JURISDICTION OF SUBJECT-MATTER,-continued.

So, too, in American Union Telegraph Co. v. Middleton, 80 N. Y. 408, the rule was followed, and it was held that an action for damages from the cutting down and removal of telegraph poles and wires was quare clausum fregit.

Courts of this state have jurisdiction of an action to recover for injuries to land in another state occasioned by negligence.

Home Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 11 Hun, 182.

Contra, Genet v. D. & H. C. Co. 29 St. Rep. 954; 8 Supp. 822.

Courts of this state have no jurisdiction of an action for injuries to realty by waste in another state.

Cragin v. Lovell, 88 N. Y. 258.

Courts of this state have no jurisdiction of an action to abate a nuisance maintained on land in another state.

People v. Central Railroad of N. J., 42 N. Y. 283.

An action will lie in our courts for damages to lands within the state from a nuisance maintained on lands without the state. Ruckman v. Green, 9 Hun, 225.

State courts have jurisdiction of summary proceedings to dispossess his sublessee instituted by a lessee from the Federal government. Lotterle v. Murphy, 67 Hun, 76; 51 St. Rep. 553; 21 Supp. 1120. Citing Barrett v. Palmer, 135 N. Y. 336; 31 N. E. 1017.

d. Foreign personal torts.

Courts of this state have jurisdiction to entertain an action to recover damages against a resident of this state for a fraud committed in another

state.

McQueen v. New, 87 Hun, 206; 67 St. Rep. 446; 33 Supp. 801.

Our courts have jurisdiction of an action for personal injuries inflicted outside the state by negligence.

Barney v. Burstenbinder, 7 Lans. 210; S. C. 64 Barb. 212.

Courts of this state have jurisdiction of an action for a slander uttered in another state.

Boynton v. Boynton (Ct. App.) 43 How. Pr. 380.

But such jurisdiction will not be exercised unless special reasons are shown for doing so.

Hatfield v. Sisson, 28 Misc. 255; 93 St. Rep. 73; 59 Supp. 73.

Courts of this state have, and will entertain, jurisdiction of actions for personal injuries committed abroad, when both, or either of the parties, are citizens of the United States, but on the question of policy jurisdiction of actions for such wrongs committed abroad between nonresidents should be refused unless special reasons appear for retaining it.

Dewitt v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31.

JURISDICTION OF SUBJECT MATTER,-continued.

The courts of this state may in their discretion entertain jurisdiction of an action for a personal injury (criminal conversation) between citizens of another state actually domiciled therein when the action was begun and tried though the injury was committed in the state of their residence and domicile. Burdick v. Freeman, 120 N. Y. 420; 24 N. E. 949; 31 St. Rep. 427. 46 Hun, 138; 10 St. Rep. 756; 27 W. Dig. 313.

Aff'g

Although no sufficient reason appears for prosecuting the action in our courts, if objection to retention of jurisdiction of the action is not made by answer, or special motion, or during the trial, the defendant cannot invoke the discretion of the court to procure the dismissal of the action, after the case is practically submitted to the jury.

Id.

Jurisdiction should be declined where it does not appear that both parties to the action being foreigners may not be about to return to their own country at the completion of the voyage on which the tort was committed, in the relation of master and seaman.

Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134.

Conversely, if one party separates from the ship and the relation of master and seaman is terminated.

Johnson v. Dalton, 1 Cow. 543.

Olzen v. Schierenberg, 3 Daly, 100.

Courts of this state will entertain jurisdiction of actions for personal injuries committed abroad, when both or either of the parties are citizens of the United States.

Newman v. Goddard, 3 Hun, 70.

Dewett v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31.

It is error for the trial court to retain jurisdiction of an action between nonresidents for personal injuries inflicted in another state, unless special reasons for retaining jurisdiction are shown.

Ferguson v. Neilson, 33 St. Rep. 814; 11 Supp. 524.

Courts of this state have jurisdiction of an action for a tort committed upon its citizens on territory belonging to the Federal government.

Armstrong v. Foote, 11 Abb. Pr. 384.

Where a party is damaged by the act of another on land of the United States, a county court has jurisdiction of his action for such damages, although devoid of jurisdiction over the lands itself.

Delamater v. Falz, 50 Hun, 528; 20 St. Rep. 821; 3 Supp. 711.

State courts have jurisdiction of an action for personal injuries inflicted by a dog on territory ceded to the United States for an arsenal.

Madden v. Arnold, 22 App. Div. 240; 81 St. Rep. 757; 47 Supp. 757; 5 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 26.

Appellate Division.

[Nov.

SAGER MFG. CO. v. SMITH.

[.... App. Div. .; 94 St. Rep. 849; 69 Supp. 849.]

....

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department. November 22,

1899.)

1. RECEIVERS-AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE MATERIAL- PURCHASE IN FOREIGN STATE.

A receiver of a manufacturing company was authorized to continue the business as formerly conducted, or as in his judgment might be necessary to preserve its outstanding contracts from loss, and to enable him to collect accounts due or to become due. Held, that he was authorized to purchase a consignment of saddles to complete bicycles contracted for before his appointment.

2. SAME INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY.

Where a receiver is authorized to continue the business and make purchases, he may make them in the state of his appointment, or any other state, without being personally liable, if he discloses his character and source of authority.

Appeal from trial term, Monroe county.

NOTE. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF RECEIVERS ON THEIR CONTRACTS.

There are remarkably few cases on this question. The weight of authority has seemed to be that the receiver is personally liable, unless the creditor expressly agrees to look to the estate, the controlling principle being that the receiver, having no responsible principal, is a party to the contract individually.

Livingston v. Pettigrew, 7 Lans. 405; Schmidt v. Gayner, 59 Minn. 303; 61 N. W. 333; 62 N. W. 265; and the principal case hold, however, the contrary doctrine, if the contract is authorized by the court.

In Livingston v. Pettigrew, 7 Lans. 405, it was held that a covenant by a receiver in an assignment of a judgment belonging to an estate in which he described himself as receiver, imposed no personal liability upon him.

In Newman v. Davenport, 9 Baxter (Tenn.) 539, a receiver of a railroad appointed by the governor was held not personally liable for services rendered by an attorney employed by him as receiver, unless he pledged his in

1899].

Sager Mfg. Co. v. Smith.

Action by Sager Manufacturing Company against Frank SulThere was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendReversed.

livan Smith. ant appeals.

The action was commenced on the 31st day of December, 1898, to recover for goods sold to the defendant, and for which it is alleged he became personally liable. The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff was a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of bicycle supplies at Rochester, N. Y. The Worcester Cycle Manufacturing Company prior to the 30th day of June, 1897, was a corporation engaged in manufacturing bicycles at Worcester, in the state of Massachusetts. On said 30th day of June, 1897, the defendant was appointed receiver of the Worcester Cycle Company by the United States circuit court for the district of Massachusetts, and as such receiver took possession of its factory and plant, and entered upon the discharge of his duties as such receiver. Among other things, the order appointing the receiver contained the following: "The said receiver is hereby fully authorized and directed to take immediate possession of all and singular the property above described, wherever situated or found, and to collect

PERSONAL LIABILITY OF RECEIVERS ON THEIR CONTRACTS,--continued.

dividual credit. The exemption was put on the ground that the receiver was a public agent.

The doctrine of personal liability is supported by

Rogers v. Wendell, 54 Hun, 540; 28 St. Rep. 301; 7 Supp. 781; 8 Supp. 515.

Ryan v. Rand, 20 Abb. N. C. 313; 9 St. Rep. 523.

Sayles v. Jourdan, 19 St. Rep. 349; 2 Supp. 827; Aff'd without opinion 121 N. Y. 685; 24 N. E. 1098.

Meyer v. Lexow, 1 App. Div. 116; 72 St. Rep. 220; 37 Supp. 67.

The distinction made by McLennan, J., in the principal case, of Rogers v. Wendell, 54 Hun, 540; 28 St. Rep. 301; 7 Supp. 781; 8 Supp. 515, is hardly to be found in the case. Wendell's personal liability was not predicated on the absence of an order directing him to employ the plaintiff. The receiver was held personally liable because he "had no principal against whom the plaintiff could maintain an action." The absence of authority, express or implied, in the receiver, is not suggested, and the propriety of the receiver's action was expressly indicated in the opinion of HARDIN, J.

So, too, the decision in Ryan v. Rand, 20 Abb. N. C. 313; 9 St. Rep. 523, goes deeper than the mere omission in the order of reference to authorize the receiver to employ a stenographer. Such a provision in the order of reference would not, under the doctrine of the case, have relieved the receiver from personal responsibility. Receivers, trustees, etc., Judge McAdams says, p. 314, “are individually liable because they have no responsi

all accounts and sums due or to become due to the Worcester Cycle Manufacturing Company, and for that purpose to carry on and continue the business of said defendant company as the same is now carried on, and so far as may be necessary to preserve its rights under its contracts, acting in all things under the order and direction of the court. . . . Said receiver is hereby fully authorized to continue to operate and carry on the business of the defendant cycle company in such manner as the same is now conducted, or in such manner as will, in his judgment, produce the most satisfactory results, so far as may be necessary for the preservation from loss of the outstanding contracts of said defendant cycle company, and to collect and receive all the income therefrom, and all the debts due said company of all kinds, and for such purpose is hereby vested with full power, at his discretion, to employ and discharge, and fix the compensation of, all such officers, attorneys, managers, superintendents, agents, and employees as may be required in the discharge of his trust, with the approval of one of the judges of this court.

Said receiver shall from time to time, out of the funds coming into his hands from the operation of the property and otherwise, pay the expenses of operating the same and executing his trust, and all taxes and assessments upon the said property or any part thereof." The defendant, as

PERSONAL LIABILITY OF RECEIVERS ON THEIR CONTRACTS,—continued.

ble principal behind them for whom they may contract and against whom the creditor may enforce his demand."

In Sayles v. Jourdan, 19 St. Rep. 349; 2 N. Y. Supp. 827; Aff'd without opinion, 121 N. Y. 685; 24 N. E. 1098, the hotel which the defendant, who was receiver of a railway, was running, belonged to the railway company. The case does not show what directions the court appointing the receiver had given. The defendant was held personally liable. It was not held that had the goods been purchased in pursuance of authority from the court the defendant would not likewise have been personally liable, in the first instance, subject to reimbursement out of funds in his hands.

In Cobb v. Sweet, 46 App. Div. 375; 95 St. Rep. 545; 61 Supp. 545, which was an action against a receiver of a railroad in his representative capacity, it was held that a complaint for coal sold to and used by the receiver in the operation of the road was not demurrable because it did not allege an order of the court for such operation. "If such order was necessary, it may be presumed to have been made.”

In Meyer v. Lexow, 1 App. Div. 116; 72 St. Rep. 220; 37 Supp. 67, Barrett, J., says: "The right of action upon a receiver's promise to pay, is, ordinarily, against the individual. He has no responsible principal behind him for whom he may so promise."

In Orpherts v. Smith, .. Misc. ....; 96 St. Rep. 409; 62 Supp. 409, the same defendant as in the principal case was held not personally liable on a