RICHMOND MINING CO. v. EUREKA MINING CO.

SAME v. SAME.

APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA.

Nos. 116 and 117. Argued March 25 and 30, 1881. Decided April 25, 1881. Richmond Mining Co. v. Eureka Mining Co., 103 U. S. 839, followed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. These are suits in equity and are dependent on the suit in ejectment between the same parties which has just been decided. The decrees of the Circuit Court are affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in that case.

Affirmed.

Mr. Thomas Wren, Mr. P. Phillips and Mr. S. M. Wilson for appellant.

Mr. T. T. Crittenden and Mr. Harry I. Thornton for appellee.

WHITNEY v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF BRATTLEBORO. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF VERMONT. No. 125. Argued December 8, 1880. Decided December 20, 1880.

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National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699, followed.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This case is clearly settled by that of National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699. The identical question there decided is presented by the record, and we have no doubt it was the only question considered by the Supreme Court of the State. We certainly cannot say, from anything that appears in the bill of exceptions, that there might not have been enough evidence of negligence on the trial in the lower court to make it necessary to send the case to the jury. There is nothing whatever in the record to indicate that the positive instruction to the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendant below was based on anything else than a ruling that, as a matter of law, a national bank was not liable for the loss of special deposits.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to reverse the judgment of the county court,. and award a venire de novo.

Mr. Charles N. Davenport for plaintiff in error.

Mr. E. J. Phelps for defendant in error.

Reversed.

BENTON COUNTY v. ROLLENS.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 147. Argued December 15, 1880. Decided December 20, 1880.

Scotland County v. Thomas, 94 U. S. 682, and Schuyler County v. Thomas, 98 U. S. 169, followed.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This judgment is affirmed on the authority of Scotland County v. Thomas, 94 U. S. 682, and Schuyler County v. Thomas, 98 U. S. 169. Under the rulings in those cases the amendment to the charter of the Osage Valley and Southern Kansas Railroad Company adopted in 1871, and changing somewhat the route of the road, did not extinguish the power granted to counties by the origi. nal charter to subscribe to the stock of the company. The amendment was not a new charter, but an alteration of the old one in a way which left the power to subscribe in full force. Affirmed.

Mr. T. T. Crittenden for plaintiff in error.

Mr. John D. Stevenson and Mr. J. B. Henderson for defendants in error.

SEWARD v. COMEAU.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.

No. 240. Submitted March 3, 1881. Decided March 21, 1881.

Affirmed on the facts.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. We think the court below was right in dissolving the injunction which had been obtained in the state court and dismissing the bill. There cannot be a doubt from the evidence that the Magenta plantation contains in fact the full quantity of land which was guaranteed, and that the deficiency, if there is any, arises from a mistake in the description of one of the parcels intended to be conveyed. The grantee was put in actual possession of the whole plantation, and he, and those claiming under him, have never been disturbed since. No person has ever set up any adverse claim whatever, either to the possession or the title. The complainants have shown no reason to fear that they will ever be disquieted, and certainly they have not proven that they were in danger of eviction. They have never asked a correction of the mistake in

the description, if any there is, and it is by no means certain that the language of the whole deed does not really embrace what it is claimed has been omitted.

What we have thus said applies to all the alleged defects in the title. No adverse claim has been set up by any one, and, so far as anything appears, there is no danger whatever that the complainants will be disturbed in their possession, either because patents have not been issued, or because Mrs. Delhommer was not authorized by the court to obtain a judicial separation of property.

The fact that the sheriff advertised to sell in parcels, presents no ground for an injunction. As the injunction granted by the state court has been dissolved, and the bill dismissed, we need not inquire whether the proceeding by executory process in the state court was removed to the Circuit Court or not. The parties may now proceed with the execution of that process in such manner as they shall be advised is proper. The appellants cannot object to such removal as was actually effected to the Circuit Court, because it was brought about on their application. Affirmed.

Mr. H. N. Ogden for appellants.

Mr. E. T. Merrick and Mr. G. W. Race for appellees.

WIGHT v. CONDICT.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 280. Argued April 22, 1881. - Decided May 2, 1881.

Members of a limited partnership purchased and paid for the interes of one of the members. Subsequently the remaining members became bankrupt. Held, that the assignee in bankruptcy had no claim against the outgoing partner as a debtor by reason of this transaction.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE announced the judgment of the court. The decree in this case is affirmed. There can be no pretence that Condict owed the bankrupts anything. They bought his interest in the limited partnership of which he was once a member and paid him for it. If the creditors of that partnership have any just claims against him on account of what has been done, they must proceed as they may be advised to enforce their rights, but the assignee of the bankrupts is in no respect their representative for that purpose. He can reduce to his possession whatever is owing to the bankrupts and also what they have disposed of in fraud of the bankrupt law; but Condiet was not their debtor when

the bankruptcy occurred, and there is no allegation that what they did in respect to his interest in the limited partnership was forbidden by the bankrupt law.

Mr. John E. Risley and Mr. Daniel S. Riddle for appellant.

Mr. William P. Chambers for appellee.

FRANCE v. MISSOURI.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 915. Submitted October 18, 1880. Decided October 25, 1880.

No Federal question is raised in this case.

MOTION TO DISMISS.

The case is stated in the opinion.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This was a proceeding by quo warranto to exclude the plaintiffs in error, who were the defendants below, from the further use of the franchises of a lottery, known as the Missouri State Lottery, on the ground that the event had happened which fixed the period for the termination of the grant under which they were acting. This was in legal effect all that the petition contained. The defendants in their answer conceded that their grant was to terminate on the happening of a certain event, but insisted that this event had not yet taken place, because they had for a time been prevented from carrying on their business by judicial proceedings against them in the courts of the State. This presented the only question in the case. It was agreed by both parties that the grant or contract under which the defendants claimed was valid and binding on the State and that the grant was not limited to an arbitrary period, but to the happening of a particular event. All these questions had long before been decided by the highest court of the State, and there was no attempt to overturn or modify the decisions. No claim was made under any of the statutes of the State passed for the suppression of lotteries, and the single question put to the Supreme Court of the State for determination was, whether the event had in fact happened which all agreed was to terminate the franchise. The court decided that it had, and gave judgment accordingly. No effect whatever was given to any law of the State impairing the obligations of the grant. Nothing was done but to decide that upon the evidence the grant had expired by its own limitation. The contracts as presented and agreed on by both parties were construed and full effect given to all the obligations

they were found to contain. No Federal question was raised or decided. The motion to dismiss is, therefore, granted.

Mr. C. H. Krum and Mr. Wm. O. Bateman for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Leverett Bell for defendant in error.

GREEN v. FISK.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.

Green v. Fisk, 103 U. S. 518, followed.

MOTION TO DISMISS. The case is stated in the opinion.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This, like Green v. Fisk, just decided, is a motion to dismiss an appeal in a partition suit, because the decree appealed from is not final, and also, because the value of the matter in dispute does not exceed five thousand dollars. The appellees, complainants below, claim to be the owners each of one-eighth of the property to be divided, which it is admitted is worth only ten thousand dollars. In the petition it is alleged that the value of the annual income was five thousand dollars, and an account of the revenue is asked as well as a partition. This suit, like the other, was begun in a state court, and removed by Green to the Circuit Court, where, by an express order, it was put on the equity docket and a change in the pleadings directed so as to make it conform to rules governing equity cases.

The decree appealed from simply adjudges that the appellees are the owners each of one-eighth the property, and refers the matter "to J. W. Gurley, Esq., master, to proceed to a partition according to law, under the directions of the court." As was decided in the other case, this is not a final decree, but if it was we would be without jurisdiction, because the property only has been adjudged to the appellees, and the value of that is less than the amount required to bring a case here. There has been no order even for an accounting, and as yet we are not advised there ever will be one, much less that if it should be made a balance would be found due from the appellant sufficient to make the value of the matter in dispute on an appeal by him such as our jurisdiction requires. As the appellant to sustain his appeal must show affirmatively that more in pecuniary value than our jurisdictional