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a force. Yet the importance of preventing the Germans from conquering the road through Serbia to Constantinople surely would have warranted a more vigorous effort. No feature of the Allies' conduct of the war was so bitterly criticised as this miserable compromise between really relieving and heartlessly abandoning Serbia. In this connection it should be noted that Sir Edward Carson and Mr. Winston Churchill in Great Britain (see GREAT BRITAIN) and M. Delcassé in France (see FRANCE) resigned their ministerial posts rather than share in the responsibility of sending a pitifully weak expeditionary force to certain failure in Serbia.

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That the battle of the Vardar ended in defeat and not disaster was due to the willingness of the Franco-British forces, and the inability of the Bulgarians, to cross the Serbo-Greek frontier, violating Greek neutrality. While the Bulgarians stopped short at the frontier, the Allies retreated through Greek territory to the Greek city of Saloniki, which they proceeded forthwith to fortify, in expectation of a Teutonic-Bulgarian attack. The Greek government, as might have been expected, protested against this abuse of her "benevolent neutrality" by the Allies. The Entente Powers, however, replied that their troops had been sent to Saloniki in the first place at the invitation of M. Venizelos to assist Greece in fulfilling the terms of the secret SerboGreek defensive alliance against Bulgaria. This interpretation of the Serbo-Greek alliance was confirmed by M. Venizelos, who exhorted his countrymen not to be false to their ally. King Constantine, on the other hand, held that the treaty contemplated only a local Balkan conflict, and did not bind Greece to sacrifice herself in a general European war. While Hellenic treaty obligations remained in dispute, and neutral observers wondered whether the "benevolent neutrality" of Greece was being stretched or violated, the Allies continued their work of making Saloniki impregnable.

(16) Montenegro and Albania: December.

After Serbia, it was the turn of Montenegro and Albania to suffer invasion. Reënforced by Serbian refugees, the small but resolute Montenegrin army valiantly opposed the Teutonic invasion, but in vain. During December Teutonic columns penetrated Montenegro from the north, from the east, and from the southeast, capturing Plevlie, Ipek, and Djakowa, and threatening to make short work of the little mountain kingdom. The Albanian tribesmen, lacking organization and equipment, offered little resistance, either to the Serbian troops which had been driven across the Albanian frontier, or to the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians who followed. The numbers of the Serbians in Albania were variously estimated from 50,000 to 220,000. Whatever the strength of the Serbian force in Albania may have been, at any rate the Bulgarians experienced little difficulty in penetrating into the heart of the principality from the direction of Ochrida, Struga, and Dibra. (For details regarding the political status and previous condition of Albania, see ALBANIA, History.)

(17) Italy's Achievement: June-December. The plan of Italy's campaign against AustriaHungary has already been indicated in a previous paragraph; the achievement of the Italian army, in the seven months from May 24th to December 31st, remains to be stated. Against the mountainous eastern and central sectors of the Austrian frontier, almost no progress was made. The Italian operations in these regions, conducted under the greatest topographical difficulties, were calculated simply to protect Lombardy from a possible Austrian counter-invasion. Against the Isonzo line the main efforts of the Italian general staff were directed. The northern end of the line was forced early in the

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summer, when the peak of Monte Nero was successfully stormed by Italian infantry. Between Monte Nero and Gorizia, the Isonzo line was pierced near Plava and at Tolmino. South of Gorizia the Isonzo line was likewise crossed in the early summer, and the towns of Monfalcone and Gradisca captured, June 9-10. The Austrian positions around Gorizia, however, defied capture. The frontal attack on Gorizia was halted at the bridgeheads on the Isonzo by the withering fire of advantageously placed Austrian batteries. Enveloping movements from Plava, on the north, and from Gradisca against the Carso Plateau on the south, encountered fierce resistance and were checked with severe losses. Heavy Italian guns rained high-explosive shells on the town of Gorizia and on the Austrian positions on the heights beyond; but apparently

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with no effect. To sum up the Italian achieve ment: Italian territory had been protected from invasion; a few Austrian border towns had been pulverized, and a few towns* of "Italia Irredenta" had been "redeemed"-or laid in ruins; but the main Austrian defensive positions in the Trentino and behind Gorizia repelled every assault. According to an Italian estimate this achievement had cost Italy 45,000 men. Italy's service to her Allies, it may be remarked, was greater than her progress towards the realization of her own national interests: Italy's intervention had stopped one more channel through which supplies could leak into Germany and Austria-Hungary; her fleet had been a welcome addition to the Allies' naval superiority; and her armies had occupied the attention of somewhere between 500,000 and 1,000,000 AustroHungarian soldiers. Throughout the later months of the year, rumors frequently asserted that Italy had sent an expeditionary force to Gallipoli, or to the Dardanelles, or to the Balkans. As far as could be ascertained at the close of the year, however, Italy's only expeditionary force, and that a small one, was sent to occupy Avlona and other points along the coast of Albania.

(18) Failure on Gallipoli: June-December.

One of the keenest disappointments suffered by the Allies in 1915 was the failure of the Dardanelles campaign. By the middle of June, as an earlier paragraph has explained, the main Anglo-French land attack on the tip of Gallipoli Peninsula had apparently subsided into a deadlock. On June 21st slight gains were made on the right of this line, commanding Kereves Dere; a week later the British lines were advanced on the left, in Saghir Dere, and terrific Turkish counter-attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. Battles of this nature, in which a few hundred yards of trenches were gained or lost, continued to be reported at intervals during the autumn and winter, but the main Turk ish position in the tip of the peninsula, Achi Baba Peak, was not even seriously menaced. Despairing of success in this region, Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton decided to exert a powerful effort from the secondary British landing (Anzac Cove). If the hill (971 feet) called Sari Bair, back of Anzac Cove, could be carried by storm, an attack on the northern flank of the Kilid Bahr position might be undertaken with a reasonable probability of success. The great effort was made early in August. While reënforcements were landed north of Sari Bair, at Suvla Bay, the Australasian and Indian troops with reckless gallantry charged up the slopes of the hill. The Gurkhas actually succeeded in reaching the heights on the neck between Chanuk Bahr and "Q" Hill, whence they could look down upon the Dardanelles, but they were compelled to fall back for lack of support. With valor quite equal to that shown by the British colonials, the Turks swept down the slopes, in the face of a murderous artillery and machine-gun fire, to dislodge the British from the footholds which had been gained. On August 10th, at the close of the battle, the British still held some of their gains, but two commanding positions which had been won by daring assaults, had been lost

* Grado, Porto Buso, Monfalcone, Gradisca, Cormon, San Pietro, Plano, Caporetto, Monte Nero, and Plezzo.

again to the Turks, and the great effort had failed. In the Sari Bair region, as in the Achi Baba region, trench-battles continued throughout the rest of the year without decisive result. In the trenches on the tip of the peninsula, the Anglo-French troops were decimated by disease; before Sari Bair the British colonials were maddened with thirst in consequence of unpardonable inefficiency in the management of the water supply. More than one of Sir Ian Hamilton's lieutenants were accused of incompetence. Sir Ian himself was recalled in October, and superseded by Gen. Sir Charles C. Monro. Earl Kitchener was sent to investigate the situation. Withdrawal from the peninsula was openly advised by General Monro, frankly discussed by the press, and postponed, it seemed, only by the unwillingness of the British ministry to admit a disheartening defeat just when a supreme effort was being made to stir up popular enthusiasm for recruiting (see GREAT BRITAIN). Towards the end of December the long-expected step was taken, and the British troops were withdrawn from the Suvla Bay and Anzac regions on the western shore; shortly afterwards, early in January, the trenches on the tip of the peninsula were abandoned, without loss, according to the British report with heavy losses, according to the Turkish statement. The campaign thus brought to an inglorious close had cost the British, up to December 9th 114,555 men, of whom 26,172 were dead. It is significant that the withdrawal was effected immediately after the conclusion of Lord Derby's recruiting campaign in England (see GREAT BritAIN). The most telling criticism of the management of the Dardanelles operations, and at the same time the most vigorous apology for the higher strategy which had dictated the inauguration of the campaign, was given by Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, in his remarkable speech before the House of Commons on November 15th: "It has been proved in this war," he said, "that good troops properly supported by artillery can make a direct advance two or three miles in the face of any defense. The advance, for instance, which took Neuve Chapelle, or Loos, or Souchez, if made on the Gallipoli Peninsula, would have settled the fate of the Turkish army on the promontory, would probably have decided the whole operation, might have determined the attitude of the Balkans, might have cut off Germany from the East, and might have saved Serbia." All through the year, he asserted, he had urged the government to concentrate its offensive efforts on Gallipoli; for in France a costly gain meant only a "nibble," whereas "on the Gallipoli Peninsula, our army has stood all the summer within a few miles of a decisive victory."

(19) The Menace to Egypt.

One of the chief results of the failure of the

Anglo-French campaign at the Dardanelles was to release a Turkish army of at least 200,000 men for active service elsewhere. Since an at

Immediately after the withdrawal of the British colonial troops from the Anzac region of the Gallipoli Peninsula had been accomplished, it was announced that Sir Charles Carmichael Monro had been transferred from the Dardanelles to command the First British Army in France. Lieut.-Gen. Sir Archibald Murray succeeded General Monro in command on Gallipoli, and completed the withdrawal.

tack upon Egypt, menacing an important British possession and threatening England's cherished route through the Suez Canal to India and Australasia, would be one of the most advantageous campaigns in which Turkey's Gallipoli army could be employed, it was not surprising that at the close of the year rumors became frequent that a great Turkish invasion of Egypt was being prepared. In the light of this new situation, the earlier Turkish attack on the Suez Canal assumed new significance and interest. The difficulties of military operations against the Suez Canal were enormous. The attacking forces must drag their artillery and carry their pontoons more than a hundred miles through the desert of the Sinai Peninsula. At the end of their arduous journey, the Turks would find the canal watchfully guarded by warships and by a considerable force of British colonial and Egyptian troops. It was therefore an unpromising and a hazardous mission which Djemal Pasha undertook in the opening months of 1915. During January, 1915, the Turkish commander's army, variously estimated at from 25,000 to 65,000 men, accomplished the difficult feat of crossing the Sinai Peninsula. Advanced guards of the Turkish army were encountered and driven back by the British defenders of the canal as early as January 25th. The main Turkish columns, however, did not come up until a week later. While feint attacks were delivered, February 2nd, against El Kantara and Ismailia, the strongest column of Djemal Pasha's army was directed against the section of the canal between Tussum and Serapeum, south of Ismailia. During the night of February 2-3, the Turks dragged their pontoons and rafts to the water's edge and began to construct a pontoon bridge across the canal. They were discovered by the British troops on the western embankment, and about 3 A. M. the battle began in earnest. Under the murderous fire of the British Maxims, the Turks attempted to cross the canal in boats or rafts. One boatload actually succeeded in reaching the western bank, and attacked the British from the rear. Six batteries of field artillery were brought up by the Turks during the course of the morning of February 3rd. The British defenders, however, with the aid of torpedoboats and gunboats, frustrated the attempt to bridge the canal and in the middle of the afternoon the Turks turned and fled, leaving 500 men killed and 600 prisoners. The main Turkish force, however, made good its retreat. A month and a half later, a body of Turkish troops, about 1000 strong, was encountered near Suez and driven back towards Nakhl. With this skirmish, the first Turkish attack on Egypt may be said to have ended. Djemal Pasha's force had been too small, and the expedition had been too feebly equipped, to constitute a serious menace to the canal; at the close of the year 1915, how ever, the Turks had available a larger army than Djemal Pasha's; they were receiving munitions from Germany by way of conquered Serbia; and German engineers might expedite the crossing of the Sinai Peninsula by constructing military railways through the desert. Whether under these more favorable circumstances Enver Pasha would again send a Turkish army to invade Egypt remained one of the most interesting questions for the year 1916 to answer.

The Suez Canal route to India was menaced from yet another direction by Arab assaults

upon the British fortress of Aden, at the southern gateway to the Red Sea. Late in December the British India Office published the following statement regarding this attack: "The statement that the Turks have had far-reaching military successes at Aden is a complete misapprehension. In July last the Turks, having occupied Lahej, advanced to Sheikh Othman, in the neighborhood of Aden, and looted it. They were, however, driven out, and withdrew inland and have not ventured to advance again on the fortress of Aden. Such skirmishes as there have been during the last three months resulted favorably to us; but there has been no material change in the situation during that period. . . . So far as the security of the Suez Canal route to India is concerned, the present situation at Aden may be left out of account." Egypt, it should be mentioned, was attacked from the west in December by comparatively small bodies of Senussi tribesmen from the Libyan frontier.

(20) The British in Mesopotamia.

Before Enver Pasha, the ambitious Turkish minister of war, undertook a new offensive campaign against Egypt, it seemed probable that he would send reënforcements to the Turkish troops resisting British and Russian aggression in Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Persia. Up to the end of 1915 the campaigns in these regions were of distinctly secondary importance. The force originally sent by the British from India to Shatel-Arab (at the head of the Persian Gulf) included only three Indian regiments and had, as far as could be discerned at the time, no other important object than the protection of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's pipe-line, near Basra. The Turkish garrison of Basra, advancing to repel the British, was crushingly defeated, Nov. 17, 1914, and Basra was occupied by the British. The British then advanced to Kurna, at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The Turkish forces in Mesopotamia, however, would not permit the British to remain at rest in the entrenched camp at Kurna. In April, 1915, the British were compelled to meet the Turks in a pitched battle at Shaiba; according to British reports the Turks left 6000 of their men on the field, besides valuable supplies, machine-guns, automobiles, and ammunition. At the end of May the British, again assailed, pursued a Turkish force up the Tigris to Amara (75 miles north of Kurna). Flushed with success, the British were drawn further and further northward, until on September 28th Maj.-Gen. C. V. F. Townshend defeated the Turks before Kut-el-Amara and occupied the city the following day. With insignificant forces the British had penetrated more than 200 miles into Mesopotamia (346 miles by water). Bagdad, only 100 miles further up the Tigris (227 following the course of the river), lured the invaders on.

Gen. Sir John Nixon, the commander in charge of the expedition, sent Major-General Townshend on to Bagdad. On November 22nd Major-General Townshend attacked and carried the Turkish defensive positions at Ctesiphon, only 18 miles from Bagdad. Then the tide turned. Townshend, overwhelmed by superior numbers, was defeated with a loss of 4500 out of 20,000 men and driven back to Kut-el-Amara, which was promptly surrounded and invested. A relief expedition, led by General Aylmer, failed

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