testimony sought and the books, papers, etc., called for relate to the
matter under investigation, if such matter is one which the Com-
mission is legally entitled to investigate, and if the witness is not ex-
cused by the law on some personal ground from doing what the
Commission requires at his hands. Ib.
4. Power given to Congress to regulate interstate commerce does not
carry with it authority to destroy or impair those fundamental guar-
antees of personal rights that are recognized by the Constitution as
inhering in the freedom of the citizen. Ib.
5. It was open to each of the defendants in this proceeding to contend
before the Circuit Court that he was protected by the Constitution
from making answer to the questions propounded to him or that he
was not bound to produce the books, papers, etc., ordered to be pro-
duced, or that neither the questions propounded nor the books, papers,
etc., called for related to the particular matter under investigation,
nor to any matter which the Commission was entitled under the
Constitution or laws to investigate. This issue being determined in
their favor by the court below, the petition of the Commission could
have been dismissed upon its merits. Ib.
6. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409; United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40;
Todd's Case, 13 How. 52; Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697; In
re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222, examined and distinguished. Ib.
7. The inquiry whether a witness before the Commission is bound to
answer a particular question propounded to him, or to produce books,
papers, etc., in his possession and called for by that body, is one that
cannot be committed to a subordinate administrative or executive
tribunal for final determination. Such a body could not, under our
system of government, and consistently with due process of law, be
invested with authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judg-
ment of fine or imprisonment. Ib.
8. Except in the particular instances enumerated in the Constitution, and
considered in Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, and in Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 190, of the exercise by either house of Con-
gress of its right to punish disorderly behavior upon the part of its
members, and to compel the attendance of witnesses, and the produc-
tion of papers in election and impeachment cases, and in cases that
may involve the existence of those bodies, the power to impose fine
or imprisonment in order to compel the performance of a legal duty
imposed by the United States can only be exerted, under the law
of the land, by a competent judicial tribunal having jurisdiction in
the premises. Ib.
9. A proceeding under the twelfth section of the Interstate Commerce
Act is not merely ancillary and advisory, nor is its object merely to
obtain an opinion of the Circuit Court that would be without opera-
tion upon the rights of the parties. Any judgment rendered will be
a final and indisputable basis of action as between the Commission
and the defendant, and furnish a precedent for similar cases. The
judgment is none the less one of a judicial tribunal dealing with
questions judicial in their nature and presented in the customary
forms of judicial proceedings, because its effect may be to aid an ad-
ministrative or executive body in the perforinance of duties legally
imposed upon it by Congress in execution of a power granted by the
Constitution.
10. The issue made in such a case as this is not one for the determination
of a jury, nor cau any question of contempt arise until the issue of
law in the Circuit Court is determined adversely to the defendants,
and they refuse to obey, not the order of the Commission, but the
final order of the court. In matters of contempt a jury is not re-
quired by due process of law. Ib.
1. This court has no jurisdiction to review by writ of error a judgment of
the highest court of a State, as against a right under the Constitution
of the United States, if the right was not claimed in any form before
judgment in that court. Morrison v. Watson, 111.
2. It is for the Supreme Court of the State of Virginia to construe the
statute of that State which provides that "any person duly authorized
and practising as counsel or attorney at law in any State or Territory
of the United States, or in the District of Columbia, may practise as
such in the courts of this State," and to determine whether the word
"person," as therein used, is confined to males, and whether women
are admitted to practise law in that Commonwealth. In re Lockwood,
Petitioner, 116.
3. When the laws of a State create a tribunal for the correction and
equalization of assessments, and provide that persons feeling aggrieved
by a valuation may apply to such board for its correction, and confer
upon the board power so to do, it is for the Supreme Court of the
State to determine whether the statute remedy is exclusive or whether
it is only cumulative; and its action in that respect raises no Federal
question. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Patterson, 130.
4. Several judgments severally held by different complainants who unite
in the prosecution of a creditor's bill, cannot be added together to
make the amount necessary to give this court appellate jurisdiction.
Hunt v. Bender, 556.
5. No question under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act having been
passed upon by the court below, this court has no jurisdiction over
the judgment of the state court. Davidson v. Starcher, 566.
6. There being no exception to a ruling or to anything which took place
at the trial, there is nothing in the record to be reviewed, and the
judgment below is affirmed. Weed v. Crane, 570.
7. This court will not take jurisdiction over an interlocutory decree.
McCollum v. Howard, 577.
8. To give this court jurisdiction over the judgment of the highest court
of a State, brought here by writ of error, it must appear that some
question under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act was made by the
pleadings, or passed upon by the court. Gray v. Coan, 589.
9. A writ of error to a state court is dismissed because no question was
decided by that court of which this court has jurisdiction under the
25th section of the Judiciary Act. Davidson v. Connelly, 589..
10. Dismissed because the amount in controversy does not give the court
jurisdiction. Jones v. Fritschle, 590.
11. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Allen v. Tarleton, 596.
12. The finding by a state court that the facts on which a party relies to
bring his case within a statute of the United States do not exist is no
decision against the validity of that statute. Crary v. Devlin, 619.
13. Dismissed because the jurisdictional amount is not involved. Bennett
v. Butterworth, 8 How. 124, distinguished. Pittsburgh Locomotive Car
Works v. Keokuk National Bank, 626.
14. Until the record of a judgment in a state court which this court is
called upon to examine discloses the question necessary to give it
jurisdiction, this court cannot proceed. Goodenough Horse-Shoe Manu-
facturing Co. v. Rhode Island Horse-Shoe Co., 635.
15. This court has no jurisdiction over a judgment of a state court when
it does not appear that a Federal question was raised, and that it was
either decided or necessarily involved in the judgment pronounced.
Hagar v. California, 639.
(16. An appeal to this court will not lie from the judgment of a Circuit
Court in a proceeding by a creditor to prove his demand against the
estate of a bankrupt. Ingersoll v. Bourne, 645.
See ADMIRALTY, 2, 3;
JURISDICTION, A, 2, 3.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
1. An action of ejectment was brought in a state court of Alabama, in
which the parties were the same, the lands sought to be recovered were
the same, the issues were the same and the proof was the same as in
this action. That case was taken to the Supreme Court of the State,
and it was there held that, whilst the plaintiffs and those whom they
represented had no legal right to bring an action of ejectment pending
a life estate in the premises, yet, in view of a probate sale of the re-
versionary interest and the recorded title thereto, and of the payment
of the purchase price into the estate and its distribution among the
creditors of the estate, the heirs had an equitable right to commence
a suit to remove the cloud on the title which the probate proceedings
created; and, inasmuch as they had failed to do so during twenty
years, their right of action was barred under the doctrine of prescrip-
tion. The statutes of Alabama provide that two judgments in favor
of the defendant in an action of ejectment, or in an action in the
nature of an action of ejectment, between the same parties, in which
the same title is put in issue, are a bar to any action for the recovery of
the land, or any part thereof, between the same parties or their privies,
founded on the same title. The plaintiffs, availing themselves of this
statute, brought this suit. Held, that, although the judgment of this
court might be, if the question were before it for original considera-
tion, that the bar of the statute would only begin to run upon the
death of the holder of the life estate, yet that, the court of last resort
of the State having passed upon the questions when the bar of the
statute of prescription began to be operative, and when the parties
were obliged to bring their action, whether legal or equitable, those
questions were purely within the province of that court, and this
court was bound to apply and enforce its conclusions. Balkam v.
Woodstock Iron Co., 177.
2. In Illinois, a will probated in Virginia is as available in proof as if pro-
bated in Illinois. Long v. Patton, 573.
District of Columbia. See STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Virginia.
The mandate of this
Court of Claims.
637.
court in this case was fully complied with by the
United States v. Atchison, Topeka &c. Railroad Co.,
A common day laborer in the employ of a railroad company, who, while
working for the company under the order and direction of a section
"boss" or foreman, on a culvert on the line of the company's road, re-
ceives an injury by and through the negligence of the conductor and
of the engineer in moving and operating a passenger train upon the
company's road, is a fellow-servant with such engineer and such con-
ductor, in such a sense as exempts the railroad company from liability
for the injury so inflicted. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Hambly,
349.
See PUBLIC LAND, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
1. The legislature of Iowa had power to authorize the city of Keokuk to
subscribe for and take stock in a railway company, to issue its bonds
therefor and to lay a tax to pay the interest thereon.
kuk, 546; Same v. Lee County, 547.
2. It had also power to give validity to bonds informally issued for such
purpose. lb.
3. A plaintiff who purchases such bonds in the open market is not charge-
able with defects or irregularities in their issue. Ib.
1. The reissue of June 10, 1884, by which the patent of May 8, 1883, to
Joseph T. Dunham, for a combined tag and envelope, with an end
flap covering the side of the envelope, was so enlarged as to include an
envelope with a flap of any size or shape, is void. Dunham v. Dennison
Manufacturing Company, 103.
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