we would need battleships except for defense and in our Philippine possessions. We are sending you the important telegrams so that you may keep posted. Faithfully yours, FRANK B. KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/331: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, June 28, 1927—noon. 20. Your No. 35, June 27, 8 p. m. At present there is neither a British Ambassador nor Chargé in Washington. Entire force has moved to the North Shore, leaving only a third secretary at the Embassy who knows nothing about the matter under discussion. There is no use in trying to do any business through Embassy here, as I have informed Sterling who undoubtedly communicated the information to British Government. American Embassy in London has also been furnished with copies of your telegram No. 27, June 23, 9 p. m., and of our No. 11, June 24, 8 p. m., to you. With the latter we included the following instruction: [Here follows the final paragraph of the Department's telegram No. 138, June 25, 1 p. m., printed on page 56.] We have not yet heard from Sterling in reply. I shall communicate further with him along lines of your No. 35. I should prefer not to leave Washington if there is any possibility that my absence would delay or embarrass proceedings at Geneva. Please advise in this respect. KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/369 President Coolidge to the Secretary of State RAPID CITY, S. DAK., June 30, 1927. [Received July 5.] MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of the 28th, with the enclosure from the British Ambassador, both of which I have read with care. Your position seems to me correct and satisfactory. Very truly yours, CALVIN COOLIDGE 500.A15 a 1/350: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State GENEVA, June 30, 1927-1 p.m. [Received June 30-12:38 p. m.] 44. [Paraphrase.] Last night Bridgeman sent for Sharkey of the Associated Press and drafted with him the following authorized interview, text of which I deem it wise to cable to Department for its records: [End paraphrase.] "Great Britain has no intention of contesting the principle of parity between the naval strength of the United States and Great Britain, Mr. Bridgeman, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, said tonight in an exclusive statement to the Associated Press. Mr. Bridgeman added that he was surprised to see that an impression seemed to prevail in some quarters that Great Britain was asking for supremacy. He said that he was not aware of anything that had been said by any of the British delegates that could convey that idea. He continued: "Our policy has been to state frankly what are the British requirements but we never disputed the American claim for parity as established by the Washington treaty. It is true that we think our special needs demand higher number in certain types of vessels but we do not deny the right of the United States to build up to an equal figure in any type of warship if she thought it necessary. As regards battleships I have seen statements that the possession by Great Britain of the new ships, the Rodney and the Nelson, would give Great Britain some superiority if her proposals to limit the future size of battleships to 30,000 were adopted but I am sure that a continuance of parity arrived at in Washington in battleships could be secured by a reasonable adjustment of replacement tables.'" GIBSON 500.A15 a 1/354: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, June 30, 1927-2 p. m. 45. There are summarized below certain changes in the situation which are considered most favorable to us: 1. After apparently planning to justify their claim to superiority in naval strength, the British have weighed the matter and changed their minds. The idea of absolute parity between the United States and Great Britain has been unequivocally admitted by Bridgeman. (Reference is made to my telegram No. 44, June 30, 1 p. m., concerning this.) Bridgeman has told me that he considers it to be preferable for us to postpone public sessions at this time and he has put an end to the insistence for public debate on the naval needs of Great Britain and the United States. It is felt that your well-timed inquiry through our Chargé at London in regard to this matter was most beneficial to us. 2. It is believed that the British are conscious that they cannot force revision of the Washington treaty by using any rush tactics upon us. The original statement made by Bridgeman has now been publicly qualified by his announcing that the possession by the British Empire of three ships of greater tonnage than those possessed by the United States will necessitate numerous technical adjustments before any arrangement for the reduction of maximum tonnage of capital ships can be reached. 3. A reasonable and sensible spirit has been exhibited in the work thus far done by the technical committees. Although we are conscious that the cruiser problem is one of great difficulty, it is felt that there is a growing desire to reach an agreement and that the United States' position is such that we have no grounds for fears on this score. In regard to the points, tentative agreement has been reached with great ease. GIBSON 500.A15 a 1/362: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, July 2, 1927—11 a. m. 53. On the afternoon of July 1, Admiral Hara and Captain Toyoda of the Japanese delegation accompanied Captain Egerton of the British delegation to call on Admiral Schofield for the purpose of informally discussing the problem of cruisers. The conversation was opened by Admiral Schofield, who said that the British claim of 75 cruisers as a necessity for them was so large that it appeared to constitute no limitation whatever. Upon being asked for figures upon which British minimum requirements for total tonnage could be based, Egerton said that an irreducible minimum was 75 cruisers and that the minimum type would displace 7,500 tons. This would therefore total 598,200 tons for cruisers of all classes. It was further stated by Egerton that if the smaller type of cruiser were unacceptable to us the British figure would be increased as, in that 52 Telegram in three sections. event, Britain would require 75 cruisers of 10,000 tons displacement, or 750,000 tons in all. Schofield replied that, since this would in reality constitute no limitation, we could perceive no purpose in entering into a treaty for limitation of naval armaments on such a basis. In support of the British demand, Egerton advanced the explanation that the cruisers above-mentioned would serve the purely defensive purpose of securing and linking up the Empire's trade routes, preventing the interruption of the supply of food to the British Isles, etc.; the pressure for cruisers was very strong in the Dominions he stated and added that there could be no reduction in the number given, which had been reached as the result of careful and thorough study. In reply the opinion was expressed by Schofield that the publication of such a figure would be very unfortunate since, should an agreement not be reached, the press in each country would be given to unfavorable and mutual criticism which might gravely impair those cordial relations the promotion of which was our fundamental principle. Egerton said that he was fully aware of this but that "they were welcome to criticize until they were blue in the face so far as Great Britain was concerned." The difficulties of the problem were recognized by Captain Toyoda, who said that the two theses appeared so widely separated as to be irreconcilable. During the discussion Toyoda took the attitude of a listener rather than that of a participant. It was suggested by Schofield that an agreement might perhaps be reached covering the particular period of the treaty proposed and he also suggested that by considering building and scrapping programs it might be possible to find a formula for agreement. To this Egerton replied by saying that this was an entirely new idea which had not as yet been studied; that he felt that it had some promise; he expressed gratefulness to Schofield for advancing it; that it appeared to offer a means of escaping from a dilemma of a serious nature, but that in spite of all this he would have to consult with Bridgeman on this point before he would be ready for any further informal conversations. Egerton today said that he had spoken to Bridgeman and that Bridgeman had instructed him to state that the delegation of Great Britain would be willing to consider Schofield's idea provided however that we "in advance wholeheartedly" agreed to aspects of the following principles: (1) Age limit to be as high as possible; (2) The armament for the new type of light cruiser to be of 6-inch caliber: (3) 7,500 tons to be the displacement of the new type of light cruiser; (4) The number of total tonnage of 8-inch-gun cruisers to be fixed by agreement. He said that, subject to our agreement on these points, the British would be able to say that their total tonnage arrived at in 1936 would be 462,000 tons. Schofield then asked whether after arriving at that total tonnage the British would agree to refrain from increasing it in subsequent years. Egerton answered that this was an arrangement which was to run only to 1936 and that as the British replaced their 6-inch-gun cruisers they would increase tonnage gradually to a maximum of approximately 562,000 tons. As he understood it, he said, this was simply postponing until 1936 what at present seemed to be a serious difference between the American and British delegations. Schofield then pointed out that the original 1936 proposal was 505,996 tons and that this new proposal came within 40,000 tons, the equivalent of four cruisers, of that total. In conclusion, Egerton said that Bridgeman had stated to him that if the American delegation did not agree to the four above-mentioned points, it was "quite useless for him to waste his time in making studies." Admiral Jones and I concurred that an answer ought to be made to Captain Egerton to the effect that the United States was not prepared to make promises of a blind character with regard to the acceptance of the four above-mentioned points in exchange for a promise to consider what is a reasonable suggestion, and that, therefore, the question had better be sent back to the technical committee. I was told today by Saburi that the Japanese delegation was "shocked" by the figures of the British and that it was felt by the Japanese delegation that it would probably be necessary within a few days for the American and Japanese delegates to discuss the matter seriously with Bridgeman urging him to lower the British figures to reasonable proportions which would constitute a general limitation. Saburi stated that the delegation of Japan was anxious for real limitation and he added that he believed that the entire world would be shocked at the proportions of the figures of the British. I am inclined to doubt that much pressure is being brought to bear on the British by the Dominions so far as the building of cruisers is concerned, as some of the delegations from the Dominions have expressed their entire indifference with regard to this subject and they have said that they were present in Geneva solely to establish the constitutional principle of participation by the Dominions in negotiations which affect the Empire. Should it become necessary to have a consultation of the delegations of the three powers, we intend to say that if the British are disinclined to reduce their figures in a manner such as will enable them to be incorporated in a treaty for "naval limitation" we think that it would be decidedly more honest for them to publish their figures, together with their justification therefor, and to state quite frankly |
