years. Mr Pitt had no mind indeed to throw away so great an appointment upon any of the class in question. In common with Lord Shelbourne, he thought of Lord Cornwallis at first for the command in chief, and afterwards for the chief direction of civil affairs likewise. Without any of the political talents of his grandfather, who had been First Minister of George I., or the energy of character that gave promise of his retrieving the disaster which had virtually brought the American war to an end, Lord Cornwallis occupied a position in public life which no Minister was likely to overlook. With good manners, good connections, and good fortune, his friendship was sought by men of all parties; and enemies he had none. Left to himself, he would probably have sauntered happily and unnoticeably along the down-hill steep of life, grumbling occasionally in the House of Lords at what he did not approve, but never engaging deeply in party plots, or aspiring to lead a parliamentary campaign. What he wanted was to be made. Constable of the Tower, and he betrayed some vexation at being passed over for that sinecure post; but it was certainly not with any view to get rid of him as a troublesome critic. or a dangerous opponent that the Ministry in 1786 pressed upon him the government of India. He was thought eligible, as an amiable and respectable man, who might be relied on to keep peculation in check, and to curb the violent courses which had brought the administration of his predecessor into question. Not without hesitation he agreed at length to go; little foreseeing probably how lastingly his name would be written on the financial and territorial records of Hindustan. He sailed for the East in the latter end of April 1786, and arrived in Madras the following August. His first letters home express his strong dissatisfaction at the part 1 already taken by the Madras Government in aiding the Mahrattas to violate the treaty with Tippoo Sultan. He denounced also the incapacity and peculation of the Company's servants in no measured terms. In one letter he writes: "You will see in the letters from the Board previous to my arrival, a plan for obtaining Allahabad from the Vizier, to which he had spirit enough to make a successful resistance. Unless I see some new lights, I shall not revive it. I at present think the advantages of our possessing that post very doubtful, and I am sure it was intended as a scene of gross peculation, at the expense of the Vizier and his Government." Complaints of interference and maladministration poured in from all sides. Among the most prominent were those of Mobaruck-ulDowla, the Nawab of Bengal, who, having succeeded to the musnud during his minority in 1770, was now come of age: and who repudiated alike the control of his former guardians, and the retention by the Company of the greater part of the income guaranteed to him by treaty on his accession. was then fixed at thirty-two lacs a year; but in 1772, Warren Hastings, acting on instructions from Leadenhall Street, reduced the amount one-half, on the plea that sixteen lacs was sufficient during the Prince's minority. The rightful sum, however, was not restored, as was expected, while he had still to pay the whole staff of Company's officers, as part of the establishment originally imposed upon him. In a letter to the Court of Directors soon after his arrival, the new Viceroy wrote, that "from all he had already heard, he thought it highly probable that it would appear to be decent in the Government to abstain from much of the interference that had hitherto been used in the detail of the business of that household, and which had been 1 Confidential letter to Right Hon. Henry Dundas, Nov. 15, 1786. It attended with great expense to the Nawab.1 Through his agent in London, the Soubahdar had formally complained to the Directors of the injustice with which he was treated, and they instructed the Governor-General in a secret despatch to "take care to provide for his support and dignity, by securing to him the clear and undiminished receipt of the real stipend allotted to him, or even by its immediate augmentation;" adding, "You will always keep in view the claims he has upon us by treaty, and necessity will dictate to you a due consideration for the present state of our affairs." On the plea, however, that dependants on the native Court would be chiefly benefited, were the whole of his income restored to him, Lord Cornwallis advised that the Company should still retain half of it for themselves. In his judgment, it was only a question between whether so many lacs a year should be spent in luxury in London or in luxury at Moorshedabad. His sympathies were with the former.3 The peace concluded at Mangalore lasted six years. Tippoo in that interval reduced to subjection several of the minor states in his neighbourhood, and built or purchased several armed vessels, which helped to spread the terror of his name along the coast of Malabar. Fanaticism was with him an impulse even stronger than ambition, and his assumption of the title of Sultan was supposed to be preparatory to that of Prophet. He persuaded himself that he had a mission to clear the land of idolatry; he compelled multitudes to conform to his faith, and to behold their temples levelled with the dust. He boasted that he had destroyed 8000 shrines, and distributed 100,000 unwilling converts among his 1 The Cornwallis Correspondence, edited by Charles Ross, vol. i. p. 235. 3 See despatch, 4th March 1787. garrisons. He bore, in fact, a strong resemblance to Philip II. of Spain. They had both been educated for empire, and both possessed considerable talents, natural or acquired. Both were brave, industrious, and sagacious, and both sustained with signal constancy the ills of fortune. But both also were, perhaps from the very fact of their having been bred in the expectancy of vast dominion, far inferior to their predecessors. With less experience and original resources, they were equally despotic and exacting, more self-willed and obstinate, less fit to turn victory to account, and less versatile in retrieving the losses of defeat. Both were cruel from suspicion and resentment, both were bigoted to the faith in which they had been reared, and both sacrificed to their superstitious zeal the affection of their subjects and the security of their dominions. While history, therefore, dwells upon the memory of neither with respect or pity, fidelity to truth requires that their misdeeds should be weighed in the same balance of justice as that wherein the faults of their adversaries are measured; and if circumstances are to be allowed to aggravate or mitigate reproach, history's duty is to mete out carefully the blame which is due. It is necessary to remind those who really desire to know the truth how distrustfully we are bound to read all that is written in apology or eulogy of triumphant aggression ? The beaten are always worthless, the victors always great and good; a thousand influences of selfishness or sympathy, consciously or unconsciously, combine to tinge the narrative of victory; but where are the annals of the conquered? who shall bring garlands to the nameless grave? Of Tippoo Saib we may not err widely if we content ourselves with saying, that from all we have been enabled to glean from out the unfruitful stubble-field of military memoir, we infer that he was not much worse than other men who have been placed in similar situations elsewhere. His indifference to human life was probably about the same as that of Louis le Grand or Nicholas I., of Alba, Strafford, or Radetzky. His reluctance to employ any one holding religious opinions different from his own was probably as intolerant and oppressive as that of the most Christian Ferdinand VII., or the most religious and gracious George III.1 Towards the close of 1789 an incident occurred which led to what is called the third war with Mysore. Two forts belonging to the Dutch stood at the mouth of an estuary near the frontier lines of Travancore, and being threatened by Tippoo, their commandant, under the terms of a subsisting treaty, called on the Rajah to aid in defending them, or, if he would not, to become their purchaser. Against this Tippoo protested. The Dutch had no right, as he averred, to alienate a possession for which they paid tribute to the Rajah of Cochin, who in turn owed him fealty. The facts were disputed, and he proceeded to force the lines, whence he was repulsed with serious loss. Mr Holland, then acting President of Madras, proposed to send commissioners to inquire and negotiate. The Sultan did not forbid their coming, but said he had investigated the matter already, and he was confident as to the ground of his pretensions. Not long afterwards General Meadows became Governor, and instead of negotiating, prepared to interpose by arms. Tippoo wrote congratulating the General on his accession to the Government, and deprecating a rupture. 'Notwithstanding the bonds of friendship were firmly established, in consequence of the representations, contrary to the fact, of certain shortsighted persons to the Governor, they 1 Munro sneers at the bigotry of Tippoo in not employing any but Mohammedans in posts of confidence; somewhat absurd this from an officer in an army where none but those of the orthodox sects of Christians were then eligible to hold command. |