Miss Eulberg is an Iowa girl. She had a mis- | learned judge said it was a bad case, but no doubt understanding with a neighbor's dog. In the the prisoner was tempted by the fatal facilities course of it she not only spoke severely to the given him by persons who had relied upon him. dog, but threw sticks and stones at him. A few❘ He doubted whether he ought not to send him to months later the dog lay in wait for her and bit penal servitude, but would not take that course. her. She sued the dog's owner, a Mr. Van Berger, for damages and got a verdict. The Iowa Supreme Court sustains it. "A dog," says the justices, has no right to brood over his wrongs Republic fought against the queen, says the Law and remember in malice." - Hartford Courant. Following the established custom of electing their president one year from the country and the next year from Chicago, the Illinois Bar Association has elected as president Judge Jesse Holdom, of Chicago, to succeed Judge Benson Wood, of Effingham. The new president is of English birth, but has lived in Chicago since boyhood. His early education was obtained in the London schools and his legal training in a Chicago law office. He has long stood among the leaders of the Chicago bar, and two years ago was elected as a judge of the Superior Court. He is a prominent member of the Hamilton and Union League Clubs. Law Register. Wm. The Law Journal has been investigating the Nashville College of Law, and has obtained reliable information which justifies it in denouncing that institution as a fraud pure and simple. Farr, president of the institution, who flourishes LL. D. after his name, is a man of very shady reputation. He was at one time connected with an institution at Chattanooga, Tenn., that sold diplomas. The Bar Association of Nashville is considering the advisability of taking some action with regard to the college that will exonerate the name of that city from any responsibility for the presence there of the fraudulent concern. The Law Journal has been imposed upon to the extent of advertising for the so-called college, but upon learning the true facts of the case canceled the contract and discontinued the advertisement. Detroit Law Journal. English Notes. use At the Hertford Assizes Charles Bullock, solicitor, of Great Berkhampstead, pleaded guilty to several charges of converting to his own money entrusted to him for investment by clients, and was sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. On behalf of the treasury it was said the total sum received by prisoner as trustee was £28,000, all of which had been appropriated by him. Most of it had gone in financing certain building speculations. Mr. Grubb made an urgent appeal on behalf of the prisoner, who had not used any of the money for his own benefit, and had handed everything over to the trustees. He had a wife and a large family depending upon him. The A curious question arises as to the law under which those British subjects are punishable who have in the territory of the late South African Journal. The Roman-Dutch law of treason current in the Cape and Natal does not apply to acts by British subjects outside these territories. The Roman-Dutch law of treason in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal is substantially the same as in British South Africa, but of course the British subjects who have aided the republics against the crown have earned praise and not penalties under the republican law. The rebels are not subject to military law, nor within the provisions of the Army Act (section 41) which allow the trial of common-law crimes by courtsmartial in certain cases. The result seems to be that at present the cases of treason to which we refer are triable only in England under 35 Hen. VIII, c. 2, and 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. II. But if prosecutions are proposed, we assume that the crown can by a prerogative order in council establish a competent court of justice to try British subjects in respect of crimes against English law already cognizable here. The death of Mrs. Gladstone, the widow of the Did not the learned Glynne and Maynard Here's a marriage notice with comment that appeared in a North Dakota paper: Married at Flintstone, by Rev. M. Windstone, Nehemiah Whitestone and Wilhelmina Sandstone, both of Limestone. This is getting mighty "rocky," and there's bound to be a "blasting" of these stony hearts before many "pebbles" appear on the connubial beach. The grindstone of domestic. infelicity will sharpen the ax of jealousy and discord, and sooner or later one or the other of this pair will rest beneath a tombstone. Then look out for brimstone. Judge Wright once reminded Judge Underwood in a courteous way that justice was represented as being blind and holding the scales of justice evenly balanced in her hand. "Yes," said Underwood, and I have long thought that the representation was a mistake in the designer, for how is it possible for her to tell whether the scales are evenly balanced without she raises the bandage a little? And there is another mistake that the lawyers make. You misconstrue the old maxim that a man shall be tried by his peers, and so whenever you have a guilty scoundrel to defend, you try to get one or more guilty scoundrels on the jury. That is not what the Magna Charta meant by peers." - Exchange. New Books and New Editions. Rouech's Manual of the Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Notaries Public, Under the Common Law as Modified by the Statutes of Michigan. By August E. Rouech. The Richmond & Backus Co., Detroit, Mich. 1900. This excellent little work of some 200 pages is, as its title indicates, intended for the instruction and guidance of those public officials who are by law authorized to attest signatures in deeds, contracts, affidavits, declarations, etc., note and protest bills of exchange, draw up protests, administer oaths, etc. It consists of nearly one hundred pages of carefully prepared matter under appropriate heads and nearly an equal number of pages devoted to useful and accurately prepared forms, with instructions as to their use, besides the forms of certificates of acknowledgment used in the sev eral States and territories. The book is adapted for use in other States as well as Michigan, as the common law is given in most cases, and the principal part of the book relative to affidavits and commercial papers is governed almost entirely by the common law. It has been prepared with evident care and thoroughness and cannot fail to prove in the highest degree useful to officials of the class to which it relates. Historical Jurisprudence. An Introduction to the Systematic Study of the Development of Law. By Guy Carleton Lee, Ph. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1900. The recent awakening of interest in scientific legal study, in which important field this country has been woefully backward, has stimulated the author to publish the results of his researches which he has carried over a number of years. · Historical jurisprudence," says the author, “has been developed in the Old World. In university and in study, during a score of centuries, the ablest thinkers have given of their best effort to perfect the science, until it has achieved an importance not excelled by that of theology. In the New World the northern continent has been surpassed by the southern in this science. In South America the study of jurisprudence early found an honored place. In the United States the rush and tumult of material progress have caused the philosophical to recoil before the impact of the ultra-practical. Scientific prudence has been a thing unknown to the majority, not even being considered a necessary background for the comprehension of law. The inevitable reaction has lately occurred." This book is intended as a help in the systematic study of the history of law. Primarily written for lawyers and teachers, it also appeals to laymen, for jurisprudence has been a mighty factor in the development of civilization. The subject is treated under three headings: The Foundations of Law, The Development of Jurisprudence and The Beginnings of Modern Jurisprudence. The purpose of the volume, as declared by the author in his preface, is to prove a helpful guide to the systematic study of law, an aid to the teacher of jurisprudence who seeks a basis for his expositions, or a means of conveying information to the general reader. From such examination as we have been able to give to the volume, we are confident it will prove highly useful and valuable. Few men in the United States are better fitted by education, temperament or ability to perform the task which Prof. Lee has so well done. In the historical department of Johns Hopkins University he has accomplished much in bringing the study of scientific jurisprudence to that place to which it is entitled, and the present work will stand as a monument to his industry, research and culture. The Albany Law Journal. A Weekly Record of the Law and the Lawyers. Published by THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY, Albany, N. Y. Contributions, items of news about courts, judges and lawyers' queries or comments, criticisms on various law questions, addresses on legal topics, or discussions on questions of timely interest are solicited from members of the bar and those interested in legal proceedings. [All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] It is well to call notice to the expiration of Judge Patterson's term now and to the duty of re-electing him in November. It should be a point of honor with the members of the bar unanimously to favor his renomination. The managers of politics will do right to realize that the bar sentiment for Judge Patterson's re-election should be respected without regard to partisan considerations which, fairly enough, affect and determine choices for partisan offices. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial District has had no judge more faithful, more respected and better regarded, for reasons of character and of capacity, than Subscription price, Five Dollars per annum in advance. Single Judge Patterson. His reappointment would, of number Twenty-Five Cents. A ALBANY, AUGUST 11, 1900. Current Topics. MONG those members of the judiciary of this State whose terms of office will expire with the present year is Judge Edward Patterson, of the Supreme Court in New York county, and of the Appellate Division in the First Judicial District. This thoroughly equipped lawyer, upright and faithful judge and exemplary citizen has, as is well known to the profession and the public, served the people for the term of fourteen years, not merely acceptably, but with distinguished honor. He has, through his uprightness, impartiality, earnest and devoted attention to his high duties and rare ability in the determination of causes, won the respect and affection of the bench and of the bar, the confidence of suitors and the esteem and regard of the people. It has been well and truly said that "a good lawyer is likely to make a good judge. A good judge reelected is certain to make a better judge and certain on the bench to give better public service and greater satisfaction than any judicial novice can be expected to do." Speaking of the expiration of Judge Patterson's term and the desirability of his re-election, the Brooklyn Eagle says: The Eagle knows of no reason why the Democracy and the Republicans, too, for the matter of that, should not re-elect Judge Edward Patterson in New York county. There are many reasons why they should, but they suggest themselves from what has been already set forth. VOL. 62-No. 6. | course, follow from his re-election. The desirability of continuing the personnel of that high tribunal unimpaired needs no argument. The Eagle takes the liberty of suggesting to its Manhattan contemporaries the privilege and the obligation they have of urging the re-election of Judge Patterson to a position which he strengthens and adorns. Every word of this the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL heartily indorses. There should be no question of partisanship in such an important matter as the re-election of a faithful and upright judge such as Edward Patterson has proved himself by long and arduous service. Such jurists as he are not found every day, even among the members of a bar as rich in judicial material as the bar of the city of New York. There is another suggestion which we deem it entirely proper to make in this connection. Aside from Judge Patterson's proved and tested qualifications for the high office he has so long adorned, it should be remembered that he has given fourteen of the best years of his life to the public service, and for a monetary compensation very much less than he could have commanded in the practice of his profession, had he chosen to continue therein. While this is true, indisputably, the many years he has spent on the bench find him now not only abler, riper in judgment and more thoroughly equipped than ever, but in the prime of his powers. His re-election should be, and we have no doubt will be, put beyond the peradventure of a doubt. Justice Davy, of Rochester, of the Supreme Court, has handed down a decision to the effect that an action for damages will lie when the right of privacy, so-called, is vio- | person cannot recover damages for mental lated. The decision was rendered in the case anguish alone, and that he can recover such damages only when he is entitled to recover some of Miss Abigail Roberson, of Rochester, damages upon some other ground. It will genagainst the Rochester Folding Box Com-erally be found, however, that they are speaking pany and the Franklin Mills Company, and the question at issue was whether a company or individual possessed the right to use a picture or photograph of a private person for advertising purposes without consent. The facts appear to be that some months ago the defendants printed 25,000 lithographs advertising a brand of flour, and used a picture of the plaintiff as part of the lithograph. The picture is a profile and the likeness is said to be unmistakable. The advertisements were distributed all over the country to the annoyance of the plaintiff, who, through her attorney, Milton E. Gibbs, began the action to restrain the defendants from using her portrait and also demanding $15,000 damages. A demurrer was entered to the complaint and argued before Justice Davy on June 24th. Justice Davy in his decision sets aside this demurrer. In the course of his opinion Justice Davy says: The principal question in this case is whether the defendants have the right to print and circulate lithograph copies of plaintiff's likeness for the purpose of profit and gain to themselves without her approval and consent. The defendants contend that she is powerless to preevnt it. That there is no law that can restrain them from doing the act complained of. The substance of this contention is that the feelings of the plaintiff may be outraged with impunity by any person who may desire to circulate her likeness as an advertising scheme, and there is no power in the courts to protect her. If such were a fact, it would certainly be a blot upon our boasted system of jurisprudence, that the courts were powerless to prevent the doing of a wrongful act which would wound in the most cruel manner the feelings of a sensitive person. The infliction of mental pain and distress by the wrongful or unauthorized act of another gives a cause of action in many cases, such as libel and slander, and in all actions of tort where the wrongful act of another causes an injury, a recovery is allowed for mental pain and distress and disgrace caused by such wrongful act. So also in an action for breach of contract of marriage, the law recognizes that the infliction of such distress and disgrace caused by the wrongful act of another is ground for a recovery against the wrongdoer. I am aware that many of the text writers say that a of cases of personal injury. If injury to the feelings be an element of actual damages in slander, libel and breach of promise cases it would seem that it should equally be so considered in cases of this character. It has been remarked by a learned author that the mind is no less a part of the person than the body, and the sufferings of the former are sometimes more acute and lasting than those of the latter. The theory of the case which calls for equitable relief is not that of mere protection to wounded feelings, but the protection of plaintiff's right of privacy and the right of property in her own likeness. There may be a distinction, however, between private and public characters, as pointed out by Lord Cuttingham in Prince Albert v. Strange (1 Macn. & G. 25). The moment one voluntarily places himself before the public, either in accepting public office or in becoming a candidate for office, or as an artist or literary man, he surrenders his right to privacy and cannot complain of any fair or reasonable description or portraiture of himself. It does not appear from the complaint in this action that the plaintiff is within the category of what might be denominated a public character. She is undoubtedly a young woman of rare beauty, and this she enjoys as a private citizen. It is very natural, if the plaintiff is of a modest and retiring nature, that any such publicity would be extremely disagreeable and offensive to her. It is not impossible, therefore, that she has suffered and continues to suffer great mental injury and distress. In other words, there is plausible ground for the existence of the distress and injury alleged in her complaint. It cannot be said that it is a pure fabrication or fancy. The act is such that every person can readily see might cause, and probably did cause, mental distress and injury to her nervous system. Take any modest and refined young woman, possessed of more than ordinary beauty and intelligence, situate in like circumstances as the plaintiff; she might naturally be extremely shocked and wounded in seeing a lithographic likeness of herself posted in public places as an advertisement of some enterprising business firm. To permit every person to use a lithographic likeness of the plaintiff to advertise their business, and yet say there is no power in the courts to prevent it, would be asserting a proposition at war with the principles of justice and equity and in violation of the sacred right of privacy. Every personal interest which she possesses must be regarded as private, especially when the public has acquired no right in them. Privacy is regarded as a product of civilization. It was unsought and unknown among the barbarous tribes. It implies an improved and progressive condition of the people in cultivated manners and customs with well-defined and respected domestic relations. The privacy of the home in every civilized country is regarded as sacred, and when it is inavded it tends to destroy domestic and individual happiness. It seems to me, therefore, that the extension and development of the law so as to protect the right of privacy should keep abreast with the advancement of civilization. When private and domestic life is invaded, which brings pain and distress of mind and destroys the pleasure and happiness of domestic life, the courts ought to have the power to protect the individual from such an invasion. For years there has existed in the public mind a feeling that the law was too lax in affording some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons, and this invasion of privacy has been keenly felt by the public. It may be asked how does the circulation of these lithographic advertisements affect the plaintiff in her right of privacy. It is evident that the acts of the defendants in printing and posting her likeness in public places as an advertisement to sell their flour invites public criticism and brings her name into more or less unenviable notoriety, and, to a certain extent, inflicts injury to her reputation and feelings, especially if she desires a life of privacy, which she has a right to enjoy. If her lithographic likeness, owing to its beauty, is of great value as a trade-mark or an advertising medium, it is a property right which belongs to her and cannot be taken from her without her consent. She has a right to say that without her consent these lithographic copies of her likeness shall not be circulated or used by the defendants. In conclusion Justice Davy says: After a careful consideration of the novel and interesting questions raised on the demurrer, I have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded in her complaint, and to refuse her that relief would be to admit that a wrong has been committed which causes her severe mental pain and distress and pecuniary injury, and yet the law can afford her no relief. Such a rule is contrary to my views of equity jurisprudence. The demurrer, therefore, is overruled, with leave to the defendants to answer on payment of costs. Under this decision the defendants are restrained from further use of the plaintiff's portrait, and the plaintiff is permitted to continue the action begun to recover $15,000 damages. It is probable that Justice Davy's decision will be sustained, and we certainly think it ought to be, for however much the courts may differ as to the rights of surviving relatives because of the exhibition of memorials or photographs of a deceased person, there would seem to be no doubt whatever that with respect to living persons there is a clear right of privacy which the courts will respect and protect. Notes of Cases. -- Railroads Accident at Crossing. - In Gulf, C. & S. F. R'y v. Marchand, decided by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in June, 1900, it appeared that defendant's train, on a bright moonlight night, while running at the rate of thirty miles an hour through a town of about 500 population, without slacking its speed, struck a cow and hurled it in the air so that it hit plaintiff, a pedestrian crossing defendant's track, and about nineteen feet therefrom. The track was straight, and the engineer could have seen cattle on the track, which an agent of the company attempted to drive away, and the animal struck got on the track when the train was within ten feet of it. There was no signal or attempt to stop the train, and the engineer and fireman knew that cattle frequented the grounds near the track, but were looking at a merry-go-round at the side of the track while approaching the town instead of watching the track. Plaintiff could not see the train, and did not know that the cattle were on the track. It was held sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court said in part: We are of opinion that under the facts of this case the appellant cannot be justified on the ground that the cow came upon the track and was discovered by the train operatives too late to check the speed of the train and prevent the col lision. The speed of the train, in the light of the circumstances, is the act complained of, and upon which the recovery can alone be upheld. It is true, as contended by appellant, that the high rate of speed is not of itself negligence. This doctrine was announced on the former appeal, and has been settled by many well-considered cases. But we have found no case, and have been cited to none, in which it has been declared that speed may not become negligence under certain circumstances. In determining whether the act of the train operatives in running a train at a high rate of speed amounts to negligence, it is proper to consider, not only such attendant facts and circumstances as were known to them, but such as, in the exercise of ordinary care, they ought to have known. The following facts attendant upon or immediately preceding the accident in question |