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500.A15 a 1/406 Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, July 11, 1927-6 p. m.
[Received July 11-9:05 a. m.]

100. The Minister for Foreign Affairs called me into conference today and asked me to transmit to Washington his earnest desire for a successful result of Geneva Conference and his strong feeling that the situation had reached the stage where the action of the delegates should be guided more by political considerations and less by technical ideas. He was afraid that the present outlook was more in the direction of expansion of armament than limitation and if the Conference resulted in any such agreement he knew that the people of Japan would not approve it and he believed it would not be approved by the people either of the United States or Great Britain. He said the people of Japan were strongly in favor of limitation of naval armament, both because of their desire for peaceful relations with the United States and other nations and also for economic reasons, as they desired to limit their own expenditure on naval armaments as far as consistent with safety. The Minister for Foreign Affairs therefore begged me to ask the good offices of my Government in assisting the Japanese in bringing about some agreement which will not call for material increases in naval armaments. I stated that I would transmit his views to my Government but would be glad to know whether the most effective means for bringing about the desired result would not be to persuade the British to act in the same direction and he agreed that this was so and thought that this possibly could be done by a common attitude on the part of the United States and Japan.

At the close of the conference he reiterated his desire that I should impress upon my Government his feeling that this matter should now be taken up from a political standpoint rather than a technical naval standpoint.

MACVEAGH

500.A15 a 1/413: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

GENEVA, July 11, 1927-11 p. m.
[Received July 12-12:37 p. m.]

81. After postponement of plenary session I called this morning on Viscount Ishii to discuss several matters. Among others I urged him to indicate clearly both to us and to British how far the British would have to come down to reach a level which would afford a

profitable basis of discussion to Japanese. Ishii stated that he had this morning informed Bridgeman in definite terms that the Japanese were practically rigid on figure of 450,000 tons for cruisers and destroyers combined for United States and Great Britain. Ishii said that Japanese delegation felt very strongly on subject; they were quite willing at present moment to return home without an agreement, if necessary, but that they were not willing to conclude agreement which would call for program of naval expansion.

Bridgeman called on me after lunch in a much more conciliatory mood than he has shown heretofore. He said that he felt a plenary session on Thursday was needed in order to state British position as he was under serious home criticism on account of the general misrepresentation of the British attitude abroad. Bridgeman assured me that he would confine himself to statement of British case and would take no action which could be considered provocative. He would ask no questions or he might ask certain general questions which would not be embarrassing and which I could answer or not as I chose. I said that I thought this was the preferable way when we were endeavoring to arrive at a working agreement, but that if he set pace I was quite ready for plain talking. I told him that I thought it was regrettable that we should consume both our time and energy in trying to find a common British-American basis of agreement if, after we reached it, it was not acceptable to the Japanese, and that we ought to have clearly understood what levels would prove acceptable to the Japanese; once there was agreement between British and Japanese on tonnage levels it would probably not be difficult for us to make agreement complete. Bridgeman replied that Anglo-Japanese agreement would present no difficulty as the Japanese would come up to the British figures, only they would demand a quid pro quo and he had not yet been able to ascertain from them what it would be. I said that Viscount Ishii had stressed fact that Japanese would rather have no agreement than to revise materially their figures but Bridgeman said he did not regard that seriously.

Later on in day Saburi of the Japanese delegation came to see me. I asked him if his delegation had fully impressed on the British the fact that Japanese were in earnest about their tonnage levels figures. Saburi said that they had, and he repeated that the Japanese would rather go home without an agreement than materially to revise these figures upward. He then added significant remark that if our delegation could reach agreement with British on high tonnage level and cared to conclude a treaty with them, no objection would be offered by Japan but that she should not care to become a party to such a treaty.

Delegation feels that our efforts now should be directed to concentrating attention on need for finding common ground for agree

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ment between Japanese and British, and emphasizing consistently our preference for Japanese levels. Unless the two extreme positions can be reconciled, and until they are reconciled, British-American negotiation is fruitless. At present our delegation proposes to make a British-Japanese agreement our objective, and we feel that you may wish to impress on both the other parties to this Conference the necessity for their finding common ground for discussion. A copy of this telegram has been sent by mail to London.

500.A15 a 1/418: Telegram

GIBSON

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary

of State

[Paraphrase]

GENEVA, July 12, 1927—10 a. m.
[Received July 13-1:55 a. m.]

84. Your No. 41, July 11, 6 p. m. The Wythe Williams article was founded on pure conjecture as we had no intention of referring to question of overtonnage of capital ships in plenary session or anywhere else. As far as I am aware we have no mass of documents on subject of capital ship tonnage, though the British themselves circulated a confidential document containing figures. Correspondents have discussed the figures referred to from time Conference began. I now learn that they were published last January in Gallic American by William Baldwin Shearer. I am able to say that the members of the American delegation have been most scrupulous in not revealing confidential information to press and in refusing to discuss committee proceedings or proposals of other delegations.

Only statements that either Admiral Jones or I have made which could bear in any way on this subject have been to effect that signatories of treaty of Washington have scrupulously observed its provisions.

500.A15 a 1/414a: Telegram

GIBSON

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation

(Gibson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1927-noon.

42. The press in this country has several times reported from English sources statements similar to that which appeared Sunday, July 10, in New York Times, as follows: 59

59 Quoted passage not paraphrased.

"According to the reports received here (i. e. London) the official American experts at Geneva have been strongly reinforced by unofficial representatives of great concerns whose probable interests lie in the direction of contracts for steel plants and other indispensable concomitants of a big navy. Much of the pugnacious spirit in which reports to the American press from Geneva have been conceived is attributed here to the activities of these unofficial propagandists." Does statement that representatives of steel plants or manufacturing concerns are in Geneva or are interfering in any way with deliberations contain any truth?

The New York Times also has an editorial based on British information that the United States, Great Britain, and Japan would have been saved $750,000,000 through British extension of age limit alone, and that reduction on the size of cruisers would have been a great saving. The first statement is, of course, absurd, and second is wholly inaccurate unless total tonnage is reduced; cost of building small cruisers is more proportionately than to build large ones, and they cost more to maintain. These points should be borne in mind in event of statements at plenary session or at any other time, in your judgment, when press statements are given out.

KELLOGG

500.A15 a 1/414: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) to the Secretary

of State

LONDON, July 12, 1927-noon.

[Received 1:24 p. m.]

162. My 158, July 9, 10 a. m. Chamberlain asked me to meet him last night at the House of Commons. He told me he had conferred with Baldwin, Balfour and Beatty 60 yesterday morning and again late yesterday afternoon. Their reports from Geneva he said were not complete but he thought a reasonable hope of agreement still existed.

Chamberlain then went on to explain the differences as he saw them between the British and American demands and concluded by saying that there seemed to be almost insuperable difficulties in a three-power negotiation in getting an agreement on a ratio of total tonnage based on the theoretical needs of each. As an effort to surmount this difficulty his Government offered the following suggestion:

"Instead of endeavoring to fix maximum overhead tonnage for all time, based on theoretical needs and embracing far larger construction than any of powers now had in contemplation, solution should

Admiral of the Fleet David Beatty, Earl Beatty of the North Sea and of Brooksby.

be sought on lines of an agreement as to total in each class beyond which each party would not go up to 1936, to wit, date of expiration of Washington treaty at which time whole subject must again be considered. If the United States Government approve this suggestion and will issue [instructions to] Mr. Gibson to seek solution on these lines British Government will send similar instructions to Mr. Bridgeman." [Paraphrase]

Chamberlain made certain significant statements during the conversation above-mentioned:

(1) That the American delegates in the Conference had not yet stated that, owing to lack of naval stations, American ships needed a larger cruising radius, and that therefore 10,000-ton cruisers were

necessary.

(2) That if we were willing to limit our own total to twelve 10,000-ton cruisers during this period Great Britain, although she now has twelve such cruisers in addition to two building and one laid down, is willing to scrap those now being constructed and to limit. herself to the same number as the United States.

(3) That the British Government will ask a short adjournment of the Conference and order Bridgeman home for consultation if agreement cannot be reached along the lines suggested above.

(4) That should you request it, Chamberlain is willing to meet you in Geneva in case of absolute need.

In transmitting the above I desire to offer no comment except that, in my opinion, the British Government will endeavor to reach a compromise since it is now keenly aware of the importance of public sentiment developing abroad and at home.

This telegram has been sent to Geneva for the information of our delegation.

HOUGHTON

500.A15 a 1/415: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation, (Gibson) to the Secretary

of State

GENEVA, July 12, 1927-8 p. m.
[Received July 13-1:45 a. m.]

82. With a view to exploring every phase of cruiser difficulty from political as well as from technical angle there has been set up by agreement between the chief delegates an [omission] group to examine the question untrammeled by instructions from the chief delegates.62 This committee composed of Dulles and Smyth for us, Campbell and

The mixed committee, a small committee composed of one naval officer and one civilian from each delegation.

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