the night, I conclude that no great damage was done. The vessels withdrew at daylight. Their fire was not returned. Very respectfully, &c., JOSEPH HOOKER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division. Capt. GEORGE L. HARTSUff, FAYETTEVILLE, VA., January 9, 1862. Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Army, Hdqrs. Dept. of W. Va.: SIR: I regret to say that the railroad expedition has for the present been prevented by the absolutely impassable condition of the roads. At the time appointed for the march a heavy fall of snow made it improper to commence so long a march as was contemplated, and Dr. Hayes, the brigade surgeon, was of opinion that only the last necessity would justify it. Since then we have had rain; the snow has disappeared, but the rain is unceasing, and the roads mud. My efforts to obtain information have been unceasing. I have now scouts trying to get to the railroad. I think they will succeed. Major Comly, at Raleigh, is untiring in making reconnaissances, sending out scouts, and swearing Union men. The Twenty-sixth leaves as soon as possible and within the time for which I was permitted to keep them. Notwithstanding their departure, I will go to Princeton as soon as the roads permit. The militia are called out in the adjacent counties south, but I fancy that the result of the call will not be dangerous, although it necessitates more watchfulness on our part. I think that the people here are under the impression that rebellion is not a success. Even the disloyal in Southwestern Virginia think so, and the entering upon successive points of the road south as if we meant to stay there without fear, though prepared for serious opposition, indicates something stronger than bushwhacking. The condition of this command is in most respects good. The efforts to keep up efficient guards is attended with more difficulty than anything else. We have not yet succeeded in finding the arms left near Dickerson's. There are there, I think, some 200 or 300 muskets. Intrenching tools in considerable numbers have been found buried, and the search for arms still continues.* Very respectfully, your obedient servant, E. P. SCAMMON, Colonel, Commanding Third Provisional Brigade. FREDERICK, January 10, 1862-8.30 p. m. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding: Dispatch received.† General Williams telegraphs from General Kelley, 7.30 p. m., that Loring was 18 miles from Romney, Winchester road. Lander falling back on Cumberland. Three regiments, one section artillery, marched this morning for Romney. Two cavalry companies move "Some matters of detail omitted. to-night. Have ordered him to put so much of his brigade in readi ness to march as can be spared. He has five regiments and four guns. Fears to part with more artillery. Can spare infantry. I think enemy reported at Bath again moving on Hancock; not believed by General Williams. N. P. BANKS, Major General, Commanding Division. JANUARY 10, 1862. Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War: Mr. David, the person in charge of the telegraph at General Kelley's headquarters, Cumberland, sends me the following this p. m.: General Lander has information which leads him to believe that Jackson is advancing on Springfield. If true, he will have to fall back on New Creek. Telegram to General Kelley from Big Cacapon says a country clerk from Bath reports Jackson's force 16,000, made up of militia from Morgan, Frederick, Berkeley, and Hampshire Counties, and regulars from Georgia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia. Thinks militia numbers 3,000. He counted twenty-four pieces of artillery, two of them 32pounders. Very respectfully, yours, ANSON STAGER. HEADQUARTERS HOOKER'S DIVISION, Camp Baker, Lower Potomac, Maryland, January 11, 1862. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS: Since my interview with the Major-General Commanding on Friday last it has suggested itself to me that it might not be unimportant for him to be informed of the facilities at Port Tobacco for embarking troops. The wharf at the town is 50 feet long, with 9 feet water at high tide. Three miles below, on the bay, troops can step from the shore on to vessels drawing not over 5 or 6 feet water. This town is 32 miles distant from Washington, with better roads than those leading to my camp. The piles for my wharf are nearly all driven and many of them capped. It will be 300 feet long, of the form of an L, and wide enough for a four-horse wagon to turn on it without difficulty at the outer extremity. There I will have 6 feet water. (This is at Rum Point.) To-morrow I propose to send the pile-driver to Liverpool Point, where I shall require it a couple of days. A wharf there of 60 feet in length will give me 6 feet water. These two wharves are indispensable. Since my return from Washington I have learned that a negro on the steamer Freeborn visited the neighborhood of Aquia and brought away his wife and children. He reports the number of troops in that vicinity to be that already communicated. He is ready and willing to visit that district any night. Brooke's Station is on the north side of the Potomac River, where the railroad bridge crosses that river, and 6 miles from Aquia bridge, about 300 feet in length. From Brooke's Station to Fredericksburg is 7 miles. Three bridges cross Rappahannock at this town. The railroad bridge stands on stone piers, and is about 600 feet in length. The others are wooden bridges, one about one-third of a mile, the other about one mile from the railroad bridge. I can learn of the presence of but few troops in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. They are to be found in small bodies and at long intervals along the shores of the Potomac. A prisoner sent to Washington yesterday informed me of about 1,800 stationed around Nomini Bay. My belief is that the great majority of the rebel forces are encamped well in the advance, in anticipation of their inability to move promptly at this season of the year. I have no changes to report in my immediate front. JOSEPH HOOKER, General, Commanding Division. HEADQUARTERS HOOKER'S DIVISION, Camp Baker, Lower Potomac, Maryland, January 12, 1862. Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac : GENERAL: The Pensacola passed the batteries about 5 o'clock this morning unharmed. Fifteen or twenty shots were fired by the rebels as she descended the river, when she must have been lost sight of from that shore. From the Maryland shore an indefinable dark object was all that my pickets could see of her: Later in the day the rebels were very active with their heavy guns, and blazed away at almost every object that presented itself, whether within the range of their guns or not. To me it seemed like an ebullition of anger on the escape of the Pensacola, for they had evidently made unusual preparation to receive her. Their accumulation of ammunition was afterwards expended on objects of little or no importance and without result. It is deserving of remark in the history of these heavy batteries, that during my sojourn here the enemy have discharged them not less than 5,000 times, and, with the exception of the single shot which struck one of the vessels of the flotilla a few days since, while she was engaged in exchanging shots with them, not a vessel has been damaged in navigating the river nor the skin of a person broken on our shore. I regret to learn that one of our barges was sunk two or three days since, off Alexandria, while on her way with stores for this camp. She is now at Rum Point. I am informed that she has on board stores from all of the departments, and I hope with care that no great loss will be suffered. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOSEPH HOOKER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division. OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, General S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General : General Barry informed me on Saturday that General Wadsworth had written to him that much of the board revetment of Fort Ramsay had been stripped off by the men, and asked for permission to use the rest. Colonel Alexander reports to me that he found Fort Corcoran on Sat. urday in a shocking condition from neglect; that the guns are not used at all, and some appeared to require adjustment of platforms to be capable of use. The whole line of works from the Potomac to the Eastern Branch and thence along its eastern shore to the Potomac again-twenty-eight works -are without garrisons; the small guards placed at them are changed daily (I believe). Of course they have no idea of what is required to keep the armament or earthwork in condition (which indeed is not much a part of their duty), and, as represented to me, perform even their duties as guard very inefficiently. These ungarrisoned works have now 200 guns mounted, for which no ammunition can be supplied until there are garrisons, or at least ordnance sergeants to care for it. (At the present time I am obliged to keep hired men at most of the finished works to look after public property.) I need scarcely say that if circumstances called for the action of these works against an enemy, it would require much time for the Ordnance Department to supply them all with ammunition. I look upon the garrisoning of these works-that is, with artillerymen-as under all circumstances indispensable, and an absolutely necessary preliminary to any offensive operations of the Army. Such offensive operations, if made against distant points, may throw the defense of Washington, against the bulk of the enemy's forces, upon these works (assisted by reserves); or, as at Bull Run, it is in the range of possibilities that a disaster in the field may paralyze our active army, or throw it back disorganized, to rally under protection of these works. Not only that they should fulfill such purposes, but be preserved from dilapidation, requires efficient gar risoning, and some more efficient system of supervision or command than has yet been established. In some cases (as of the works in charge of the Fourteenth Massachusetts and Fourth Connecticut) the commanding officers and subordinates feel pride in preserving their works in perfect order. Such is not always the case, as the use and importance of the works are not appreciated, and where it is not, we may expect to see the timber work and abatis converted into tent floors and fire-wood. The uses and services expected from this enormous work we have made at an expense of a half million of dollars (armament not included) will not be rendered without careful preservation and efficient garrisons; and that these last should be efficient, a number of regular artillery officers of rank are required to visit such work every day, attend to and enforce the drill, and see that the work and armament are properly cared for. Very respectfully, J. G. BARNARD, Adjutant-General THOMAS: WHEELING, January 13, 1862. I transmit the following for the information of the General-in-Chief, whom I have this morning informed of the available force in the department this side of Kanawha Valley: HUTTONSVILLE, January 13. At the four posts of Beverly, Huttonsville, Elk Water, and Cheat Mountain there is about a million dollars' worth of Government property. Rebels know this and on weakness, and, rumor says, are concentrating a large force at Monterey to retaliato the Huttonsville blow. I desire force enough to give me some chance. Can I have them? Plenty of provisions here. R. H. MILROY, General, I wait instructions thereon. W. S. ROSECRANS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, January 14, 1862. To the SECRETARY OF WAR: SIR: I inclose and invite your attention to the accompanying communication from Brigadier General Shields to Major-General McClellan, offering suggestions upon the conduct of the war. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, [Inclosure.] WM. H. SEWARD. WASHINGTON, January 10, 1862. Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army: GENERAL: Profiting by your kind and instructive suggestions the other day, I have taken the liberty of throwing out a few hints in relation to the general mode of prosecuting this war, and respectfully present them for your consideration. The Richmond in the East and Memphis at the West are the two dominating objective points of the Southern Confederacy in this war. possession of these points will break the power of that Confederacy. Every military effort should be directed to the attainment of this object. Every employment of force in Missouri, Western Virginia, or around the coast (except in support of the blockade), which does not directly or indirectly bear upon the capture of these points, is a waste of force. The movement against Richmond is the principal one, and the other must be subordinate to it. Richmond can be reached by some one of the following routes, without encountering very serious military obsta cles: James River, York River, or the Rappahannock. There is doubtless abundant information in the possession of the Department to determine this point with certainty. In the absence of this information I will assume that the route by Yorktown is the most eligible. The capture of Yorktown would be the first important operation of the campaign. With such assistance as the Navy may be able to lend, an army of 20,000 men of all arms, embracing as many regulars as possible, in addition to the force already at Fort Monroe, would make the result certain. In the operations against Yorktown nothing should be left to accident. Nothing in the nature of an assault upon their works ought to be attempted in the first stages of the campaign. The place should be carried by regular and systematic approaches, if only to instruct the men and accustom them to work under fire and work and move and operate together. Six weeks will suffice for the reduction of Yorktown, and six weeks before that place will give the men an amount of steadiness and practical discipline which they cannot get in six months around Washington. The better to insure the success of this movement, the army may be assembled outside of Fort Monroe, and strong |