; would make us a silver monometallic nation, would require us in all our dealings with foreign nations to buy their medium of exchange from them, and would give us in the United States itself two prices-one a higher price for all imported articles, the other a lower price for all domestic articles. And the farmer and the wageearner would be the chiefest sufferers.

ness.

AN HONEST DOLLAR.

The free silver coinage argument is not, in the intent of those who constitute the great body of the silver constituency, a movement in favor of repudiation of debts, either public or private. Its motive power is not a dishonest desire. It cannot be counteracted by sermons on the text "Thou shalt not steal." Its errors and weaknesses are rather those of a religious enthusiasm than of a fever of covetousThe current, not to say cant, phrases" honest dollar" and "sound money" feed the passion which those who use them desire to allay. It is because the free coinage advocate believes that the gold dollar is a dishonest dollar, and that the gold currency is unsound money, that he is impatient of all checks, cautions and restraints in his eager desire to change it. An honest dollar is one which retains the same purchasing power from year to year and from epoch to epoch. It must be so steady in its value that the farmer who has promised to pay $1.000 loaned to him upon a mortgage shall not have to render at the end of five years more brain and muscular toil for the $1,000 than he would have had to render when he borrowed the money. And, on the other hand, so steady that he who has loaned the money shall be able to get with it at the end of the ten years as much in those productions which alone give to money their value as he would have received when he loaned the money. If the currency system is. so constructed that the dollars rise in their value, or so constructed that they fall in their value, they will do injustice. Says President Andrews :* "Increase in the value of money robs debtors. It forces every one of them to pay more than he covenanted-not more dollars, but more value, the given number of dollars embodying at date of payment greater value than at date of contract. Decrease in the value of money robs creditors, necessitating each to put up, in payment of what is due to him, with a smaller modicum of value than was agreed upon."

Now the free silver coinage advocate believes that the demonetization of silver, dating from about the year 1870, and successively enacted in different European countries and in the United States during

An Honest Dollar," by E. Benjamin Andrews, Am. Econ., page 8.

twenty years (1870-1890), has wrought a great increase in the value of money and accordingly has robbed debtors. He proposes to remonetize silver, believing that this will give the country back an honest dollar. Either he does not believe, or he does not realize, that this will work an immediate decrease in the value of money and so rob creditors. He who is able to escape from the heat of a partisan campaign and look at this question judicially should be able to see that injustice has been done to the debtor class, but he should also be able to see that in rectifying that injustice the utmost caution should be exercised and the utmost care taken not to work injustice to the creditor class. Two wrongs do not make a right; and if it be conceded that the demonetization of silver has, however little intended by those who accomplished it, wrought injustice to debtors, it should also be perceived that the remonetization of silver, unless very carefully guarded, will work injustice to creditors. Thus the moral question is not so simple as either the silver partisan or the gold partisan seems to think. Indeed, how to secure an honest dollar-that is, one which shall remain steady in its values--is one of the most perplexing problems of political economy, as it is one of the most important.

This moral question is still further complicated by the incongruous legislation of the United States. On the one hand, Congress has affirmed explicitly that all debts, public and private, including all bonds of the national government, are payable in silver, and this declaration still remains upon the statute book;* and, on the other hand, it has equally emphatically declared that it is the settled policy of the United States government to maintain a parity between gold and silver. Now the simple truth is that the United States government cannot carry out both of these pledges. If it begins to pay its public debts in silver gold will at once go to a premium, and it will no longer fulfill its pledged purpose to keep gold and silver at a parity. If, on the other hand, it fulfills its pledged purpose and keeps gold and silver at a parity, unless it does so by securing the co-operation of other nations, sooner or later silver will almost certainly cease to be a legal tender for all debts, public and private, and will become only a token"-that is to say, a poor sort of substitute for a paper promise to pay gold. The United States government has brought itself into exactly that condition into which a careless or easygoing man finds himself when he has made two pledges, quite inconsistent with each other, to two different persons, and both simultaneously demand performance. "You have only promised," says the

*The Matthews Concurrent Resolution (1878) declared that all bonds are payable in silver dollars containing 412 grains each at the option of the government," thus officially defining what Congress meant by the word "coin" as used in these bonds; the Bland-Allison act of the same year enacts that silver dollars of 412% grains each are legal tender "for all debts and dues, public and private, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract."

Sherman act of 1890.

free silver coinage man, "to pay silver to the bondholder. You have no right to borrow gold and tax me for the interest, in order to give the bondholder gold instead of silver." "You have promised," says the bondholder, "to keep gold and silver at a parity; and you are bound to do this, even if you do have to tax yourself to borrow gold in order to maintain that parity." There is color of justice on both sides. The wrong was perpetrated by the careless politicians who passed a concurrent resolution to satisfy one faction, and put a parenthetic declaration of the policy of the government into another act for the purpose of satisfying another faction.

But although there is color of justice in both claims, it must not be forgotten that the nation has a personality of its own, and that Congress and the President are the chosen representatives of that personality. In strictness of speech the nation has not made two pledges. It has made one pledge and reserved to itself one liberty. It has promised to maintain the parity between gold and silver. It has promised this not only in words, but in nearly or quite a quarter of a century of practice. During all that time it has maintained that parity by paying its debts in gold. If it can maintain that parity and fulfill that pledge only by sacrificing the liberty which it has reserved to pay in silver, the highest canons of honor require that it should make the sacrifice, that the people of the land should submit to the tax in which the incompetence of their political leaders and their own carelessness have involved them, and should learn by experience to require in future of their legislators a self-consistent and harmonious policy.

OTHER ISSUES INVOLVED.

So much space has been taken in the consideration of the financial question, both because it is the most prominent and the most perplexing of the campaign, that little room is left for the consideration of the other issues involved. Little space, however, is required by them. At least they appear to me to be as clear as they are simple. It is true that in theory the tariff question is involved, and the tariff question is neither clear nor simple. But though the two platforms antagonize one another upon this important question, practically it has no place in the campaign. Whatever our theories may be upon that much vexed question, there is little reason to doubt that the income of the national government will depend for the next four years largely upon its tariff, and that whether the tariff is levied ostensibly for revenue only, or ostensibly for protection also, it will be in effect a protective tariff. The only practical question is, shall such simplification or modification of it as the revenues of the country require be intrusted to the Democratic or the Re publican party?

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM.

The civil service issue is sharply defined by the contrasted declarations of the two platforms. The

Republican party promises thoroughly and honestly to enforce, and wherever practicable to extend, the Civil Service law. The Democratic party, in somewhat more vague language, declares its opposition to "life tenure in the public service," and favors "such an administration of the Civil Service laws as will afford equal opportunities to all citizens of ascertained fitness.' Interpreted by the frank declarations of its chief candidate, there is no mistaking the meaning of this plank. There is not now and never has been life tenure in the public service, and no one proposes it. There is only a provision for ascertaining the fitness of candidates for office and appointing only those whose fitness has been ascertained by competitive examinations or by previous fidelity. This system, inaugurated under General Grant, incorporated in the public law in 1883, and steadily pursued from that time to this, has now become the dominant system in the federal administration. Against the 85,000 administrative offices which are now thus filled, there are only a few thousand left so open that they may be given as a reward of party service to party hacks. Either the Democratic platform is to be interpreted as an appeal to a great horde of office seekers, but an appeal so couched that its vague promise need not be fulfilled, in which case it is flagrantly dishonest, or it must be interpreted as the indication of a purpose to restore the method of appointment introduced into our government by Jackson, and carried to such dangerous excess in the English government by Walpole, a method which debauches the public service, and by putting up every four years 75,000 offices to be fought over, corrupts the national conscience and embitters and inflames party animosities. It is hardly too much to say that the overthrow of the civil service system, could it be accomplished, though it would entail no such immediate disaster as the free coinage of silver, would involve a greater national peril.

FEDERAL AUTHORITY.

The language of the Democratic platform respecting the Supreme Court of the United States is ambiguous: "We declare that it is the duty of Congress to use all the constitutional power which remains after that decision (the income tax decision), or which may come from its reversal by the court as it may hereafter be constituted, so that the burdens of taxation may be equally and impartially laid, to the end that wealth may bear its due proportion of the expenses of the government." It is unquestionably within the constitutional power of Congress and of the President acting in conjunction with Congress so to increase the number of judges of the Supreme Court, and so to constitute the personnel of the increased court, as to reverse at once its decision respecting the constitutional powers of Congress to impose an income tax. To this extent there is implied in this platform a threat to pack the court for the purpose of securing such a re

versal. Let us hope that this implication was not in the minds of those who framed the platform and is not in the purpose of those who stand upon it. It is certain that any open threat to do what this platform has been regarded as impliedly threatening would array against both platform and party the whole conservatism of the United States. The Supreme Court was the one great notable addition which the founders of the United States made to national life. It is the one supreme and necessary check upon the passions of a too mobile democracy. Its overthrow or corruption might easily prove fatal to the very life of the republic.

But if the language of this plank is ambiguous, the language of that on federal interference is not so: "We denounce arbitrary interference by federal authority in local affairs as a violation of the constitution of the United States and a crime against free institutions." Read in the light of recent history, applied as this plank was intended to be applied, to the action of President Cleveland in quelling the Chicago mob in the summer of 1894, there is no mistaking its meaning. Giving to it the most temperate possible interpretation it means this That the President of the United States has no right to intervene to put down mob violence in any part of the United States, except at the request of the governor or legislature of the state. This is a serious misinterpretation of the constitution. The constitution does indeed provide that the United States government shall protect the several states against "domestic violence" on the request of the legislature or the Executive, but this is not the only provision conferring authority upon the federal government. It has authority among other things to regulate interstate commerce, to establish post offices and post roads, and to provide and maintain a navy and an army, and therefore it has authority to do whatever is necessary to fulfill these duties laid upon it. If a mob assaults one of its forts, interferes with the railroads which are carrying on interstate commerce, obstructs or prevents the prompt transportation or delivery of the mails, or in any other way assails the majesty of the federal government, the federal government need not wait to ask permission of the state to maintain its majesty and enforce its laws. Even were the state by its executive and legislative action to approve, confirm and ratify the mob, as it did in South Carolina, the duty of the federal government would remain unchanged. Whether Governor Altgeld was asked or not asked to protect Chicago from the mob, whether he was ready or not ready to interfere, whether he was able or not able to put down the mob and ensure the peaceable operation of the railroads, are questions wholly immaterial. The mo

ment the federal duty was interfered with and the federal law violated, that moment the federal government had a right and a duty to intervene, if the chief executive believed that direct and immediate intervention would prove the quickest, simplest and readiest method of preserving law and order. As to the further clause in this plank, approving a special act of Congress limiting the powers of the federal courts in contempt cases, it must suffice to say here that a particular law, pending under a particular Congress, the details of which are unknown to the great body of the American people, forms no proper subject for a national issue.

CONCLUSION.

At this writing political indications point to the election of Mr. McKinley by a large popular majority and a considerable majority in the Electoral College. With this election the coinage issue may perhaps disappear from American politics. On the one hand, it is not impossible that international agreement may be secured with France and Germany, if not with other European powers, for a bimetallic currency; on the other, it is not impossible that the discovery of the immense gold fields in South Africa may at once lessen the difficulty of establishing bimetallism and lessen the evils of the gold standard. But it appears to me very clear that the party which has selected Mr. Bryan as its standard bearer will not disappear. Though the issues formulated in 1896 will never again be similarly formulated, the tendencies appearing in 1896 will certainly reappear in two great national organizations. Conservatism will be represented in the one party, radicalism in the other. A too staid and self satisfied content will be the fault of the one, and a too restless and eager demand for change the fault of the other. One will have too little, the other too much faith in popular government; the one will fear the excesses of liberty, the other will be impatient of constitutional restraints; the one will tend toward Toryism, the other toward radicalism, if not socialism. Let us hope that they may find as leaders worthy successors, the one to Alexander Hamilton, the other to Thomas Jefferson, that the great middle body of voters, alternately attracted by the promises and repelled by the failures of the competing parties, may wisely mediate between them, that the country may thus be preserved from falling either into the political stolidity and stagnation of Spain or the restlessness and untempered radicalism of France, and by the sometimes inspiring, sometimes restaining influence of the people may be kept in that path of real and rational progress which has been the safety of Great Britain and the glory of Anglo-Saxon history.

T would be impossible to understand the conduct

I

out taking into account the conditions which confronted the party managers prior to and immediately after the great national conventions. These conditions, it is safe to say, were unprecedented in American politics. On the first day of January, 1896-six months before the "lining up"-neither of the two great parties in the country knew precisely where it stood on the issue which in the event has dominated all other issues and has made greater confusion in party lines than any other political question that has arisen since 1860. On the Demo. cratic side there was the demoralization which always overtakes the party in power during a season of national depression. The party, it was admitted on all sides, was illy prepared to go before the country on the question of national revenues, for it was now on the defensive, whereas four years ago it had been the eager champion of reform and had been led to triumph because of its promises to readjust the tariff system; but such readjustment as a Democratic Congress had attempted was under the ban of public disapproval as expressed at the polls in 1894. The last heritage of the Civil War-the force bill-was no longer a political issue, and it was evident that the Democratic hosts could not be rallied effectively under their old standards.

THE DEMOCRATS AND FREE SILVER.

But a "new Democracy" was asserting itself in the South and West. In more than one state the old party leadership was discredited and deposed. It was felt that the administration at Washington no longer represented the party. In some statesnotably in South Carolina and Illinois-the drift was unmistakably toward Populism. Almost everywhere the opposition to trusts and monopolies was growing more insistent and pronounced. In the West and South the demand for the free and unlimited coinage of silver served to concentrate and organize this opposition. This demand had been growing steadily for years. It was immensely accelerated by the People's Party movement, though free silver was but one of a long catalogue of radical measures proposed in Populist platforms. The freecoinage movement made headway in both parties. To Democrats the silver men appealed with special force, for their proposition was calculated to win votes in those sections and from those classes of the population to which the recent party policy as exemplified by President Cleveland had been especially repugnant. Something must be done, reasoned the Democratic politicians, to hold in line the discontented voters who had drifted into the party fold in

HON. JOSEPH W. BABCOCK, Chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee. ing to strengthen their party's claims to popular support. In other states like considerations prevailed; the important fact to be noted is that not merely in the South, where Democracy was assured of its strength, did the free silver leaven do its rapid work, but in the great states of the middle West, where Democracy faced great odds and had to fight to win, this same appeal in silver's behalf was made the rallying cry. In the East Democrats still stood out against the new dispensation, but they were in Republican states. In the Chicago convention the silver men were not only a decisive majority of the delegates, but they were in an overwhelming majority of the delegates from the assuredly Democratic and the possibly Democratic states of the Union. For better, for worse, the Democrats of those states were now fully committed to a policy